Date: Sat, 12 Apr 2008 12:38:45 -0600 (MDT) From: "M. Warner Losh" <imp@bsdimp.com> To: cokane@freebsd.org Cc: gnome@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Seahorse issues Message-ID: <20080412.123845.-216597985.imp@bsdimp.com> In-Reply-To: <1208020460.10093.20.camel@localhost> References: <1208018626.10093.7.camel@localhost> <1208019652.82222.13.camel@shumai.marcuscom.com> <1208020460.10093.20.camel@localhost>
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In message: <1208020460.10093.20.camel@localhost>
Coleman Kane <cokane@freebsd.org> writes:
: On Sat, 2008-04-12 at 13:00 -0400, Joe Marcus Clarke wrote:
: > On Sat, 2008-04-12 at 12:43 -0400, Coleman Kane wrote:
: > > On Fri, 2008-04-11 at 11:54 -0400, Joe Marcus Clarke wrote:
: > > > On Fri, 2008-04-11 at 10:14 -0400, Coleman Kane wrote:
: > > > > I removed your earleir patch, which has the side effect of causing
: > > > > gnome_keyring_memory_try_alloc(size) to act in a manner that violates
: > > > > its documentation, as well as causing the above bug. I then added the
: > > > > three patches to security/seahorse which I posted into
: > > > > http://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=527193 today:
: > > > > * http://bugzilla.gnome.org/attachment.cgi?id=109055
: > > > > * http://bugzilla.gnome.org/attachment.cgi?id=109056
: > > > > * http://bugzilla.gnome.org/attachment.cgi?id=109057
: > > > >
: > > > > These three alter the behavior of Seahorse in the manner I described
: > > > > above, and don't touch gnome-keyring. For all purposes, I *think*
: > > > > gnome-keyring is acting properly here. The consumer of gnome-keyring
: > > >
: > > > You're right. I was hoping to hack g-k in such a way to avoid having to
: > > > fix other broken consumers in the future. Of course, my approach was
: > > > very wrong.
: > > >
: > > > > (seahorse) should first be testing if the features that it wants to use
: > > > > are actually provided by the library before it blindingly attempts to
: > > > > use them. This is, IMHO, why gnome-keyring provides the *_try(...)
: > > > > versions of its securemem alloc functions.
: > > >
: > > > Fixing seahorse is the right thing to do. The bug has been moved into
: > > > gnome-keyring's court, so you way want to get them to move it back.
: > > >
: > > > >
: > > > > Additionally, you'll get a seahorse g_warning about unavailable secure
: > > > > memory now too.
: > > >
: > > > Thanks for your work here. Feel free to commit these patches to our
: > > > seahorse port.
: > > >
: > > > Joe
: > > >
: > >
: > > Joe,
: > >
: > > I've got a revised version of the patch that allows the seahorse panel
: > > applet to work properly, as well as all of the other seahorse-based
: > > gadgetry that is installed with the security/seahorse port. This
: > > performs the conditional alloc remappings inside of
: > > seahorse-secure-memory.c, and warns the user appropriately when they
: > > don't have mlock() privileges.
: >
: > I like this approach. It's much more central.
: >
: > >
: > > I'm attaching the full patch to security/seahorse here for you to look
: > > over. I'll submit a forward of this email to ports@ as well (so that we
: > > don't incur the wrath of cross-post-thulu).
: > >
: > > If it doesn't break anything, and seems to make this thing work for
: > > everyone, then I'll commit it later on (probably tomorrow or Monday).
: > > I'd like to give it time to simmer, in case there are more things
: > > touched by this problem that might come up.
: > >
: > > As for the mlock() privilege issue, I am not sure what we'll do about
: > > that. It would be nice, at some point, to support that feature for
: > > normal users. As long as I'm diligent about my swap-space, etc... and
: > > access to my workstation, I'm *pretty* secure. Things like common-use
: > > lab computers, etc... are probably more appropriate for this feature.
: >
: > Yes, Linux allows this, but Solaris does not (Solaris and FreeBSD share
: > the same behavior). Perhaps it's something FreeBSD could allow via a
: > sysctl. The default would be to restrict mlock(2) to processes with an
: > effective UID of 0, but the sysctl could change that behavior to allow
: > normal users to make use of the feature.
: >
: > Joe
: >
:
: My understanding of the Linux implementation is that there's an rlimit
: for mlock that restricts the maximum usage for unprivileged, and allows
: unlimited usage for privileged users. This behavior is new as of kernel
: 2.6.9, and kernels 2.6.8 and earlier use similar semantics to what
: FreeBSD and Solaris do now.
That's actually not a bad idea... But we need to be careful to make
sure that fork can't be used to multiply the rlimit and make a DoS
possible.
Warner
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