Date: Mon, 9 Feb 2015 19:15:16 -0800 (PST) From: Don Lewis <truckman@FreeBSD.org> To: mjguzik@gmail.com Cc: svn-src-head@FreeBSD.org, svn-src-all@FreeBSD.org, src-committers@FreeBSD.org, rpaulo@FreeBSD.org Subject: Re: svn commit: r278479 - in head: etc sys/kern Message-ID: <201502100315.t1A3FGpQ016118@gw.catspoiler.org> In-Reply-To: <201502100311.t1A3BkE0016096@gw.catspoiler.org>
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On 9 Feb, Don Lewis wrote:
> On 10 Feb, Mateusz Guzik wrote:
>> On Mon, Feb 09, 2015 at 11:13:51PM +0000, Rui Paulo wrote:
>>> +notify 10 {
>>> + match "system" "kernel";
>>> + match "subsystem" "signal";
>>> + match "type" "coredump";
>>> + action "logger $comm $core";
>>> +};
>>> +
>>> */
>>>
>> [..]
>>> + if (vn_fullpath_global(td, p->p_textvp, &fullpath, &freepath) != 0)
>>> + goto out;
>>> + snprintf(data, len, "comm=%s", fullpath);
>>
>> I cannot test it right now, but it looks like immediate privilege
>> escalation.
>>
>> Path is not sanitized in any way and devd passes it to 'sh -c'.
>>
>> So a file named "a.out; /bin/id; meh" or so should result in execution
>> of aforementioned /bin/id.
>
> Then there is the issue of a user-generated core file being fed into the
> crash analyzer, possibly exploiting bugs in the latter.
Or worse, the contents of the executable, in particular the debug info,
could also be an attack vector.
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