Date: Tue, 14 May 2024 18:15:27 -0500 From: Kyle Evans <kevans@FreeBSD.org> To: Alexander Leidinger <Alexander@Leidinger.net> Cc: "freebsd-hackers@FreeBSD.org" <freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org> Subject: Re: Initial implementation of _FORTIFY_SOURCE Message-ID: <b77dee76-34e0-4a22-808a-bdbca33bc7dd@FreeBSD.org> In-Reply-To: <97f000a2-eba8-4767-91e3-d5f311fa4e72@FreeBSD.org> References: <f8000e6b-226b-45f3-a751-aca790f4f8c8@FreeBSD.org> <83ac28b8e8e79866facbde716b051340@Leidinger.net> <97f000a2-eba8-4767-91e3-d5f311fa4e72@FreeBSD.org>
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On 5/14/24 11:34, Kyle Evans wrote:
> On 5/14/24 07:47, Alexander Leidinger wrote:
>> Am 2024-05-13 19:47, schrieb Kyle Evans:
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> As of 9bfd3b407 ("Add a build knob for _FORTIFY_SOURCE"), I've
>>> imported an initial version of FORTIFY_SOURCE from FreeBSD.
>>> FORTIFY_SOURCE is an improvement over classical SSP, doing
>>> compiler-aided checking of stack object sizes to detect more
>>> fine-grained stack overflow without relying on the randomized stack
>>> canary just past the stack frame.
>>
>> This breaks some port builds.
>>
>> Example libfido2 (which is a dependency in the build of e.g. mysql):
>> ---snip---
>> [ 0% 4/1032] /usr/local/libexec/ccache/cc -DHAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
>> -DHAVE_ASPRINTF -DHAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME -DHAVE_DEV_URANDOM
>> -DHAVE_ENDIAN_H -DHAVE_ERR_H -DHAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO -DHAVE_GETLINE
>> -DHAVE_GETOPT -DHAVE_GETPAGESIZE -DHAVE_GETRANDOM -DHAVE_OPENSSLV_H
>> -DHAVE_READPASSPHRASE -DHAVE_SIGNAL_H -DHAVE_STRLCAT -DHAVE_STRLCPY
>> -DHAVE_STRSEP -DHAVE_SYSCONF -DHAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H -DHAVE_TIMESPECSUB
>> -DHAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP -DHAVE_UNISTD_H
>> -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L -DTLS=__thread -D_FIDO_INTERNAL
>> -D_FIDO_MAJOR=1 -D_FIDO_MINOR=14 -D_FIDO_PATCH=0
>> -I/wrkdirs/usr/ports/security/libfido2/work/libfido2-1.14.0/src
>> -I/usr/local/include -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200809L -D_BSD_SOURCE
>> -D__BSD_VISIBLE=1 -std=c99 -O2 -pipe -O2 -pipe -mtune=native
>> -fvectorize -O2 -pipe -mtune=native -fvectorize -march=native
>> -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L -fstack-protector-strong
>> -fno-strict-aliasing -O2 -pipe -O2 -pipe -mtune=native -fvectorize -O2
>> -pipe -mtune=native -fvectorize -march=native
>> -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L -fstack-protector-strong
>> -fno-strict-aliasing -DNDEBUG -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -fPIC -Wall -Wextra
>> -Werror -Wshadow -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -Wmissing-prototypes
>> -Wbad-function-cast -Wimplicit-fallthrough -pedantic -pedantic-errors
>> -Wshorten-64-to-32 -fstack-protector-all -Wconversion
>> -Wsign-conversion -Wframe-larger-than=2047 -MD -MT
>> src/CMakeFiles/fido2.dir/aes256.c.o -MF
>> src/CMakeFiles/fido2.dir/aes256.c.o.d -o
>> src/CMakeFiles/fido2.dir/aes256.c.o -c
>> /wrkdirs/usr/ports/security/libfido2/work/libfido2-1.14.0/src/aes256.c
>> FAILED: src/CMakeFiles/fido2.dir/aes256.c.o
>> /usr/local/libexec/ccache/cc -DHAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF -DHAVE_ASPRINTF
>> -DHAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME -DHAVE_DEV_URANDOM -DHAVE_ENDIAN_H -DHAVE_ERR_H
>> -DHAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO -DHAVE_GETLINE -DHAVE_GETOPT -DHAVE_GETPAGESIZE
>> -DHAVE_GETRANDOM -DHAVE_OPENSSLV_H -DHAVE_READPASSPHRASE
>> -DHAVE_SIGNAL_H -DHAVE_STRLCAT -DHAVE_STRLCPY -DHAVE_STRSEP
>> -DHAVE_SYSCONF -DHAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H -DHAVE_TIMESPECSUB
>> -DHAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP -DHAVE_UNISTD_H
>> -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L -DTLS=__thread -D_FIDO_INTERNAL
>> -D_FIDO_MAJOR=1 -D_FIDO_MINOR=14 -D_FIDO_PATCH=0
>> -I/wrkdirs/usr/ports/security/libfido2/work/libfido2-1.14.0/src
>> -I/usr/local/include -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200809L -D_BSD_SOURCE
>> -D__BSD_VISIBLE=1 -std=c99 -O2 -pipe -O2 -pipe -mtune=native
>> -fvectorize -O2 -pipe -mtune=native -fvectorize -march=native
>> -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L -fstack-protector-strong
