Date: Wed, 04 Feb 2004 15:01:31 +0100 From: des@des.no (Dag-Erling =?iso-8859-1?q?Sm=F8rgrav?=) To: Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk> Cc: arch@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Resolving the crypto duplicity... Message-ID: <xzp4qu7ymdg.fsf@dwp.des.no> In-Reply-To: <29979.1075898861@critter.freebsd.dk> (Poul-Henning Kamp's message of "Wed, 04 Feb 2004 13:47:41 %2B0100") References: <29979.1075898861@critter.freebsd.dk>
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Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk> writes: > I would like to propose that we try to eliminate the private copies > of crypto functions in sys/opencrypto and instead focus on the > copies in src/crypto as our "generic" implementations. > > Are there any technical or political reasons why we should not do this ? I'm not sure how well-tested the KAME code is. For instance, until recently, src/sys/crypto/md5.c used a static buffer as temporary storage on big-endian systems, making it non-reentrant. DES --=20 Dag-Erling Sm=F8rgrav - des@des.no
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