Date: Sun, 9 Jul 2000 04:19:59 -0400 (EDT) From: Adam <bsdx@looksharp.net> To: Alfred Perlstein <bright@wintelcom.net> Cc: arch@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: making the snoop device loadable. Message-ID: <Pine.BSF.4.21.0007090414370.407-100000@turtle.looksharp.net> In-Reply-To: <20000709000458.M25571@fw.wintelcom.net>
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On Sun, 9 Jul 2000, Alfred Perlstein wrote: >Ok, I noticed that with a bit of hacking the snp device can be made >loadable. Making it unloadable is a bit of a pain, but I can >implement it using refcounting on the amount of ttys that have snp >devices hooked onto them so that the machine doesn't panic if you >unload it. > >The 'problem' that happens is that kern/tty.c now needs to include >snoop.h unconditionally, and it also has to provide some exernally >visible pointers to functions for the loadable snoop device to >hook into. > >Basically, does anyone have a problem with snp becoming loadable >before I commit to finishing off the work? (it's loadable now, but >not unloadable). Would it make sense to have a kernel option or something to disable this feature without using securelevels? I'm thinking of the situation of the owner of a computer is paranoid (or highly ethical) and strongly dislikes the snooping ability yet other root users on the machine might not have the same standards and try to sneak in a module to peek around quick or cause trouble with other users. As it is now you would have to cause quite a commotion by at least rebooting the machine... To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-arch" in the body of the message
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