Date: Sat, 28 Apr 2012 20:04:31 +0200 From: Kurt Jaeger <lists@opsec.eu> To: freebsd-stable@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Restricting users from certain privileges Message-ID: <20120428180431.GP5335@home.opsec.eu> In-Reply-To: <20120428102117.GX37811@e-new.0x20.net> References: <CACuV5sCyCgn8aBawTEP=BT%2B%2B4Ut4kPt8fXSq%2BgcS2YrkZaU%2BJw@mail.gmail.com> <E1SO2ER-000K66-8k@kabab.cs.huji.ac.il> <CACuV5sCHmnUnXTTY%2BkGqszi-Ynu8Vr3bf%2BLALf=yQbhHPXSdXA@mail.gmail.com> <4F9BBABA.6040708@rdtc.ru> <0F37A1B9-993B-4A4E-9FCC-8B19AADCFB72@punkt.de> <20120428102117.GX37811@e-new.0x20.net>
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Hi!
> > > Please do study sudo real power :-)
> > > It can give selective privileges per-command,
[...]
> > Just make sure none of the permitted commands has got the
> > feature of starting a shell ;-))
>
> Right, think of vi(1), less(1), et al.
Even this aspect is taken care of with sudo (at least to a certain limit):
NOEXEC and EXEC
If sudo has been compiled with noexec support and the underlying
operating system supports it, the NOEXEC tag can be used to prevent a
dynamically-linked executable from running further commands itself.
In the following example, user aaron may run /usr/bin/more and
/usr/bin/vi but shell escapes will be disabled.
aaron shanty = NOEXEC: /usr/bin/more, /usr/bin/vi
See the "PREVENTING SHELL ESCAPES" section below for more details on
how NOEXEC works and whether or not it will work on your system.
--
pi@opsec.eu +49 171 3101372 8 years to go !
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