Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2016 22:30:03 +0000 (UTC) From: Gleb Smirnoff <glebius@FreeBSD.org> To: src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-releng@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r296953 - in releng/9.3: . crypto/openssh sys/amd64/amd64 sys/conf Message-ID: <201603162230.u2GMU3b1043034@repo.freebsd.org>
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Author: glebius Date: Wed Mar 16 22:30:03 2016 New Revision: 296953 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/296953 Log: o Fix OpenSSH xauth(1) command injection. [SA-16:14] o Fix incorrect argument validation in sysarch(2). [SA-16:15] Security: FreeBSD-SA-16:14.openssh-xauth, CVE-2016-3115 Security: FreeBSD-SA-16:15.sysarch, CVE-2016-1885 Approved by: so Modified: releng/9.3/UPDATING releng/9.3/crypto/openssh/session.c releng/9.3/sys/amd64/amd64/sys_machdep.c releng/9.3/sys/conf/newvers.sh Modified: releng/9.3/UPDATING ============================================================================== --- releng/9.3/UPDATING Wed Mar 16 19:46:22 2016 (r296952) +++ releng/9.3/UPDATING Wed Mar 16 22:30:03 2016 (r296953) @@ -11,6 +11,12 @@ handbook: Items affecting the ports and packages system can be found in /usr/ports/UPDATING. Please read that file before running portupgrade. +20160316 p39 FreeBSD-SA-16:14.openssh-xauth + FreeBSD-SA-16:15.sysarch + + Fix OpenSSH xauth(1) command injection. [SA-16:14] + Fix incorrect argument validation in sysarch(2). [SA-16:15] + 20160310 p38 FreeBSD-SA-16:13.bind FreeBSD-SA-16:12.openssl [revised] Modified: releng/9.3/crypto/openssh/session.c ============================================================================== --- releng/9.3/crypto/openssh/session.c Wed Mar 16 19:46:22 2016 (r296952) +++ releng/9.3/crypto/openssh/session.c Wed Mar 16 22:30:03 2016 (r296953) @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include <arpa/inet.h> +#include <ctype.h> #include <errno.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <grp.h> @@ -294,6 +295,21 @@ do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt) do_cleanup(authctxt); } +/* Check untrusted xauth strings for metacharacters */ +static int +xauth_valid_string(const char *s) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { + if (!isalnum((u_char)s[i]) && + s[i] != '.' && s[i] != ':' && s[i] != '/' && + s[i] != '-' && s[i] != '_') + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + /* * Prepares for an interactive session. This is called after the user has * been successfully authenticated. During this message exchange, pseudo @@ -367,7 +383,13 @@ do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt) s->screen = 0; } packet_check_eom(); - success = session_setup_x11fwd(s); + if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) && + xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data)) + success = session_setup_x11fwd(s); + else { + success = 0; + error("Invalid X11 forwarding data"); + } if (!success) { free(s->auth_proto); free(s->auth_data); @@ -2199,7 +2221,13 @@ session_x11_req(Session *s) s->screen = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); - success = session_setup_x11fwd(s); + if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) && + xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data)) + success = session_setup_x11fwd(s); + else { + success = 0; + error("Invalid X11 forwarding data"); + } if (!success) { free(s->auth_proto); free(s->auth_data); Modified: releng/9.3/sys/amd64/amd64/sys_machdep.c ============================================================================== --- releng/9.3/sys/amd64/amd64/sys_machdep.c Wed Mar 16 19:46:22 2016 (r296952) +++ releng/9.3/sys/amd64/amd64/sys_machdep.c Wed Mar 16 22:30:03 2016 (r296953) @@ -586,8 +586,8 @@ amd64_set_ldt(td, uap, descs) struct i386_ldt_args *uap; struct user_segment_descriptor *descs; { - int error = 0, i; - int largest_ld; + int error = 0; + unsigned int largest_ld, i; struct mdproc *mdp = &td->td_proc->p_md; struct proc_ldt *pldt; struct user_segment_descriptor *dp; Modified: releng/9.3/sys/conf/newvers.sh ============================================================================== --- releng/9.3/sys/conf/newvers.sh Wed Mar 16 19:46:22 2016 (r296952) +++ releng/9.3/sys/conf/newvers.sh Wed Mar 16 22:30:03 2016 (r296953) @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ TYPE="FreeBSD" REVISION="9.3" -BRANCH="RELEASE-p38" +BRANCH="RELEASE-p39" if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE} fi
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