Date: Sun, 08 Jul 2012 02:31:17 -0700 From: Doug Barton <dougb@FreeBSD.org> To: Darren Pilgrim <darren@bluerosetech.com> Cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org, FreeBSD Hackers <freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org> Subject: Re: Replacing BIND with unbound (Was: Re: Pull in upstream before 9.1 code freeze?) Message-ID: <4FF95365.7010605@FreeBSD.org> In-Reply-To: <4FF8D89B.1030308@bluerosetech.com> References: <CA%2BQLa9B-Dm-=hQCrbEgyfO4sKZ5aG72_PEFF9nLhyoy4GRCGrA@mail.gmail.com> <4FF2E00E.2030502@FreeBSD.org> <86bojxow6x.fsf@ds4.des.no> <89AB703D-E075-4AAC-AC1B-B358CC4E4E7F@lists.zabbadoz.net> <4FF8C3A1.9080805@FreeBSD.org> <0AFE3C4A-22DB-4134-949F-4D05BBFC4C6C@lists.zabbadoz.net> <4FF8CA35.7040209@FreeBSD.org> <4FF8D89B.1030308@bluerosetech.com>
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On 07/07/2012 17:47, Darren Pilgrim wrote:
> On 2012-07-07 16:45, Doug Barton wrote:
>> Also re DNSSEC integration in the base, I've stated before that I
>> believe very strongly that any kind of hard-coding of trust anchors as
>> part of the base resolver setup is a bad idea, and should not be done.
>> We need to leverage the ports system for this so that we don't get stuck
>> with a scenario where we have stale stuff in the base that is hard for
>> users to upgrade.
>
> Considering the current root update cert bundle has a 20-year root CA
> and 5-year DNSSEC and email CAs,
Neither of which has any relevance to the actual root zone ZSK, which
could require an emergency roll tomorrow.
> I don't think it's unreasonable to
> maintain a copy of icannbundle.pem in the source tree
Again, that has nothing to do with the actual ZSK, other than providing
a way to validate the *existing* one. That's not the issue, at all.
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