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Date:      Wed, 20 Dec 2000 18:05:58 -0800
From:      Jason DiCioccio <Jason.DiCioccio@Epylon.com>
To:        'Kris Kennaway' <kris@FreeBSD.ORG>, Alfred Perlstein <bright@wintelcom.net>
Cc:        Mark Zielinski <markz@2cactus.com>, cjclark@alum.mit.edu, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   RE: Read-Only Filesystems
Message-ID:  <657B20E93E93D4118F9700D0B73CE3EA024346@goofy.epylon.lan>

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The only way I could think of to do his securely in the current
implementation is to chflags most of the etc dir (with the exception
of files that did need to be cahnged like passwd master.passwd
aliases, etc.).. mainly the rc files.. but this makes administering
remotely a pain in the ass.. Of course, security in many cases comes
with a hassle factor.

- -JD-

- -------
Jason DiCioccio
Evil Genius
Unix BOFH

mailto:jasond@epylon.com

415-593-2761          Direct & Fax
415-593-2900          Main

Epylon Corporation
645 Harrison Street, Suite 200
San Francisco, CA 94107
www.epylon.com

BSD is for people who love Unix -
Linux is for people who hate Microsoft


- -----Original Message-----
From: Kris Kennaway [mailto:kris@FreeBSD.ORG]
Sent: Wednesday, December 20, 2000 6:00 PM
To: Alfred Perlstein
Cc: Kris Kennaway; Mark Zielinski; cjclark@alum.mit.edu;
freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject: Re: Read-Only Filesystems


On Wed, Dec 20, 2000 at 05:41:29PM -0800, Alfred Perlstein wrote:
> * Kris Kennaway <kris@FreeBSD.ORG> [001220 17:39] wrote:
> > On Wed, Dec 20, 2000 at 02:14:43PM +0000, Mark Zielinski wrote: 
> > > This is a attack that we fixed in SecureBSD by not allowing
> > > filesystems to be un-mounted and re-mounted back in May of
> > > 1999. We added security checks to the mount() and unmount()
> > > system calls based upon a MIB called securebsd.options.mount
> > > which could be turned on or off depending upon your securelevel
> > > setting.
> > 
> > The argument is that securelevel is fundamentally flawed and
> > fairly useless as a security feature, unless you treat every
> > system reboot (expected or not) as a potential compromise.
> 
> Actually, securelevel as a all-covering blanket would work better
> if people implemented fixes for it like a solution for the mount
> problem described here.

That still doesn't alter the fact that only a single reboot is needed
to undo the restrictions. I can see both points of view: on the one
hand we have a system which stops some script kiddies, so we might as
well extend the coverage a bit and try and foil a few more. It also
happens to be the best available system right now. On the other hand,
it's fundamentally incomplete and easily worked around, so you can
argue there's no point wasting effort in polishing a turd.

> Securelevel is hard to implement, but hard to mess up unlike ACLs
> which are both hard to implement and hard to deploy.

Well, we're not talking about ACLs here..MAC is a different beast. I
don't know to what extent your criticism applies, though, not having
administered or configured such a system.

Kris

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