Date: Mon, 08 Mar 2004 22:10:38 +0100 From: "Georg-W. Koltermann" <gwk@rahn-koltermann.de> To: Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org> Cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Call for review: restricted hardlinks. Message-ID: <1078780238.1937.11.camel@localhost.muc.eu.mscsoftware.com> In-Reply-To: <20040308093642.GI10864@darkness.comp.waw.pl> References: <20040308093642.GI10864@darkness.comp.waw.pl>
next in thread | previous in thread | raw e-mail | index | archive | help
When you restrict links, do you want to restrict copying as well? Seems somewhat paranoid to me. You already need write permission on the directory where you create the link, and permissions are checked against the inode on open(2) anyway. My $0.0002. -- Regards, Georg. Am Mo, den 08.03.2004 schrieb Pawel Jakub Dawidek um 10:36: > Hi. > > I've no response from so@ in this topic, probably because leak of time, > so I'll try here. > > Here is a patch that I'm planing to commit: > > http://people.freebsd.org/~pjd/patches/restricted_hardlinks.patch > > It adds two new sysctls: > > security.bsd.hardlink_check_uid > security.bsd.hardlink_check_gid > > If sysctl security.bsd.hardlink_check_uid is set to 1, unprivileged users > are not permitted to create hard links to files not owned by them. > If sysctl security.bsd.hardlink_check_gid is set to 1, unprivileged users > are not permitted to create hard links to files if they are not member > of file's group. > > For now user is able to create hardlinks to any files.
Want to link to this message? Use this URL: <https://mail-archive.FreeBSD.org/cgi/mid.cgi?1078780238.1937.11.camel>