Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2009 10:43:41 -0400 (EDT) From: Rick Macklem <rmacklem@uoguelph.ca> To: Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> Cc: jeff@FreeBSD.org, "Bjoern A. Zeeb" <bz@FreeBSD.org>, freebsd-current@FreeBSD.org, kib@FreeBSD.org, Navdeep Parhar <np@FreeBSD.org>, Navdeep Parhar <nparhar@gmail.com>, Larry Rosenman <ler@lerctr.org>, lstewart@FreeBSD.org Subject: Re: reproducible panic in netisr Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.4.63.0908061038120.22077@muncher.cs.uoguelph.ca> In-Reply-To: <alpine.BSF.2.00.0908061508520.62916@fledge.watson.org> References: <20090804225806.GA54680@hub.freebsd.org> <20090805054115.O93661@maildrop.int.zabbadoz.net> <20090805063417.GA10969@doormat.home> <alpine.BSF.2.00.0908060011490.59996@fledge.watson.org> <alpine.BSF.2.00.0908060834120.21318@thebighonker.lerctr.org> <alpine.BSF.2.00.0908061508520.62916@fledge.watson.org>
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On Thu, 6 Aug 2009, Robert Watson wrote: > other places where we have very strong alignment requirements on i386/amd64, > such as the td_ucred pointer that we check for change on system calls/traps > to see if we need to refresh the thread's credential from the process > credential. > Does this imply that the nfs/krpc hack of: oldcred = td->td_ucred; td->td_ucred = "some other cred ptr" ... td->td_ucred = oldcred; could be dangerous? Maybe it should be converted to code that replaces the contents instead of replacing the *cred? (Variants of the above live in a bunch of places in the krpc, nlm and nfs code, due to the fact that the socket functions use td->td_ucred in various places.) rick
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