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Date:      Sat, 8 Sep 2001 18:08:48 -0700
From:      Kris Kennaway <kris@obsecurity.org>
To:        "Andrey A. Chernov" <ache@nagual.pp.ru>
Cc:        Kris Kennaway <kris@obsecurity.org>, Matt Dillon <dillon@earth.backplane.com>, Jordan Hubbard <jkh@FreeBSD.ORG>, security@FreeBSD.ORG, audit@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: Fwd: Multiple vendor 'Taylor UUCP' problems.
Message-ID:  <20010908180848.A94567@xor.obsecurity.org>
In-Reply-To: <20010909045226.A33654@nagual.pp.ru>; from ache@nagual.pp.ru on Sun, Sep 09, 2001 at 04:52:27AM %2B0400
References:  <5.1.0.14.0.20010908153417.0286b4b8@192.168.0.12> <200109082103.f88L3fK29117@earth.backplane.com> <20010908154617.A73143@xor.obsecurity.org> <20010908170257.A82082@xor.obsecurity.org> <20010908174304.A88816@xor.obsecurity.org> <20010909045226.A33654@nagual.pp.ru>

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On Sun, Sep 09, 2001 at 04:52:27AM +0400, Andrey A. Chernov wrote:
> On Sat, Sep 08, 2001 at 17:43:04 -0700, Kris Kennaway wrote:
> > On Sat, Sep 08, 2001 at 05:02:57PM -0700, Kris Kennaway wrote:
> >=20
> > > Looks like setting the schg flag is the only feasible containment
> > > solution for now.
> >=20
> > Here's a proposed fix.  It just disallows anyone other than root from
> > specifying an alternate configuration file, for the setuid utilities
> > (which was the cause of the vulnerability here, AFAIK).
>=20
> What you try to fix this way? It brokes normal users dialing to theirs
> systems, they always specify their own files. Consider uu* as user level
> utilities. The only point of restriction is restrict their access to
> dialing devices, not to utulities.

The vulnerability involves uucp being made to run arbitrary commands
as the uucp user through specifying a custom configuration file - see
bugtraq.  There may be other problems resulting from user-specified
configuration files.  I don't have time to go through the code and fix
up the revocation of privileges right now..in the meantime, this
prevents the root exploit where a user replaces a uucp-owned binary
like uustat, which is called daily by /etc/periodic.

Kris

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