Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2009 10:28:07 -0800 From: Julian Elischer <julian@elischer.org> To: Max Laier <max@love2party.net> Cc: svn-src-head@freebsd.org, Adrian Chadd <adrian@freebsd.org>, src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org Subject: Re: svn commit: r186955 - in head/sys: conf netinet Message-ID: <49679737.60709@elischer.org> In-Reply-To: <200901091909.00457.max@love2party.net> References: <200901091602.n09G2Jj1061164@svn.freebsd.org> <200901091802.10287.max@love2party.net> <49678D5E.3030600@elischer.org> <200901091909.00457.max@love2party.net>
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Max Laier wrote: > On Friday 09 January 2009 18:46:06 Julian Elischer wrote: >> Max Laier wrote: >>> On Friday 09 January 2009 17:02:19 Adrian Chadd wrote: >>>> Author: adrian >>>> Date: Fri Jan 9 16:02:19 2009 >>>> New Revision: 186955 >>>> URL: http://svn.freebsd.org/changeset/base/186955 >>>> >>>> Log: >>>> Implement a new IP option (not compiled/enabled by default) to allow >>>> applications to specify a non-local IP address when bind()'ing a >>>> socket to a local endpoint. >>> That's a *socket* option ... you had me very worried there for a moment >>> ;) I don't quite see why you'd hide these under a build time option - >>> having the sysctl defaulting to off under CTLFLAG_SECURE seems good >>> enough - if people disagree - make it a boot time tuneable, but I >>> certainly don't see why you should have to rebuild the kernel for a minor >>> thing like this. It certainly isn't performance critical. >> because it can be a big security hole and you do not want people to >> have it available on the average machine. >> Also because purists complained about it. >> You'll notice that the compile option enables the sysctl, >> which is used to turn on and off the capacity to do this per socket. >> so the admin can disable it, but I felt a lot more comfortable having >> it not compiled in by default. > > Speaking of disabling it ... setting the sysctl to 0 is not really enough to > do that. One would also have to walk through the active sockets and GC any > that are bound to nonlocal addresses to really disable it ... or do we rely on > tcpdrop or the like to do that manually? Of course it would make sense to > have something like this: start tproxy, bind forwarding ports, disable > sysctl, raise securelevel exactly, we disable NEW connections. It's not done with securelevel but possibly because I didn't think of it.. I'm not worried about existing connections... > > In addition, should there be a priv(9) check in ip_ctloutput? I was thinking about that.. possibly. (in fact probably) >
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