Date: Sat, 17 May 2008 17:41:13 -0700 (PDT) From: "Abiron Arroyo" <abi@e-arroyo.net> To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Vulnerability with compromised geli credentials? Message-ID: <39408.75.36.168.192.1211071273.squirrel@209.51.135.2>
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I'm not really a developer, but was considering if there is a key vulnerability in geli given that when you change a key there isn't a disk update. Consider the scenario where a new file system is created and populated with some files. At a later time the original key is changed because someone has gained access to the key and passphrase. A new key is generated and attached, but none of the files are modified. Furthermore, let's say the thief has access to the system and is able to update the disk to use the previous key and then reattach/mount. Is it then possible for the person that has the stolen credentials to mount the drive and view the files? The man page does not detail how the metadata is written. With that said, if this is possible, what's the best way to update the system? I suspect that moving the file is not enough, using vi in a script is not very practical, and using cat may cause problems with some special characters.
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