Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2010 10:19:55 +0000 (UTC) From: Dag-Erling Smorgrav <des@FreeBSD.org> To: src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r202613 - head/lib/libfetch Message-ID: <201001191019.o0JAJttr058163@svn.freebsd.org>
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Author: des Date: Tue Jan 19 10:19:55 2010 New Revision: 202613 URL: http://svn.freebsd.org/changeset/base/202613 Log: Add HTTP digest authentication. Submitted by: Jean-Francois Dockes <jf@dockes.org> Forgotten by: des (repeatedly) Modified: head/lib/libfetch/Makefile head/lib/libfetch/http.c Modified: head/lib/libfetch/Makefile ============================================================================== --- head/lib/libfetch/Makefile Tue Jan 19 05:00:57 2010 (r202612) +++ head/lib/libfetch/Makefile Tue Jan 19 10:19:55 2010 (r202613) @@ -17,7 +17,9 @@ CFLAGS+= -DINET6 .if ${MK_OPENSSL} != "no" CFLAGS+= -DWITH_SSL DPADD= ${LIBSSL} ${LIBCRYPTO} -LDADD= -lssl -lcrypto +LDADD= -lssl -lcrypto -lmd +.else +LDADD= -lmd .endif CFLAGS+= -DFTP_COMBINE_CWDS Modified: head/lib/libfetch/http.c ============================================================================== --- head/lib/libfetch/http.c Tue Jan 19 05:00:57 2010 (r202612) +++ head/lib/libfetch/http.c Tue Jan 19 10:19:55 2010 (r202613) @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include <string.h> #include <time.h> #include <unistd.h> +#include <md5.h> #include <netinet/in.h> #include <netinet/tcp.h> @@ -343,7 +344,8 @@ typedef enum { hdr_last_modified, hdr_location, hdr_transfer_encoding, - hdr_www_authenticate + hdr_www_authenticate, + hdr_proxy_authenticate, } hdr_t; /* Names of interesting headers */ @@ -357,6 +359,7 @@ static struct { { hdr_location, "Location" }, { hdr_transfer_encoding, "Transfer-Encoding" }, { hdr_www_authenticate, "WWW-Authenticate" }, + { hdr_proxy_authenticate, "Proxy-Authenticate" }, { hdr_unknown, NULL }, }; @@ -446,21 +449,114 @@ http_match(const char *str, const char * return (hdr); } + /* - * Get the next header and return the appropriate symbolic code. - */ -static hdr_t -http_next_header(conn_t *conn, const char **p) + * Get the next header and return the appropriate symbolic code. We + * need to read one line ahead for checking for a continuation line + * belonging to the current header (continuation lines start with + * white space). + * + * We get called with a fresh line already in the conn buffer, either + * from the previous http_next_header() invocation, or, the first + * time, from a fetch_getln() performed by our caller. + * + * This stops when we encounter an empty line (we dont read beyond the header + * area). + * + * Note that the "headerbuf" is just a place to return the result. Its + * contents are not used for the next call. This means that no cleanup + * is needed when ie doing another connection, just call the cleanup when + * fully done to deallocate memory. + */ + +/* Limit the max number of continuation lines to some reasonable value */ +#define HTTP_MAX_CONT_LINES 10 + +/* Place into which to build a header from one or several lines */ +typedef struct { + char *buf; /* buffer */ + size_t bufsize; /* buffer size */ + size_t buflen; /* length of buffer contents */ +} http_headerbuf_t; + +static void +init_http_headerbuf(http_headerbuf_t *buf) { - int i; + buf->buf = NULL; + buf->bufsize = 0; + buf->buflen = 0; +} - if (fetch_getln(conn) == -1) - return (hdr_syserror); - while (conn->buflen && isspace((unsigned char)conn->buf[conn->buflen - 1])) +static void +clean_http_headerbuf(http_headerbuf_t *buf) +{ + if (buf->buf) + free(buf->buf); + init_http_headerbuf(buf); +} + +/* Remove whitespace at the end of the buffer */ +static void +http_conn_trimright(conn_t *conn) +{ + while (conn->buflen && + isspace((unsigned char)conn->buf[conn->buflen - 1])) conn->buflen--; conn->buf[conn->buflen] = '\0'; +} + +static hdr_t +http_next_header(conn_t *conn, http_headerbuf_t *hbuf, const char **p) +{ + int i, len; + + /* + * Have to do the stripping here because of the first line. So + * it's done twice for the subsequent lines. No big deal + */ + http_conn_trimright(conn); if (conn->buflen == 0) return (hdr_end); + + /* Copy the line to the headerbuf */ + if (hbuf->bufsize < conn->buflen + 1) { + if ((hbuf->buf = realloc(hbuf->buf, conn->buflen + 1)) == NULL) + return (hdr_syserror); + hbuf->bufsize = conn->buflen + 1; + } + strcpy(hbuf->buf, conn->buf); + hbuf->buflen = conn->buflen; + + /* + * Fetch possible continuation lines. Stop at 1st non-continuation + * and leave it in the conn buffer + */ + for (i = 0; i < HTTP_MAX_CONT_LINES; i++) { + if (fetch_getln(conn) == -1) + return (hdr_syserror); + + /* + * Note: we carry on the idea from the previous version + * that a pure whitespace line is equivalent to an empty + * one (so it's not continuation and will be handled when + * we are called next) + */ + http_conn_trimright(conn); + if (conn->buf[0] != ' ' && conn->buf[0] != "\t"[0]) + break; + + /* Got a continuation line. Concatenate to previous */ + len = hbuf->buflen + conn->buflen; + if (hbuf->bufsize < len + 1) { + len *= 2; + if ((hbuf->buf = realloc(hbuf->buf, len + 1)) == NULL) + return (hdr_syserror); + hbuf->bufsize = len + 1; + } + strcpy(hbuf->buf + hbuf->buflen, conn->buf); + hbuf->buflen += conn->buflen; + } + /* * We could check for malformed headers but we don't really care. * A valid header starts with a token immediately followed by a @@ -468,11 +564,290 @@ http_next_header(conn_t *conn, const cha * characters except "()<>@,;:\\\"{}". */ for (i = 0; hdr_names[i].num != hdr_unknown; i++) - if ((*p = http_match(hdr_names[i].name, conn->buf)) != NULL) + if ((*p = http_match(hdr_names[i].name, hbuf->buf)) != NULL) return (hdr_names[i].num); + return (hdr_unknown); } +/************************** + * [Proxy-]Authenticate header parsing + */ + +/* + * Read doublequote-delimited string into output buffer obuf (allocated + * by caller, whose responsibility it is to ensure that it's big enough) + * cp points to the first char after the initial '"' + * Handles \ quoting + * Returns pointer to the first char after the terminating double quote, or + * NULL for error. + */ +static const char * +http_parse_headerstring(const char *cp, char *obuf) +{ + for (;;) { + switch (*cp) { + case 0: /* Unterminated string */ + *obuf = 0; + return (NULL); + case '"': /* Ending quote */ + *obuf = 0; + return (++cp); + case '\\': + if (*++cp == 0) { + *obuf = 0; + return (NULL); + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + *obuf++ = *cp++; + } + } +} + +/* Http auth challenge schemes */ +typedef enum {HTTPAS_UNKNOWN, HTTPAS_BASIC,HTTPAS_DIGEST} http_auth_schemes_t; + +/* Data holder for a Basic or Digest challenge. */ +typedef struct { + http_auth_schemes_t scheme; + char *realm; + char *qop; + char *nonce; + char *opaque; + char *algo; + int stale; + int nc; /* Nonce count */ +} http_auth_challenge_t; + +static void +init_http_auth_challenge(http_auth_challenge_t *b) +{ + b->scheme = HTTPAS_UNKNOWN; + b->realm = b->qop = b->nonce = b->opaque = b->algo = NULL; + b->stale = b->nc = 0; +} + +static void +clean_http_auth_challenge(http_auth_challenge_t *b) +{ + if (b->realm) + free(b->realm); + if (b->qop) + free(b->qop); + if (b->nonce) + free(b->nonce); + if (b->opaque) + free(b->opaque); + if (b->algo) + free(b->algo); + init_http_auth_challenge(b); +} + +/* Data holder for an array of challenges offered in an http response. */ +#define MAX_CHALLENGES 10 +typedef struct { + http_auth_challenge_t *challenges[MAX_CHALLENGES]; + int count; /* Number of parsed challenges in the array */ + int valid; /* We did parse