Date: Mon, 03 May 2010 17:29:24 +0100 From: Matthew Seaman <m.seaman@infracaninophile.co.uk> To: John <john@starfire.mn.org> Cc: freebsd-questions@freebsd.org Subject: Re: pf suggestions for paced attack Message-ID: <4BDEF9E4.9020806@infracaninophile.co.uk> In-Reply-To: <20100503144110.GA14402@elwood.starfire.mn.org> References: <20100503144110.GA14402@elwood.starfire.mn.org>
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On 03/05/2010 15:41:10, John wrote:
> The script kiddies have apparently figured out that we use some
> time-window sensitivity in our adaptive filtering. From sshd, I've
> been seeing "reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo ... failed" and
> from ftpd (when I have the port open at all, which is rare), I am
> seeing probes at about 27 second intervals. This stays well below
> the 3/30 (three connections in 30 seconds) sensitivity that I had
> been using. It took them nearly two and a half hours to make 154
> attemps, but computers are very patient.
>
> I have now changed the timing window sensivity, but it's to the
> point now where there's a significant probability that someone could
> lock themselves out (temporarily, at least, I do clear these tables
> periodically) if they are having a bit of a fat-finger moment with
> their password.
>
> Anybody got any superior suggestions?
Heh. If the attackers are forced to slow down the probe rate so
drastically, then their chances of breaking in would be greatly reduced
/even/ if you were using guessable passwords. Which I shall assume you
aren't: key based auth is what you need, or maybe OTP. You certainly
should not be relying on rate-adaptive blocking alone to secure your
system -- it's more a way of preventing your log files from being
flooded with crap -- and you've limited that quite effectively by
forcing the attackers to slow down. I'd not feel any necessity to
modify the rate settings on your PF rule.
Anyhow, there is certainly a potential to lock yourself out using
adaptive blacklisting. If you know where your friends are going to be
logging in from, then I'd set up a whitelist. Something like this:
(replace with a list of the addresses / ranges you want to allow)
table <ssh-whitelist> const { \
192.0.2.0/24 \
} persist
table <ssh-bruteforce> persist
set skip on lo0
scrub in
pass all
antispoof log quick for lo0
block drop in log quick from <ssh-bruteforce>
pass in proto tcp from !<ssh-whitelist> to port ssh \
flags S/SA keep state \
(max-src-conn-rate 3/30, overload <ssh-bruteforce> flush global)
pass in proto tcp from <ssh-whitelist> to port ssh \
flags S/SA keep state
Cheers,
Matthew
- --
Dr Matthew J Seaman MA, D.Phil. 7 Priory Courtyard
Flat 3
PGP: http://www.infracaninophile.co.uk/pgpkey Ramsgate
Kent, CT11 9PW
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