Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2005 23:17:50 -0700 (PDT) From: freebsd-security@dfmm.org To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Cc: Jesper Wallin <jesper@hackunite.net> Subject: Re: Information disclosure? Message-ID: <20050421230714.N97728@treehorn.dfmm.org> In-Reply-To: <20050422001054.V9404@odysseus.silby.com> References: <42686A29.7090900@hackunite.net> <20050422001054.V9404@odysseus.silby.com>
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> For some reason, I thought little about the "clear" command today..
> Let's say a privileged user (root) logs on, edit a sensitive file (e.g,
> a file containing a password, running vipw, etc) .. then runs clear and
> logout. Then anyone can press the scroll-lock command, scroll back up
> and read the sensitive information.. Isn't "clear" ment to clear the
I've thought about this also - I think that if it's really a concern, the
thing to do is to just disable the kernel-level text console scrollback
completely and use screen(1) or something similar for those times when you
do want scrollback.
alternatively,
alias clear='for i in {1..SC_HISTORY_SIZE} ; do echo "" ; done'
-Jason
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