Date: Tue, 24 Oct 1995 15:38:17 -0700 From: David Greenman <davidg@Root.COM> To: Dataradio sysadmin <root@vhf.dataradio.com> Cc: "David A. Borman" <dab@berserkly.cray.com>, hartmans@mit.edu, security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: telnetd fix Message-ID: <199510242238.PAA27570@corbin.Root.COM> In-Reply-To: Your message of "Tue, 24 Oct 95 11:51:27 EDT." <Pine.BSF.3.91.951024114920.28496F-100000@vhf.dataradio.com>
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>On Tue, 24 Oct 1995, David A. Borman wrote: > >> >> > Hi; I've been thinking about the telnetd security patch that was recently >> > sent out. I've been watching the list of "vulnerable" environment variables >> > grow daily...I really think that excluding certain environment variables is the >> > wrong approach to solving the problem. I think it is is much wiser to do an > >[snip] > >Have I missed something here? > >Why not just compile telnetd / login as a statically linked programs, and >voila, no worry about possibly switching libc under their noses. Because the standard libc in most systems also access certain environment variables that may be used to alter the behavior of telnetd and/or login(1). In other words: the list of vulnerable systems is likely much longer than is suggested in the announcement. -DG
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