Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 09:40:32 -0500 From: "Philip M. Gollucci" <pgollucci@p6m7g8.com> To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Cc: FreeBSD Security Advisories <security-advisories@freebsd.org> Subject: Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-18:02.ntp Message-ID: <CACM2dAbhK7u8Rk0Ax9i_pSxZ_gk3CZO-7yeT1iGvVd5ukQQvKQ@mail.gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <20180307071008.BB2B6447F@freefall.freebsd.org> References: <20180307071008.BB2B6447F@freefall.freebsd.org>
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The links are 404ing On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 2:10 AM, FreeBSD Security Advisories < security-advisories@freebsd.org> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA512 > > ============================================================ > ================= > FreeBSD-SA-18:02.ntp Security > Advisory > The FreeBSD > Project > > Topic: Multiple vulnerabilities of ntp > > Category: contrib > Module: ntp > Announced: 2018-03-07 > Credits: Network Time Foundation > Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. > Corrected: 2018-02-28 09:01:03 UTC (stable/11, 11.1-STABLE) > 2018-03-07 05:58:24 UTC (releng/11.1, 11.1-RELEASE-p7) > 2018-03-01 04:06:49 UTC (stable/10, 10.4-STABLE) > 2018-03-07 05:58:24 UTC (releng/10.4, 10.4-RELEASE-p6) > 2018-03-07 05:58:24 UTC (releng/10.3, 10.3-RELEASE-p27) > CVE Name: CVE-2018-7182, CVE-2018-7170, CVE-2018-7184, CVE-2018-7185, > CVE-2018-7183 > > For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, > including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the > following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>. > > I. Background > > The ntpd(8) daemon is an implementation of the Network Time Protocol (NTP) > used to synchronize the time of a computer system to a reference time > source. > > II. Problem Description > > The ctl_getitem() function is used by ntpd(8) to process incoming "mode 6" > packets. A malicious "mode 6" packet can be sent to an ntpd instance, and > if the ntpd instance is from 4.2.8p6 through 4.2.8p10, ctl_getitem() will > read past the end of its buffer. [CVE-2018-7182] > > The ntpd(8) service can be vulnerable to Sybil attacks. If a system is > configured to use a trustedkey and if one is not using the feature > introduced > in ntp-4.2.8p6 allowing an optional 4th field in the ntp.keys file to > specify > which IPs can serve time, a malicious authenticated peer, i.e., one where > the > attacker knows the private symmetric key, can create arbitrarily-many > ephemeral associations in order to win the clock selection of ntpd and > modify > a victim's clock. [CVE-2018-7170] > > The fix for NtpBug2952 was incomplete, and while it fixed one problem it > created another. Specifically, it drops bad packets before updating the > "received" timestamp. This means a third-party can inject a packet with > a zero-origin timestamp, meaning the sender wants to reset the association, > and the transmit timestamp in this bogus packet will be saved as the most > recent "received" timestamp. The real remote peer does not know this > value and this will disrupt the association until the association resets. > [CVE-2018-7184] > > The NTP Protocol allows for both non-authenticated and authenticated > associations, in client/server, symmetric (peer), and several broadcast > modes. In addition to the basic NTP operational modes, symmetric mode and > broadcast servers can support an interleaved mode of operation. In > ntp-4.2.8p4, a bug was inadvertently introduced into the protocol engine > that > allows a non-authenticated zero-origin (reset) packet to reset an > authenticated interleaved peer association. If an attacker can send a > packet > with a zero-origin timestamp and the source IP address of the "other side" > of > an interleaved association, the 'victim' ntpd will reset its association. > The attacker must continue sending these packets in order to maintain the > disruption of the association. [CVE-2018-7185] > > The ntpq(8) utility is a monitoring and control program for ntpd. The > internal decodearr() function of ntpq(8) that is used to decode an array in > a response string when formatted data is being displayed. This is a > problem > in affected versions of ntpq if a maliciously-altered ntpd returns an array > result that will trip this bug, or if a bad actor is able to read an > ntpq(8) > request on its way to a remote ntpd server and forge and send a response > before the remote ntpd sends its response. It is potentially possible that > the malicious data could become injectable/executable code. [CVE-2017-7183] > > III. Impact > > Malicious remote attackers may be able to break time synchornization, > or cause the ntpq(8) utility to crash. > > IV. Workaround > > No workaround is available, but systems not running ntpd(8) or ntpq(8) are > not affected. Network administrators are advised to implement BCP-38 which > helps to reduce risk associated with the