Date: Sat, 8 Sep 2001 18:08:48 -0700 From: Kris Kennaway <kris@obsecurity.org> To: "Andrey A. Chernov" <ache@nagual.pp.ru> Cc: Kris Kennaway <kris@obsecurity.org>, Matt Dillon <dillon@earth.backplane.com>, Jordan Hubbard <jkh@FreeBSD.ORG>, security@FreeBSD.ORG, audit@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: Fwd: Multiple vendor 'Taylor UUCP' problems. Message-ID: <20010908180848.A94567@xor.obsecurity.org> In-Reply-To: <20010909045226.A33654@nagual.pp.ru>; from ache@nagual.pp.ru on Sun, Sep 09, 2001 at 04:52:27AM %2B0400 References: <5.1.0.14.0.20010908153417.0286b4b8@192.168.0.12> <200109082103.f88L3fK29117@earth.backplane.com> <20010908154617.A73143@xor.obsecurity.org> <20010908170257.A82082@xor.obsecurity.org> <20010908174304.A88816@xor.obsecurity.org> <20010909045226.A33654@nagual.pp.ru>
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--NzB8fVQJ5HfG6fxh Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Sun, Sep 09, 2001 at 04:52:27AM +0400, Andrey A. Chernov wrote: > On Sat, Sep 08, 2001 at 17:43:04 -0700, Kris Kennaway wrote: > > On Sat, Sep 08, 2001 at 05:02:57PM -0700, Kris Kennaway wrote: > >=20 > > > Looks like setting the schg flag is the only feasible containment > > > solution for now. > >=20 > > Here's a proposed fix. It just disallows anyone other than root from > > specifying an alternate configuration file, for the setuid utilities > > (which was the cause of the vulnerability here, AFAIK). >=20 > What you try to fix this way? It brokes normal users dialing to theirs > systems, they always specify their own files. Consider uu* as user level > utilities. The only point of restriction is restrict their access to > dialing devices, not to utulities. The vulnerability involves uucp being made to run arbitrary commands as the uucp user through specifying a custom configuration file - see bugtraq. There may be other problems resulting from user-specified configuration files. I don't have time to go through the code and fix up the revocation of privileges right now..in the meantime, this prevents the root exploit where a user replaces a uucp-owned binary like uustat, which is called daily by /etc/periodic. Kris --NzB8fVQJ5HfG6fxh Content-Type: application/pgp-signature Content-Disposition: inline -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (FreeBSD) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iD8DBQE7msEfWry0BWjoQKURAsqNAJ9in4houn79ZDPgchdBuFdR/NzTNQCfcU/A YUiKjRdCEl0osBNUB6doQ5Y= =8BHV -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --NzB8fVQJ5HfG6fxh-- To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-audit" in the body of the message
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