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Date:      Mon, 14 Apr 2003 01:13:56 +0200
From:      Pawel Jakub Dawidek <nick@garage.freebsd.pl>
To:        Ruslan Ermilov <ru@freebsd.org>
Cc:        Mark Shepard <mns@BEST.COM>
Subject:   Re: chroot() as non-root user?
Message-ID:  <20030413231356.GC52293@garage.freebsd.pl>
In-Reply-To: <20030413154146.GB92320@sunbay.com>
References:  <5.2.0.9.2.20030413101417.022481b0@127.0.0.1> <20030413154146.GB92320@sunbay.com>

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[-- Attachment #1 --]
On Sun, Apr 13, 2003 at 06:41:46PM +0300, Ruslan Ermilov wrote:
+> chroot(2) has no effect on the process's current directory; you
+> could hide (hard-link) the setuid program (su(1)) there, so
+> removing this protection on the syscall level can easily result
+> in a compromise.
+> 
+> chroot(8) changes the current working directory, but it's not
+> setuid root.

And if kern.chroot_allow_open_directories is set to 0?

-- 
Pawel Jakub Dawidek                       pawel@dawidek.net
UNIX Systems Programmer/Administrator     http://garage.freebsd.pl
Am I Evil? Yes, I Am!                     http://cerber.sourceforge.net

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