Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2001 11:45:06 +0100 From: Andrea Campi <andrea@webcom.it> To: Kris Kennaway <kris@FreeBSD.org> Cc: cvs-committers@FreeBSD.org, cvs-all@FreeBSD.org Subject: Re: cvs commit: src/crypto/openssh rsa.c rsa.h ssh-agent.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c Message-ID: <20010212114505.B631@webcom.it> In-Reply-To: <200102120644.f1C6iqj18540@freefall.freebsd.org>; from kris@FreeBSD.org on Sun, Feb 11, 2001 at 10:44:52PM -0800 References: <200102120644.f1C6iqj18540@freefall.freebsd.org>
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> Modified files:
> crypto/openssh rsa.c rsa.h ssh-agent.c sshconnect1.c
> sshd.c
> Log:
> Patches backported from later development version of OpenSSH which prevent
> (instead of just mitigating through connection limits) the Bleichenbacher
> attack which can lead to guessing of the server key (not host key) by
> regenerating it when an RSA failure is detected.
Haven't actually tested this given -CURRENT breakage so I might say something
stupid but...
What happens if an attacker is able to trigger regeneration tens or hundreds of
times per second? I think there is opportunity for a DOS if this isn't done
properly!
Bye,
Andrea
--
The computer revolution is over. The computers won.
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