Date: Wed, 4 Apr 2012 11:40:04 -0600 From: Shawn Webb <lattera@gmail.com> To: jb <jb.1234abcd@gmail.com> Cc: freebsd-stable@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Text relocations in kernel modules Message-ID: <CADt0fhzxN3-_ubRKgKa_xEL_tn4_8SFw7A-X43_oR3SPX5Jf0g@mail.gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <loom.20120404T192618-4@post.gmane.org> References: <CAGE5yCpuvsVrc-%2BDTVas-W4fjuP2s%2B6PQONMOTyEbGnj2CY3ig@mail.gmail.com> <4F766F29.2030803@cs.stonybrook.edu> <CAFHbX1KiZx68MP4bCAvPc0Zui3fA4O35_z3kP781zoJqLYp7Bw@mail.gmail.com> <4F79D88B.3040102@cs.stonybrook.edu> <CAFHbX1KE15G9gx7Duw2R8zC5jL1jiEir0yMB0-s5%2B4xx517WtQ@mail.gmail.com> <4F79E27E.3000509@cs.stonybrook.edu> <CAGE5yCrwLosuTT2yq0DEx%2Bz8ztKpkrB=tORmURcuh_SCz=L7qg@mail.gmail.com> <4F79FCB8.1090003@cs.stonybrook.edu> <CAGE5yCrz45AWeJGv=2UWRq7xpXZVtvsx%2B5O6cvaE6ZzoFrz5mA@mail.gmail.com> <4F7A05C4.9070808@cs.stonybrook.edu> <20120403170259.GA94837@neutralgood.org> <loom.20120404T103230-175@post.gmane.org> <1333550029.1090.67.camel@revolution.hippie.lan> <loom.20120404T165909-66@post.gmane.org> <CAGE5yCoZuyUhuWRc0orYkB2wuuESuBzzoRNqOvWr-G=a1XOJDA@mail.gmail.com> <loom.20120404T192618-4@post.gmane.org>
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If there is malicious code in a kernel module, then discussions of relocations become moot. Sent from my Android 4.0 device. Please forgive any spelling or grammatical errors. On Apr 4, 2012 11:35 AM, "jb" <jb.1234abcd@gmail.com> wrote: > Peter Wemm <peter <at> wemm.org> writes: > > > ... > > There is no way to interfere because it is done outside of user space > > entirely, **after** the file has been copied out of the file system. > > You can do whatever you like to the file, but it has no effect because > > all the relocation is done in a private kernel copy. > > ... > > What if attack code (broadly understood) is part of module code, and is > based > on either or both of: > - hidden (as to meaning and reloc targets) arrangement of relocations > needed > - has an ability of (self) activation during load/link and *relocations* > process > already under the privilege of the kernel ? > > Is that possible at all ? > Would there be any protection against it (except giving up relocations as > an enabling vehicle) ? > > jb > > > _______________________________________________ > freebsd-stable@freebsd.org mailing list > http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-stable > To unsubscribe, send any mail to "freebsd-stable-unsubscribe@freebsd.org" >
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