Date: Mon, 29 Nov 1999 14:33:09 -0800 (PST) From: Kris Kennaway <kris@hub.freebsd.org> To: Matthew Dillon <dillon@apollo.backplane.com> Cc: Dan Moschuk <dan@FreeBSD.ORG>, cvs-committers@FreeBSD.ORG, cvs-all@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: cvs commit: src/sys/i386/conf files.i386 src/sys/kern kern_fork.c src/sys/libkern arc4random.c src/sys/sys libkern.h Message-ID: <Pine.BSF.4.21.9911291431310.19254-100000@hub.freebsd.org> In-Reply-To: <199911292135.NAA09413@apollo.backplane.com>
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On Mon, 29 Nov 1999, Matthew Dillon wrote: > Randomizing is a relatively 'weak' security fix, especially in light of > the severe restrictions on both pid and port number ranges. Even with > a good random number generator. I don't particularly see why it should > be imposed on everyone. And, frankly, I *use* the fact that pid's tend > to increment when I look at 'ps' and 'jobs -l' output just as a > double check, and I'm sure other people do to. The big thing which randomized pids gives you is protection against tempfile guessing (e.g. /tmp/foo<pid>). We can't fix all of those bugs because they exist in a lot of third party code, including code without source. Kris To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe cvs-all" in the body of the message
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