Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2002 21:29:49 -0500 From: Steve Ames <steve@energistic.com> To: D J Hawkey Jr <hawkeyd@visi.com> Cc: Dag-Erling Smorgrav <des@ofug.org>, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: CERT (Was: Re: NUTS! "Much ado about nothing" -- I need a clearer up or down) Message-ID: <20020627022949.GA55324@energistic.com> In-Reply-To: <20020626210055.A2065@sheol.localdomain> References: <UqmS8.2068$eH2.1608821@ruti.visi.com> <200206261711.g5QHB9t00396@sheol.localdomain> <xzpr8itxzgm.fsf@flood.ping.uio.no> <20020626210055.A2065@sheol.localdomain>
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On Wed, Jun 26, 2002 at 09:00:55PM -0500, D J Hawkey Jr wrote:
> On Jun 27, at 03:49 AM, Dag-Erling Smorgrav wrote:
> >
> > hawkeyd@visi.com (D J Hawkey Jr) writes:
> > > Sorry to be so thick-headed, but between Mike and Jacques, the answer
> > > to "Is 'OpenSSH_2.9 FreeBSD localisations 20020307' even vulnerable?"
> > > is "That does appear to be the case.".
> >
> > 2.9 is not vulnerable to this particular attack.
>
> That's as simple as it gets. Thanks.
That "particular attack"... yep. The CERT advisory seemed to indicate
that earlier versions also have vulnerabilities? From 2.3.1p1 to 3.3...
-Steve
CERT Advisory CA-2002-18 OpenSSH Vulnerabilities in Challenge Response
Handling
Original release date: June 26, 2002
Last revised: --
Source: CERT/CC
A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.
Systems Affected
* OpenSSH versions 2.3.1p1 through 3.3
Overview
There are two related vulnerabilities in the challenge response
handling code in OpenSSH versions 2.3.1p1 through 3.3. They may allow
a remote intruder to execute arbitrary code as the user running sshd
(often root). The first vulnerability affects OpenSSH versions 2.9.9
through 3.3 that have the challenge response option enabled and that
use SKEY or BSD_AUTH authentication. The second vulnerability affects
PAM modules using interactive keyboard authentication in OpenSSH
versions 2.3.1p1 through 3.3, regardless of the challenge response
option setting. Additionally, a number of other possible security
problems have been corrected in OpenSSH version 3.4.
I. Description
Two related vulnerabilities have been found in the handling of
challenge responses in OpenSSH.
The first vulnerability is an integer overflow in the handling of the
number of responses received during challenge response authentication.
If the challenge response configuration option is set to yes and the
system is using SKEY or BSD_AUTH authentication then a remote intruder
may be able to exploit the vulnerability to execute arbitrary code.
This vulnerability is present in versions of OpenSSH 2.9.9 through
3.3. An exploit for this vulnerability is reported to exist. This
vulnerability is partially described in a recent ISS security advisory
available at
http://bvlive01.iss.net/issEn/delivery/xforce/alertdetail.jsp?oid=20584
The second vulnerability is a buffer overflow involving the number of
responses received during challenge response authentication.
Regardless of the setting of the challenge response configuration
option, systems using PAM modules that use interactive keyboard
authentication (PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt), may be vulnerable to the
remote execution of code. At this time, it is not known if this
vulnerability is exploitable. Both vulnerabilities are corrected by
the patches in a recent OpenSSH security advisory available from
http://www.openssh.com/txt/preauth.adv
Both vulnerabilities exploit features present only in version 2 of the
SSH protocol.
Vulnerability Note VU#369347 lists the vendors we contacted about this
vulnerability. The vulnerability note is available from
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/369347
II. Impact
A remote attacker can execute code with the privileges of the user
running the sshd (often root). These vulnerabilities may also be used
to cause a denial-of-service condition.
III. Solution
Upgrade to OpenSSH version 3.4
These vulnerabilities are eliminated by upgrading to OpenSSH version
3.4, which is available from the OpenSSH web site at
http://www.openssh.com
OpenSSH version 3.4 will correct several other software defects with
potential security implications not described in this advisory.
Apply a patch from your vendor
A patch for this problem is included in the OpenSSH advisory at
http://www.openssh.com/txt/preauth.adv
This patch may be manually installed with minor changes to correct
these vulnerabilities in all affected versions of OpenSSH. Please note
that applying the patches described in the OpenSSH advisory does not
correct the other software defects with potential security
implications not described in this advisory.
