Date: Wed, 24 Nov 1999 10:23:54 -0500 (EST) From: Garrett Wollman <wollman@khavrinen.lcs.mit.edu> To: Mike Smith <mike@smith.net.au> Cc: freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: ps on 4.0-current Message-ID: <199911241523.KAA29780@khavrinen.lcs.mit.edu> In-Reply-To: <199911240546.VAA00843@dingo.cdrom.com> References: <19991123183733.A21142@dan.emsphone.com> <199911240546.VAA00843@dingo.cdrom.com>
next in thread | previous in thread | raw e-mail | index | archive | help
<<On Tue, 23 Nov 1999 21:46:24 -0800, Mike Smith <mike@smith.net.au> said: > This was discussed close to death before the changes were committed, Where, and by whom? I don't recall seeing any such discussion on -security. > and the current behaviour (restricted access) has been agreed by > general consensus to be the most appropriate. Agreed by whom? Remember POLA? > Making this behaviour tunable would be bad; it adds another option Indeed; it should be reverted completely. Portable programs may not rely on their argv[] being ``secret''. Portable sysadmins rely on argv[] not being ``secret''. Having bogus behavior such as this encourages sysadmins to do all their work as root -- a very Bad Thing. Not only that, it violates 20 years of UNIX tradition. -GAWollman -- Garrett A. Wollman | O Siem / We are all family / O Siem / We're all the same wollman@lcs.mit.edu | O Siem / The fires of freedom Opinions not those of| Dance in the burning flame MIT, LCS, CRS, or NSA| - Susan Aglukark and Chad Irschick To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-current" in the body of the message
Want to link to this message? Use this URL: <https://mail-archive.FreeBSD.org/cgi/mid.cgi?199911241523.KAA29780>