Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2011 00:46:37 +0400 From: Andrey Chernov <ache@FreeBSD.ORG> To: d@delphij.net Cc: freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG, Doug Barton <dougb@FreeBSD.ORG>, John Baldwin <jhb@FreeBSD.ORG> Subject: Re: svn commit: r228843 - head/contrib/telnet/libtelnet head/crypto/heimdal/appl/telnet/libtelnet head/include head/lib/libc/gen head/lib/libc/iconv head/lib/libc/include head/lib/libc/net head/libexec... Message-ID: <20111229204637.GB51102@vniz.net> In-Reply-To: <4EFCCDDF.5080602@delphij.net> References: <201112231500.pBNF0c0O071712@svn.freebsd.org> <201112291400.41075.jhb@freebsd.org> <CAGMYy3t89jcmU6AP4Bsa%2Bv%2BVs%2BK7qm_SaqwA5u==wKrzaqTWBQ@mail.gmail.com> <201112291435.03493.jhb@freebsd.org> <4EFCCDDF.5080602@delphij.net>
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On Thu, Dec 29, 2011 at 12:30:23PM -0800, Xin Li wrote: > >> On Thu, Dec 29, 2011 at 11:00 AM, John Baldwin <jhb@freebsd.org> > > Another route might have been set an env > > var I already suggest it as one of possible ways. > Using an environment variable may be not a good idea since it can be > easily overridden, and I think if the program runs something inside > the chroot, the jailed chroot would have more proper setup to avoid > this type of attack? In case user (more precisely, ftpd) runs any program which resides in /incoming/, nothing helps in anycase. In case ftpd runs known programs from known locations only, it can't be overriden because known program (say, ls) is not malicious by itself and can be turned malicious only by loading .so from current directory, which env variable prevents. -- http://ache.vniz.net/
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