If your vendor has provided a patch to correct these vulnerabilities,
you may want to apply their patch rather than upgrading your version
of sshd. System administrators may want to confirm whether their
vendor's patch includes the other possible vulnerabilities corrected
in OpenSSH 3.4. More information about vendor-specific patches can be
found in the vendor section of this document. Because the publication
of this advisory was unexpectedly accelerated, statements from all of
the affected vendors were not available at publication time. We will
update this document as vendors provide additional information.
Disable SSH protocol version 2
Since both vulnerabilities are present only in protocol version 2
features, disabling version 2 of the protocol will prevent both
vulnerabilities from being exploited. Typically, this is accomplished
by adding the following line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config:
Protocol 1
This option may set to "2,1" by default. System administrators should
be aware that disabling protocol version 2 may prevent the sshd daemon
from accepting connections in certain configurations. Applying one or
both of the configuration changes described below may be a less
disruptive workaround for this problem.
Disable challenge response authentication
For OpenSSH versions greater than 2.9, system administrators can
disable the vulnerable portion of the code by setting the
"ChallengeResponseAuthentication" configuration option to "no" in
their sshd configuration file. Typically, this is accomplished by
adding the following line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config:
ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
This option may be enabled (set to "yes") by default. This workaround
should prevent the first vulnerability from being exploited if SKEY or
BSD_AUTH authentication is used. It will not prevent the possible
exploitation of the vulnerability via PAM interactive keyboard
authentication.
Disable PAM authentication via interactive keyboard
For OpenSSH versions greater than 2.9, system administrators can
disable the vulnerable portion of the code affecting the PAM
authentication issue by setting the "PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt"
configuration option to "no" in their sshd configuration file.
Typically, this is accomplished by adding the following line to
/etc/ssh/sshd_config:
PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt no
This option may be disabled (set to "no") by default. This workaround
should prevent the second vulnerability from being exploited if PAM
interactive keyboard authentication is used. It will not prevent the
possible exploitation of the vulnerability via SKEY or BSD_AUTH
authentication.
Disable both options in older versions of OpenSSH
For OpenSSH versions between 2.3.1p1 and 2.9, system adminstrators
will instead need to set the following options in their ssh
configuration file:
KbdInteractiveAuthentication no
ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
Setting both of these options is believed to prevent the exploitation
of the vulnerabilities regardless of which authentication mechanisms
are used.
Use privilege separation to minimize impact
System administrators running OpenSSH versions 3.2 or 3.3 may be able
to reduce the impact of this vulnerability by enabling the
"UsePrivilegeSeparation" configuration option in their sshd
configuration file. Typically, this is accomplished by adding the
following line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config:
UsePrivilegeSeparation yes
This workaround does not prevent these vulnerabilities from being
exploited, however due to the privilege separation mechanism, the
intruder may be limited to a constrained chroot environment with
restricted privileges. This workaround will not prevent these
vulnerabilities from creating a denial-of-service condition. Not all
operating system vendors have implemented the privilege separation
code, and on some operating systems, it may limit the functionality of
OpenSSH. System administrators are encouraged to carefully review the
implications of using the workaround in their environment, and use a
more comprehensive solution if one is available. The use of privilege
separation to limit the impact of future vulnerabilities is
encouraged.
Appendix A. - Vendor Information
This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this
advisory. As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will
update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their
comments.
Compaq Computer Corporation
SOURCE: Compaq Computer Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Hewlett-Packard Company and Hewlett-Packard Company HP Services.
Software Security Response Team
x-ref:SSRT2263
At the time of writing this document, Compaq is currently
investigating the potential impact to HP Tru64 UNIX, commercial
version of SSH for V5.1a.
As further information becomes available notice will be provided of
the completion/availability of any necessary patches through standard
product and security bulletin announcements and be available from your
normal HP Services support channel.
Caldera
Caldera OpenLinux OpenSSH has neither the S/KEY nor BSD Auth features
compiled in, so it is not vulnerable to the Challenge/Response
vulnerability. We do have the ChallengeResponseAuthentication option
on by default, however, so to be safe, we recommend that the option be
disabled in the sshd_config file.
In addition, the sshd_config PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt option is off
by default, so OpenLinux is not vulnerable to the other alleged
vulnerability in a default configuration, either. However, Caldera
recommends that this option be disabled if it has been enabled by the
system administrator.
Cray, Inc.