an authenticate header */ +} http_auth_challenges_t; + +static void +init_http_auth_challenges(http_auth_challenges_t *cs) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < MAX_CHALLENGES; i++) + cs->challenges[i] = NULL; + cs->count = cs->valid = 0; +} + +static void +clean_http_auth_challenges(http_auth_challenges_t *cs) +{ + int i; + /* We rely on non-zero pointers being allocated, not on the count */ + for (i = 0; i < MAX_CHALLENGES; i++) { + if (cs->challenges[i] != NULL) { + clean_http_auth_challenge(cs->challenges[i]); + free(cs->challenges[i]); + } + } + init_http_auth_challenges(cs); +} + +/* + * Enumeration for lexical elements. Separators will be returned as their own + * ascii value + */ +typedef enum {HTTPHL_WORD=256, HTTPHL_STRING=257, HTTPHL_END=258, + HTTPHL_ERROR = 259} http_header_lex_t; + +/* + * Determine what kind of token comes next and return possible value + * in buf, which is supposed to have been allocated big enough by + * caller. Advance input pointer and return element type. + */ +static int +http_header_lex(const char **cpp, char *buf) +{ + size_t l; + /* Eat initial whitespace */ + *cpp += strspn(*cpp, " \t"); + if (**cpp == 0) + return (HTTPHL_END); + + /* Separator ? */ + if (**cpp == ',' || **cpp == '=') + return (*((*cpp)++)); + + /* String ? */ + if (**cpp == '"') { + *cpp = http_parse_headerstring(++*cpp, buf); + if (*cpp == NULL) + return (HTTPHL_ERROR); + return (HTTPHL_STRING); + } + + /* Read other token, until separator or whitespace */ + l = strcspn(*cpp, " \t,="); + memcpy(buf, *cpp, l); + buf[l] = 0; + *cpp += l; + return (HTTPHL_WORD); +} + +/* + * Read challenges from http xxx-authenticate header and accumulate them + * in the challenges list structure. + * + * Headers with multiple challenges are specified by rfc2617, but + * servers (ie: squid) often send them in separate headers instead, + * which in turn is forbidden by the http spec (multiple headers with + * the same name are only allowed for pure comma-separated lists, see + * rfc2616 sec 4.2). + * + * We support both approaches anyway + */ +static int +http_parse_authenticate(const char *cp, http_auth_challenges_t *cs) +{ + int ret = -1; + http_header_lex_t lex; + char *key = malloc(strlen(cp) + 1); + char *value = malloc(strlen(cp) + 1); + char *buf = malloc(strlen(cp) + 1); + + if (key == NULL || value == NULL || buf == NULL) { + fetch_syserr(); + goto out; + } + + /* In any case we've seen the header and we set the valid bit */ + cs->valid = 1; + + /* Need word first */ + lex = http_header_lex(&cp, key); + if (lex != HTTPHL_WORD) + goto out; + + /* Loop on challenges */ + for (; cs->count < MAX_CHALLENGES; cs->count++) { + cs->challenges[cs->count] = + malloc(sizeof(http_auth_challenge_t)); + if (cs->challenges[cs->count] == NULL) { + fetch_syserr(); + goto out; + } + init_http_auth_challenge(cs->challenges[cs->count]); + if (!strcasecmp(key, "basic")) { + cs->challenges[cs->count]->scheme = HTTPAS_BASIC; + } else if (!strcasecmp(key, "digest")) { + cs->challenges[cs->count]->scheme = HTTPAS_DIGEST; + } else { + cs->challenges[cs->count]->scheme = HTTPAS_UNKNOWN; + /* + * Continue parsing as basic or digest may + * follow, and the syntax is the same for + * all. We'll just ignore this one when + * looking at the list + */ + } + + /* Loop on attributes */ + for (;;) { + /* Key */ + lex = http_header_lex(&cp, key); + if (lex != HTTPHL_WORD) + goto out; + + /* Equal sign */ + lex = http_header_lex(&cp, buf); + if (lex != '=') + goto out; + + /* Value */ + lex = http_header_lex(&cp, value); + if (lex != HTTPHL_WORD && lex != HTTPHL_STRING) + goto out; + + if (!strcasecmp(key, "realm")) + cs->challenges[cs->count]->realm = + strdup(value); + else if (!strcasecmp(key, "qop")) + cs->challenges[cs->count]->qop = + strdup(value); + else if (!strcasecmp(key, "nonce")) + cs->challenges[cs->count]->nonce = + strdup(value); + else if (!strcasecmp(key, "opaque")) + cs->challenges[cs->count]->opaque = + strdup(value); + else if (!strcasecmp(key, "algorithm")) + cs->challenges[cs->count]->algo = + strdup(value); + else if (!strcasecmp(key, "stale")) + cs->challenges[cs->count]->stale = + strcasecmp(value, "no"); + /* Else ignore unknown attributes */ + + /* Comma or Next challenge or End */ + lex = http_header_lex(&cp, key); + /* + * If we get a word here, this is the beginning of the + * next challenge. Break the attributes loop + */ + if (lex == HTTPHL_WORD) + break; + + if (lex == HTTPHL_END) { + /* End while looking for ',' is normal exit */ + cs->count++; + ret = 0; + goto out; + } + /* Anything else is an error */ + if (lex != ',') + goto out; + + } /* End attributes loop */ + } /* End challenge loop */ + + /* + * Challenges max count exceeded. This really can't happen + * with normal data, something's fishy -> error + */ + +out: + if (key) + free(key); + if (value) + free(value); + if (buf) + free(buf); + return (ret); +} + + /* * Parse a last-modified header */ @@ -618,6 +993,291 @@ http_base64(const char *src) return (str); } + +/* + * Extract authorization parameters from environment value. + * The value is like scheme:realm:user:pass + */ +typedef struct { + char *scheme; + char *realm; + char *user; + char *password; +} http_auth_params_t; + +static void +init_http_auth_params(http_auth_params_t *s) +{ + s->scheme = s->realm = s->user = s->password = 0; +} + +static void +clean_http_auth_params(http_auth_params_t *s) +{ + if (s->scheme) + free(s->scheme); + if (s->realm) + free(s->realm); + if (s->user) + free(s->user); + if (s->password) + free(s->password); + init_http_auth_params(s); +} + +static int +http_authfromenv(const char *p, http_auth_params_t *parms) +{ + int ret = -1; + char *v, *ve; + char *str = strdup(p); + + if (str == NULL) { + fetch_syserr(); + return (-1); + } + v = str; + + if ((ve = strchr(v, ':')) == NULL) + goto out; + + *ve = 0; + if ((parms->scheme = strdup(v)) == NULL) { + fetch_syserr(); + goto out; + } + v = ve + 1; + + if ((ve = strchr(v, ':')) == NULL) + goto out; + + *ve = 0; + if ((parms->realm = strdup(v)) == NULL) { + fetch_syserr(); + goto out; + } + v = ve + 1; + + if ((ve = strchr(v, ':')) == NULL) + goto out; + + *ve = 0; + if ((parms->user = strdup(v)) == NULL) { + fetch_syserr(); + goto out; + } + v = ve + 1; + + + if ((parms->password = strdup(v)) == NULL) { + fetch_syserr(); + goto out; + } + ret = 0; +out: + if (ret == -1) + clean_http_auth_params(parms); + if (str) + free(str); + return (ret); +} + + +/* + * Digest response: the code to compute the digest is taken from the + * sample implementation in RFC2616 + */ +#define IN +#define OUT + +#define HASHLEN 16 +typedef char HASH[HASHLEN]; +#define HASHHEXLEN 32 +typedef char HASHHEX[HASHHEXLEN+1]; + +static const char *hexchars = "0123456789abcdef"; +static void +CvtHex(IN HASH Bin, OUT HASHHEX Hex) +{ + unsigned short i; + unsigned char j; + + for (i = 0; i < HASHLEN; i++) { + j = (Bin[i] >> 4) & 0xf; + Hex[i*2] = hexchars[j]; + j = Bin[i] & 0xf; + Hex[i*2+1] = hexchars[j]; + }; + Hex[HASHHEXLEN] = '\0'; +}; + +/* calculate H(A1) as per spec */ +static void +DigestCalcHA1( + IN char * pszAlg, + IN char * pszUserName, + IN char * pszRealm, + IN char * pszPassword, + IN char * pszNonce, + IN char * pszCNonce, + OUT HASHHEX SessionKey + ) +{ + MD5_CTX Md5Ctx; + HASH HA1; + + MD5Init(&Md5Ctx); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszUserName, strlen(pszUserName)); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszRealm, strlen(pszRealm)); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszPassword, strlen(pszPassword)); + MD5Final(HA1, &Md5Ctx); + if (strcasecmp(pszAlg, "md5-sess") == 