Date: Sat, 22 Jul 2000 21:39:56 +0200 From: Mark Murray <mark@grondar.za> To: "David Schwartz" <davids@webmaster.com> Cc: current@FreeBSD.org Subject: Re: randomdev entropy gathering is really weak Message-ID: <200007221939.VAA37028@grimreaper.grondar.za> In-Reply-To: <NCBBLIEPOCNJOAEKBEAKOEPGJNAA.davids@webmaster.com> ; from "David Schwartz" <davids@webmaster.com> "Sat, 22 Jul 2000 12:01:44 MST." References: <NCBBLIEPOCNJOAEKBEAKOEPGJNAA.davids@webmaster.com>
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> /dev/random should block if the system does not contain as much real entropy > as the reader desires. Otherwise, the PRNG implementation will be the > weakest link for people who have deliberately selected higher levels of > protection from cryptographic attack. I don't want to rehash this thread from the beginning. Please go back, read the Yarrow paper, and recognise that Yarrow is not an entropy-counter, it is a cryptographically secure PRNG. The "count random bits and block" model does not apply. M -- Mark Murray Join the anti-SPAM movement: http://www.cauce.org To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-current" in the body of the message
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