attacks. > > V. Solution > > Perform one of the following: > > 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or > release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. > > The ntpd service has to be restarted after the update. A reboot is > recommended but not required. > > 2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: > > Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 > platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: > > # freebsd-update fetch > # freebsd-update install > > The ntpd service has to be restarted after the update. A reboot is > recommended but not required. > > 3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: > > The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable > FreeBSD release branches. > > a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the > detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. > > [FreeBSD 11.1] > # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:02/ntp-11.1.patch > # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:02/ntp-11.1.patch.asc > # gpg --verify ntp-11.1.patch.asc > > [FreeBSD 10.4] > # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:02/ntp-10.4.patch > # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:02/ntp-10.4.patch.asc > # gpg --verify ntp-10.4.patch.asc > > [FreeBSD 10.3] > # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:02/ntp-10.3.patch > # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:02/ntp-10.3.patch.asc > # gpg --verify ntp-10.3.patch.asc > > b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: > > # cd /usr/src > # patch < /path/to/patch > > c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as > described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>. > > Restart the applicable daemons, or reboot the system. > > VI. Correction details > > The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each > affected branch. > > Branch/path Revision > - ------------------------------------------------------------ > ------------- > stable/10/ r330141 > releng/10.3/ r330567 > releng/10.4/ r330567 > stable/11/ r330106 > releng/11.1/ r330567 > - ------------------------------------------------------------ > ------------- > > To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the > following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a > machine with Subversion installed: > > # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base > > Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: > > <URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>; > > VII. References > > <URL:http://support.ntp.org/bin/view/Main/SecurityNotice# > February_2018_ntp_4_2_8p11_NTP_S> > > <URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-7182>; > > <URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-7170>; > > <URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-7184>; > > <URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-7185>; > > <URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-7183>; > > The latest revision of this advisory is available at > <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-18:02.ntp.asc>; > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > > iQKTBAEBCgB9FiEE/A6HiuWv54gCjWNV05eS9J6n5cIFAlqfhYNfFIAAAAAALgAo > aXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3BlbnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEZD > MEU4NzhBRTVBRkU3ODgwMjhENjM1NUQzOTc5MkY0OUVBN0U1QzIACgkQ05eS9J6n > 5cL9GQ/+PLffyegsvxKngL83XWG9UuHbcGG5aWbNwCecTEzNoCI72TI03aga0ge5 > iLz5kW3SQvl8tsq778U4YbfFcCw6ifq2ws8asqNviv+u4AcJh7oD8CS3/kFuA9xM > zjAIrScdNR2taBJhBW3nwlb7RmDeKqydQ3OIxHVvs9Fj5Alc5ZEGezUjC2dueB+M > UdORg6GvHGMYQ+4AtBFRgZHAU3BFkwmgqsIICywYnUVH+AxKj34shs/pMMeJd/d9 > a+BIu/tUjAIlQp23VunNAfq7r2eZik9LOV8Y5l1Ww7+K1IwlwezxI+Iw18BMFEVn > L9baBY9RFh8v/yrZCBqUc7Prhs3ExU/lnAb05Va7TYeD4RXVmSU0jNXi/przN3y2 > PR7Z3JCm60mFKyp0/Hz2MmS1XPBVBrW4P6g9hH8TZmOHb2mZlK3zDXmil7HKp5DK > UhtMJpPEWV9k5rfP8iijHJnwkPr0ALntMUAAKUyw/6isVtHT6BZLaYsZvRYIm8YY > Mn2RUl74m+XoIhQ8R4mxRcaAHwKKXyeyP5nlAs6TQVb9QJukoRiNDr3g8TwbtT54 > iTswVu+z/a89/YIwJoc6Ud7eCZSDYe6qfuC19TVuledayjjy/ZPMH0ZkNWFWJ3AE > VAvdyvoUuNbmsv42o4AUtpE/1CmDqOjwBRZZbtV4CONCDFpk26o= > =D2ov > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > _______________________________________________ > freebsd-security-notifications@freebsd.org mailing list > https://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security-notifications > To unsubscribe, send any mail to "freebsd-security- > notifications-unsubscribe@freebsd.org" > -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4096R/D21D2752 <http://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xF699A450D21D2752>; ECDF B597 B54B 7F92 753E E0EA F699 A450 D21D 2752 Philip M. Gollucci (pgollucci@p6m7g8.com) c: 703.336.9354 Member, Apache Software Foundation Committer, FreeBSD Foundation Consultant, P6M7G8 Inc. Director Cloud Technology, Capital One What doesn't kill us can only make us stronger; Except it almost kills you.
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