Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2000 07:02:26 -0500 (EST) From: Omachonu Ogali <oogali@intranova.net> To: Sheldon Hearn <sheldonh@uunet.co.za> Cc: Adam <bsdx@looksharp.net>, Will Andrews <andrews@TECHNOLOGIST.COM>, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: Parent Logging Patch for sh(1) Message-ID: <Pine.BSF.4.10.10001180657470.99197-100000@hydrant.intranova.net> In-Reply-To: <6196.948175796@axl.noc.iafrica.com>
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The first patch (sh-log.patch) didn't offer denying features, I then wrote a second one that did. My main focus was on BIND, I haven't seen someone yet who has smashed the stack and changed argv[0], and secondly, it reads the process name from the /proc filesystem, so if you do change the program name on the stack, the original still exists... Omachonu Ogali Intranova Networking Group On Tue, 18 Jan 2000, Sheldon Hearn wrote: > > > On Mon, 17 Jan 2000 21:04:07 EST, Omachonu Ogali wrote: > > > http://tribune.intranova.net/archives/sh-log+access.patch adds uid and > > username logging along with a deny list (/etc/sh.deny). > > When you first posted, you neglected to mention that your patch included > a deny list (/etc/sh.deny). This puts a different spin on things. :-) > > While it sounds attractive on the surface, think how easy it is to work > around -- the exploit code must simply change its progname to something > which will never be in /etc/sh.deny (e.g. login). > > So your patch scores something useful for a week, whereafter the script > kiddies catch up and we're back to square one. :-) > > No, if this is to be done, it's with per-process credentials. Someone > is already working on such a system for FreeBSD. Since you seem > interested in helping out with the process of hardening FreeBSD, I urge > you to contact Robert Watson, who's spearheading the current hardening > project. > > You can reach him at Robert Watson <robert+freebsd@cyrus.watson.org>. > > Thanks for your interest in a more secure FreeBSD. :-) > > Ciao, > Sheldon. > To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message
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