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Date:      Thu, 20 Jul 2000 12:48:05 +0200
From:      Terje Elde <terje@elde.net>
To:        Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.ORG>
Cc:        Sheldon Hearn <sheldonh@uunet.co.za>, =?iso-8859-1?Q?Joachim_Str=F6mbergson?= <watchman@ludd.luth.se>, Greg Lewis <glewis@trc.adelaide.edu.au>, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: Status of FreeBSD security work? Audit, regression and crypto swap?
Message-ID:  <20000720124805.D70017@dlt.follo.net>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.NEB.3.96L.1000719165025.73365A-100000@fledge.watson.org>; from rwatson@FreeBSD.ORG on Wed, Jul 19, 2000 at 04:55:34PM -0400
References:  <Pine.BSF.4.21.0007181838570.28415-100000@achilles.silby.com> <Pine.NEB.3.96L.1000719165025.73365A-100000@fledge.watson.org>

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> Personally, my big fear is my notebook computer.  I can encrypt data on it
> using command line tools, but I'd much rather see a device layer that I
> can use to protect both swap and sensitive partitions.  Swap could use a
> randomized key, and mounting of data partitions could rely on a
> user-provided key for the device layer.  A crypto-fs might be more fun,
> but if we have the facility to layer device access, we might as well use
> that for a quicky solution.  It's easy for someone to walk off with
> personal computing devices -- in the office, at home, at the airport, ...

For a "ugly hack, but up and running today" kinda solution, you could always
do what I do... Use cfs (yes, the software tcfs is based on is running under
freebsd, and is available in the ports collection) for your file systems, then
swap to a file, on one of the encrypted file systems.

It's not a pretty sight, but it does the job.

Terje


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