Date: Mon, 29 Nov 1999 20:02:59 -0800 (PST) From: Kris Kennaway <kris@hub.freebsd.org> To: Matthew Dillon <dillon@apollo.backplane.com> Cc: Doug Barton <Doug@gorean.org>, Dan Moschuk <dan@FreeBSD.ORG>, arch@FreeBSD.ORG, audit@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: cvs commit: src/sys/i386/conf files.i386 src/sys/kern kern_fork.c src/sys/libkern arc4random.c src/sys/sys libkern.h Message-ID: <Pine.BSF.4.21.9911291953130.65191-100000@hub.freebsd.org> In-Reply-To: <199911300205.SAA13833@apollo.backplane.com>
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On Mon, 29 Nov 1999, Matthew Dillon wrote: > :There will probably end up being 20 or so randomized features in the > :kernel, most of them trivial (~1 line) patches. As long as they're > :sysctl'able, is it really necessary to have each of them optionable? > > What if we just has a general security randomization option that > applied to all of them, and then a sysctl to cover each of them? > That would cover my concerns. Hmm. I think this would be an acceptable compromise provided it's in GENERIC. Boot floppies and the anti-bloat brigade can leave it out if they want to save that extra 1k :-) The only thing is that in many cases we'd end up doing the equivalent of: #ifdef RANDOM_SECURITY i = arc4random(); #else i = random(); #endif Kris To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-audit" in the body of the message
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