Date: Sat, 20 Jun 1998 21:21:14 +1000 (EST) From: Nicholas Charles Brawn <ncb05@uow.edu.au> To: security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: non-executable stack? Message-ID: <Pine.SOL.3.96.980620211437.13013A-100000@banshee.cs.uow.edu.au>
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I was pondering the following after reading about solaris 2.6's non-executable stack option. 1. How feasible is it to implement a non-executable stack kernel option? 2. If it *is* feasible, what do people think of a sysctl-based interface to enable/disenable it? 3. If both 1 & 2 were implemented, how about making it impossible to disenable at say.. securelevel >= 1? If I remember the discussions on bugtraq right, a non-exec patch isn't a cure-all for buffer overflow attacks. However it would be an overall security enhancement and prevent many script-based attacks. What are peoples thoughts on this? Nick -- Email: ncb05@uow.edu.au - http://rabble.uow.edu.au/~nick Key fingerprint = DE 30 33 D3 16 91 C8 8D A7 F8 70 03 B7 77 1A 2A To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe security" in the body of the message
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