Date: Mon, 9 Feb 2009 13:53:47 -0800 (PST) From: Jason Stone <freebsd-security@dfmm.org> To: Lyndon Nerenberg <lyndon@orthanc.ca> Cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org, Daniel Roethlisberger <daniel@roe.ch> Subject: Re: OPIE considered insecure Message-ID: <20090209134738.G15166@treehorn.dfmm.org> In-Reply-To: <alpine.BSF.2.00.0902091246280.61088@mm.orthanc.ca> References: <200902090957.27318.mail@maxlor.com> <20090209170550.GA60223@hobbes.ustdmz.roe.ch> <alpine.BSF.2.00.0902091246280.61088@mm.orthanc.ca>
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>> I also prefer current OPIE to copying SSH private keys to untrusted >> machines. > The machine you are logging IN TO does not require your private key, > just your public key. Right, but that's not the problem they're trying to solve. They're trying to solve the problem of logging in _from_ an untrusted machine, to a trusted machine. So, an alternative might be to carry around a USB key with a one-time private key, different from your normal private keys, and have the public key command-squashed on the server to remove itself from authorized_keys before running the shell. You could generate several, each with a different passphrase (assuming that you could manage to remember that many passphrases and which keys they go with), and get a similar effect to printing out a card with the next ten OPIE passwords. -Jason
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