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Date:      Fri, 25 May 2001 13:53:17 -0400 (EDT)
From:      Rob Simmons <rsimmons@wlcg.com>
To:        alexus <ml@db.nexgen.com>
Cc:        Nick Cleaton <nick@cleaton.net>, security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: 4.3 Security: local DoS via clean-tmps
Message-ID:  <Pine.BSF.4.21.0105251351250.62149-100000@mail.wlcg.com>
In-Reply-To: <001301c0e542$474fd3b0$01000001@book>

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That is off by default in FreeBSD.  You would have had to add a line like
this to /etc/periodic.conf

daily_clean_tmps_enable="YES"

The line in /etc/defaults/periodic.conf is:

daily_clean_tmps_enable="NO"

Robert Simmons
Systems Administrator
http://www.wlcg.com/

On Fri, 25 May 2001, alexus wrote:

> how can i make sure that i dont have this enabled? and if there a fix for
> that?
> 
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Nick Cleaton" <nick@cleaton.net>
> To: <security@freebsd.org>
> Sent: Friday, May 25, 2001 1:03 PM
> Subject: 4.3 Security: local DoS via clean-tmps
> 
> 
> >
> > Tested in 4.3-RELEASE only:
> >
> > If /etc/periodic/daily/clean-tmps is enabled, then it's possible
> > for any local user to trick it into calling unlink() or rmdir()
> > on anything in the root directory.
> >
> > The problem is that "find -delete" can be made to do chdir("..")
> > multiple times followed by unlink() and/or rmdir().
> >
> >    588 find     CALL  chdir(0x280e227d)
> >    588 find     NAMI  ".."
> >    588 find     RET   chdir 0
> >    588 find     CALL  chdir(0x280e227d)
> >    588 find     NAMI  ".."
> >    588 find     RET   chdir 0
> >    588 find     CALL  chdir(0x280e227d)
> >    588 find     NAMI  ".."
> >    588 find     RET   chdir 0
> >    588 find     CALL  chdir(0x280e227d)
> >    588 find     NAMI  ".."
> >    588 find     RET   chdir 0
> >    588 find     CALL  unlink(0x8051440)
> >    588 find     NAMI  "sys"
> >
> > This means it can be tricked into going up too high by moving
> > its current directory higher up the hierarchy, by for example
> > doing "mv /tmp/1/2/3 /tmp/4" while find's working directory is
> > somewhere under "/tmp/1/2/3".
> >
> > The attached exploit will cause it to delete the /home -> /usr/home
> > symlink.  I think this would render it impossible to log into a
> > system configured for non-root ssh access via DSA key only.
> >
> > This could also be used to unlink other users' files in /tmp
> > without regard to their age.
> >
> > --
> > Nick Cleaton
> > nick@cleaton.net
> >
> 
> 
> To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org
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> 
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