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Date:      Mon, 15 Jul 2002 00:05:25 +0200 (CEST)
From:      Oliver Fromme <olli@secnetix.de>
To:        freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG, "Crist J. Clark" <cjc@FreeBSD.ORG>
Subject:   Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-02:29.tcpdump
Message-ID:  <200207142205.g6EM5P541393@lurza.secnetix.de>
In-Reply-To: <20020714085734.GD56656@blossom.cjclark.org>

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Crist J. Clark <crist.clark@attbi.com> wrote:
 > On Sat, Jul 13, 2002 at 07:31:27PM +0200, Oliver Fromme wrote:
 > > [...]
 > tcpdump(8) can still be exploited to run abitrary code as that user.

That's what I wrote.

 > [...]
 > It's not really a workaround, it just mitigates the potential for
 > damage should the bug be exploited.

Again, I wrote exactly that (in the part of my mail that
you did not quote).

 > > On a related matter:  It would probably be a very good idea
 > > for tcpdump to drop priviledges right after opening the BPF
 > > device.
 > 
 > tcpdump(8) never has elevated privileges.

Not trough s-bits, but ...

 > It just runs as whoever
 > executes it.

... which is usually root because of the default permissions
of the /dev/bpf* devices.  That's the problem.

 > As you say, the way to run it at lower privileges is to
 > give a less privileged user read access to the bpf(4) devices.

Or let tcpdump drop it's root priviledges after opening
the devices.  That would be similar to what openssh does
when priviledge separation is enabled.  Or what BIND does
when running it with the -u option.  I think a _lot_ more
software should take precautions like that, and there is
no reason to exclude tcpdump.

Regards
   Oliver

-- 
Oliver Fromme, secnetix GmbH & Co KG, Oettingenstr. 2, 80538 München
Any opinions expressed in this message may be personal to the author
and may not necessarily reflect the opinions of secnetix in any way.

"All that we see or seem is just a dream within a dream" (E. A. Poe)

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