Cray, Inc. has found the OpenSSH released in Cray Open Software 3.0 to
be vulnerable. Please see Field Notice 5105 and spr 722588 for fix
information.
Debian
Debian 2.2 (the current stable release) is not affected by these
problems. The current versions of our "testing" distribution, to
become Debian 3.0, and our "unstable" distribution, are both affected
by default.
We recommend that users be certain that both:
ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
and
PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt no
are present and uncommented in /etc/ssh/sshd_config (and that the
server is restarted). Also, we recommend the use of version 3.3p1, now
available from security.debian.org (DSA-134). Stable users do not need
to upgrade and may wish to wait until the packages have received
better testing.
We intend to provide 3.4p1 packages in the near future.
Engarde
Guardian Digital ships OpenSSH in all versions of EnGarde Secure
Linux. Version 3.3p1 was introduced by ESA-20020625-015 on June 25,
2002. This update introduces privilege separation. All users are
strongly urged to upgrade to this version as soon as possible.
An upgrade to version 3.4p1 (which properly fixes the bugs) will be
made available sometime in the next few days.
Hewlett-Packard Company
Hewlett-Packard provides a version of SSH: HP-UX Secure Shell
(T1471AA) for HP-UX versions 11.00 and 11i. We are investigating to
determine whether this product is vulnerable.
IBM Corporation
IBM's AIX operating system does not ship with OpenSSH; however,
OpenSSH is available for installation on AIX via the Linux Affinity
Toolkit. The version included on the CD containing the Toolkit is
vulnerable to the latest discovered vulnerability discussed here as is
the version of OpenSSH available for downloading from the IBM Linux
Affinity website. Anyone running this version is advised to follow the
recommendations above to limit their vulnerability.
We working with the changes for version 3.4 and will have a new
package availble for download as soon as possible. When available the
new packages can be downloaded from:
http://www6.software.ibm.com/dl/aixtbx/aixtbx-p
This site contains Linux Affinity applications containing
cryptographic algorithms, and new users of this site are asked to
register first.
Lotus
Lotus products are not vulnerable to this problem.
Mandrake Software
MandrakeSoft released OpenSSH 3.3p1 in updates Monday night to
mitigate this vulnerability. Updates to OpenSSH 3.4p1 will be
available for download later this week.
Microsoft Corporation
Microsoft products are not affected by the issues detailed in this
advisory.
Network Appliance
NetApp systems are not vulnerable to this problem.
OpenBSD
See http://www.openbsd.org/errata.html#sshd
OpenSSH
See http://www.openssh.com/txt/preauth.adv
Process Software
MultiNet, TCPware, and SSH for OpenVMS are not affected by the
problems outlined in this advisory.
RedHat Inc.
Red Hat Linux versions 7, 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 as well as Red Hat Linux
Advanced Server version 2.1 ship with OpenSSH. The Red Hat Linux
OpenSSH packages were not compiled with either BSD_AUTH or SKEY
enabled, therefore in order to be vulnerable to this issue a user
would need to have enabled the configuration option
"PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt" in their sshd configuration file (the
default is disabled).
We are continuing to investigate this vulnerability and will release
updated packages where appropriate.
SGI
At this time, SGI does not ship OpenSSH as a part of IRIX.
The OpenSSH privilege separation code mostly works with IRIX, but it
uses a flag to mmap that isn't in IRIX (MAP_ANON) for compression so
you can't have both on at the same time. IRIX doesn't ship with PAM so
a lot of the PAM issues aren't issues for us.
_________________________________________________________________
The CERT/CC thanks Theo de Raadt and Markus Friedl of the OpenSSH
project for their technical assistance in producing this advisory.
_________________________________________________________________
Author: Cory F. Cohen
______________________________________________________________________
This document is available from:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-18.html
______________________________________________________________________
CERT/CC Contact Information
Email: cert@cert.org
Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
Fax: +1 412-268-6989
Postal address:
CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
U.S.A.
CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) /
EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies
during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.
Using encryption
We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email.
Our public PGP key is available from
http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key
If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
information.
Getting security information
CERT publications and other security information are available from
our web site
http://www.cert.org/
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send email to majordomo@cert.org. Please include in the body of your
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Patent and Trademark Office.
______________________________________________________________________
NO WARRANTY
Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
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_________________________________________________________________
Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information
Copyright 2002 Carnegie Mellon University.
Revision History
June 26, 2002: Initial release
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