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Date:      Thu, 8 Nov 2018 01:08:32 +0200
From:      Konstantin Belousov <kostikbel@gmail.com>
To:        John Baldwin <jhb@FreeBSD.org>
Cc:        Ed Schouten <ed@nuxi.nl>, src-committers <src-committers@freebsd.org>, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-head@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: svn commit: r340231 - head/sys/kern
Message-ID:  <20181107230832.GZ5335@kib.kiev.ua>
In-Reply-To: <081a4dfe-c95e-f8f1-ffc6-04ed5173999d@FreeBSD.org>
References:  <201811071832.wA7IW3VI045865@repo.freebsd.org> <CABh_MKm_g%2BZ6m2LQWjEDcQZdki6JeVLJ%2BZ-q3Y=EaxaJm7DHjQ@mail.gmail.com> <081a4dfe-c95e-f8f1-ffc6-04ed5173999d@FreeBSD.org>

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On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 01:35:57PM -0800, John Baldwin wrote:
> On 11/7/18 1:01 PM, Ed Schouten wrote:
> > Op wo 7 nov. 2018 om 19:32 schreef John Baldwin <jhb@freebsd.org>:
> >> Modified: head/sys/kern/imgact_elf.c
> >> ==============================================================================
> >> --- head/sys/kern/imgact_elf.c  Wed Nov  7 18:29:54 2018        (r340230)
> >> +++ head/sys/kern/imgact_elf.c  Wed Nov  7 18:32:02 2018        (r340231)
> >> @@ -120,7 +120,8 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_debug, OID_AUTO, __elfN(legacy_coredump),
> >>
> >>  int __elfN(nxstack) =
> >>  #if defined(__amd64__) || defined(__powerpc64__) /* both 64 and 32 bit */ || \
> >> -    (defined(__arm__) && __ARM_ARCH >= 7) || defined(__aarch64__)
> >> +    (defined(__arm__) && __ARM_ARCH >= 7) || defined(__aarch64__) || \
> >> +    defined(__riscv)
> >>         1;
> >>  #else
> >>         0;
> > 
> > Are we getting to the point that it might make sense to invert this
> > logic, i.e., just list the architectures that require executable
> > stacks?
> 
> It's not clear.  The remaining set is i386 (should be able to use nxstack
> when using PAE and PG_NX is supported), MIPS (no X permission in PTEs),
> 32-bit powerpc (no X permissions in PTEs AFAICT), and sparc64 (no X
> permissions in PTEs AFAICT).  For architectures without X ptes, removing
> VM_PROT_EXECUTE from the stack permissions is a no-op and would be
> harmless, so we could perhaps just default this to always on at this
> point?
AFAIR sparc64 ABI defines its stack as nx always (and PTEs do allow to
control exec permission).



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