>> -fno-strict-aliasing -O2 -pipe -O2 -pipe -mtune=native -fvectorize -O2
>> -pipe -mtune=native -fvectorize -march=native
>> -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L -fstack-protector-strong
>> -fno-strict-aliasing -DNDEBUG -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -fPIC -Wall -Wextra
>> -Werror -Wshadow -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -Wmissing-prototypes
>> -Wbad-function-cast -Wimplicit-fallthrough -pedantic -pedantic-errors
>> -Wshorten-64-to-32 -fstack-protector-all -Wconversion
>> -Wsign-conversion -Wframe-larger-than=2047 -MD -MT
>> src/CMakeFiles/fido2.dir/aes256.c.o -MF
>> src/CMakeFiles/fido2.dir/aes256.c.o.d -o
>> src/CMakeFiles/fido2.dir/aes256.c.o -c
>> /wrkdirs/usr/ports/security/libfido2/work/libfido2-1.14.0/src/aes256.c
>> /wrkdirs/usr/ports/security/libfido2/work/libfido2-1.14.0/src/aes256.c:18:2: error: use of GNU statement expression extension from macro expansion [-Werror,-Wgnu-statement-expression-from-macro-expansion]
>> 18 | memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out));
>> | ^
>> /usr/include/ssp/string.h:120:5: note: expanded from macro 'memset'
>> 120 | __ssp_bos_check3_typed(memset, void *, dst, int, val, len)
>> | ^
>> /usr/include/ssp/string.h:65:5: note: expanded from macro
>> '__ssp_bos_check3_typed'
>> 65 | __ssp_bos_check3_typed_var(fun, dsttype, __ssp_var(dstv),
>> dst, \
>> | ^
>> /usr/include/ssp/string.h:54:24: note: expanded from macro
>> '__ssp_bos_check3_typed_var'
>> 54 | src, lenvar, len) ({ \
>> | ^
>> /wrkdirs/usr/ports/security/libfido2/work/libfido2-1.14.0/src/aes256.c:60:2: error: use of GNU statement expression extension from macro expansion [-Werror,-Wgnu-statement-expression-from-macro-expansion]
>> 60 | memset(&iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
>> | ^
>> /usr/include/ssp/string.h:120:5: note: expanded from macro 'memset'
>> 120 | __ssp_bos_check3_typed(memset, void *, dst, int, val, len)
>> | ^
>> /usr/include/ssp/string.h:65:5: note: expanded from macro
>> '__ssp_bos_check3_typed'
>> 65 | __ssp_bos_check3_typed_var(fun, dsttype, __ssp_var(dstv),
>> dst, \
>> | ^
>> /usr/include/ssp/string.h:54:24: note: expanded from macro
>> '__ssp_bos_check3_typed_var'
>> 54 | src, lenvar, len) ({ \
>> | ^
>> ---snip---
>>
>> I also have a failed archivers/libdeflate, devel/highway, www/node20,
>> and lang/rust, but those complain about something which could also be
>> attributed to some kind of interaction between my use of -fvectorize
>> and the new fortify stuff. Example with libdeflate (the libdeflate
>> update in ports is from March, and I had it compiled with -fvectorize
>> successfully before the fortify stuff came in):
>> ---snip---
>> In file included from
>> /wrkdirs/usr/ports/archivers/libdeflate/work/libdeflate-1.20/lib/x86/adler32_impl.h:93:
>> /wrkdirs/usr/ports/archivers/libdeflate/work/libdeflate-1.20/lib/x86/adler32_template.h:197:21: error: always_inline function '_mm512_set1_epi8' requires target feature 'evex512', but would be inlined into function 'adler32_x86_avx512_vl512_vnni' that is compiled without support for 'evex512'
>> 197 | const vec_t ones = VSET1_8(1);
>> | ^
>> ---snip---
>> Note, my CPUs don't support evex512 or avx512 at all, the compile
>> flags haven't changed, this version of the port is installed in
>> multiple jails (since March 28), so there is a change in behavior
>> since then. It may or may not be due to the fortify stuff.
>>
>> I will test without -fvectorize later, poudriere is still building
>> ports, and I want to see if some other ports fail. Those 5 failed port
>> builds result in 160 skipped ports already (out of the >600 which this
>> run wants to build).
>>
>> Maybe you want to backout and request an exp-build to not get swamped
>> with failure reports from various people...
>>
>
> There's really not that much that can go wrong here; I looked at
> enabling the warning in question in base to try and avoid future
> landmines, but that results in an absolute dumpster fire so I guess we
> won't do that.
>
> Can you try this patch, please? https://termbin.com/jdtv -- it's the
> apparently proper way to avoid the warning.
>
I've confirmed that this patch fixes libfido2, will commit shortly. The
other failures you noted are indeed not related, FORTIFY_SOURCE has no
bearing on any of these things.
Thanks,
Kyle Evans
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