Skip site navigation (1)Skip section navigation (2)
Date:      Sat, 3 Mar 2018 09:53:25 +0000
From:      Justin Cormack <justin@specialbusservice.com>
To:        Mariusz Zaborski <oshogbo@freebsd.org>
Cc:        "<cl-capsicum-discuss@lists.cam.ac.uk>" <cl-capsicum-discuss@lists.cam.ac.uk>, freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: [capsicum] unlinkfd
Message-ID:  <CAK4o1Wyk54chHobhUkb2PBUtaWOF2rDv6tkX_bFGY6D331xUqw@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <20180302183514.GA99279@x-wing>
References:  <20180302183514.GA99279@x-wing>

next in thread | previous in thread | raw e-mail | index | archive | help
I think it would make sense to have an unlinkfd() that unlinks the file fro=
m
everywhere, so it does not need a name to be specified. This might be
hard to implement.

For temporary files, I really like Linux memfd_create(2) that opens an anon=
ymous
file without a name. This semantics is really useful. (Linux memfd also has
additional options for sealing the file fo make it immutable which are very
useful for safely passing files between processes.) Having a way to make
unnamed temporary files solves a lot of deletion issues as the file
never needs to
be unlinked.


On 2 March 2018 at 18:35, Mariusz Zaborski <oshogbo@freebsd.org> wrote:
> Hello,
>
> Today I would like to propose a new syscall called unlinkfd(2) which came=
 up
> during a discussion with Ed Maste.
>
> Currently in UNIX we can=E2=80=99t remove files safely. If we will try to=
 do so we
> always end up in a race condition. For example when we open a file, and c=
heck
> it with fstat, etc. then we want to unlink(2) it=E2=80=A6 but the file we=
 are trying to
> unlink could be a different one than the one we were fstating just a mome=
nt ago.
>
> Another reason of implementing unlinkfd(2) came to us when we were trying
> to sandbox some applications like: uudecode/b64decode or bspatch. It occu=
red
> to us that we don=E2=80=99t have a good way of removing single files. Of =
course we can
> try to determine in which directory we are in, and then open this directo=
ry and
> remove a single file.
>
> It looks even more bizarre if we would think about a program which operat=
es on
> multiple files. If we would analyze a situation with two totally differen=
t
> directories like `/tmp` and `/home/oshogbo` we would end up with pre open=
ing
> a root directory or keeping as many directories as we are working on open=
.
> All of that effort only to remove two files. This make it totally impract=
ical!
>
> I think that opening directories also presents some wider attack vector b=
ecause
> we are keeping a single descriptor to a directory only to remove one file=
.
> Unfortunately this means that an attacker can remove all files in that di=
rectory.
>
> I proposed this as well on the last Capsicum call. There was a suggestion=
 that
> instead of doing a single syscall maybe we should have a Casper service t=
hat
> will allow us to remove files. Another idea was that we should perhaps re=
design
> programs to create some subdirs work on the subdirs and then remove all f=
iles in
> this subdir. I don=E2=80=99t feel that creating a Casper service is a goo=
d idea because
> we still have exactly the same issue of race condition. In my opinion cre=
ating
> subdirs is also a problem for us.
>
> First we would need to redesign some of our tools and I think we should
> simplyfiy capsicumizition of the process instead of making it harder.
>
> Secondly we can create a temporary subdirectory but what will remove it?
> We are going back to having a fd to directory in which we just created a =
subdir.
> Another way would be to have Casper service which would remove a director=
y but
> with the risk of RC.
>
> In conclusion, I think we need syscall like unlinkfd(2), which turn out t=
aht it
> is easy to implement. The only downside of this implementation is that we=
 not
> only need to provide a fd but also a path file. This is because inodes no=
r
> vnodes don=E2=80=99t contain filenames. We are comparing vnodes of the fd=
 and the given
> path, if they are exactly the same we remove a file. In the syscall we ar=
e using
> a fd so there is no Ambient Authority because we are proving that we alre=
ady
> have access to that file. Thanks to that the syscall can be safely used w=
ith
> Caspsicum. I have already discussed this with some people and they said
> `Hey I already had that idea a while ago=E2=80=A6` so let=E2=80=99s do so=
mething with that idea!
> If you are intereted in patch you can find it here:
> https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14567
>
> Thanks,
> --
> Mariusz Zaborski
> oshogbo//vx             | http://oshogbo.vexillium.org
> FreeBSD commiter        | https://freebsd.org
> Software developer      | http://wheelsystems.com
> If it's not broken, let's fix it till it is!!1



Want to link to this message? Use this URL: <https://mail-archive.FreeBSD.org/cgi/mid.cgi?CAK4o1Wyk54chHobhUkb2PBUtaWOF2rDv6tkX_bFGY6D331xUqw>