0) { + + MD5Init(&Md5Ctx); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, HA1, HASHLEN); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszNonce, strlen(pszNonce)); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszCNonce, strlen(pszCNonce)); + MD5Final(HA1, &Md5Ctx); + }; + CvtHex(HA1, SessionKey); +} + +/* calculate request-digest/response-digest as per HTTP Digest spec */ +static void +DigestCalcResponse( + IN HASHHEX HA1, /* H(A1) */ + IN char * pszNonce, /* nonce from server */ + IN char * pszNonceCount, /* 8 hex digits */ + IN char * pszCNonce, /* client nonce */ + IN char * pszQop, /* qop-value: "", "auth", "auth-int" */ + IN char * pszMethod, /* method from the request */ + IN char * pszDigestUri, /* requested URL */ + IN HASHHEX HEntity, /* H(entity body) if qop="auth-int" */ + OUT HASHHEX Response /* request-digest or response-digest */ + ) +{ +/* DEBUG(fprintf(stderr, + "Calc: HA1[%s] Nonce[%s] qop[%s] method[%s] URI[%s]\n", + HA1, pszNonce, pszQop, pszMethod, pszDigestUri));*/ + MD5_CTX Md5Ctx; + HASH HA2; + HASH RespHash; + HASHHEX HA2Hex; + + // calculate H(A2) + MD5Init(&Md5Ctx); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszMethod, strlen(pszMethod)); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszDigestUri, strlen(pszDigestUri)); + if (strcasecmp(pszQop, "auth-int") == 0) { + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, HEntity, HASHHEXLEN); + }; + MD5Final(HA2, &Md5Ctx); + CvtHex(HA2, HA2Hex); + + // calculate response + MD5Init(&Md5Ctx); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, HA1, HASHHEXLEN); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszNonce, strlen(pszNonce)); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1); + if (*pszQop) { + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszNonceCount, strlen(pszNonceCount)); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszCNonce, strlen(pszCNonce)); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszQop, strlen(pszQop)); + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1); + }; + MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, HA2Hex, HASHHEXLEN); + MD5Final(RespHash, &Md5Ctx); + CvtHex(RespHash, Response); +} + +/* + * Generate/Send a Digest authorization header + * This looks like: [Proxy-]Authorization: credentials + * + * credentials = "Digest" digest-response + * digest-response = 1#( username | realm | nonce | digest-uri + * | response | [ algorithm ] | [cnonce] | + * [opaque] | [message-qop] | + * [nonce-count] | [auth-param] ) + * username = "username" "=" username-value + * username-value = quoted-string + * digest-uri = "uri" "=" digest-uri-value + * digest-uri-value = request-uri ; As specified by HTTP/1.1 + * message-qop = "qop" "=" qop-value + * cnonce = "cnonce" "=" cnonce-value + * cnonce-value = nonce-value + * nonce-count = "nc" "=" nc-value + * nc-value = 8LHEX + * response = "response" "=" request-digest + * request-digest = <"> 32LHEX <"> + */ +static int +http_digest_auth(conn_t *conn, const char *hdr, http_auth_challenge_t *c, + http_auth_params_t *parms, struct url *url) +{ + int r; + char noncecount[10]; + char cnonce[40]; + char *options = 0; + + if (!c->realm || !c->nonce) { + DEBUG(fprintf(stderr, "realm/nonce not set in challenge\n")); + return(-1); + } + if (!c->algo) + c->algo = strdup(""); + + if (asprintf(&options, "%s%s%s%s", + *c->algo? ",algorithm=" : "", c->algo, + c->opaque? ",opaque=" : "", c->opaque?c->opaque:"")== -1) + return (-1); + + if (!c->qop) { + c->qop = strdup(""); + *noncecount = 0; + *cnonce = 0; + } else { + c->nc++; + sprintf(noncecount, "%08x", c->nc); + /* We don't try very hard with the cnonce ... */ + sprintf(cnonce, "%x%lx", getpid(), (unsigned long)time(0)); + } + + HASHHEX HA1; + DigestCalcHA1(c->algo, parms->user, c->realm, + parms->password, c->nonce, cnonce, HA1); + DEBUG(fprintf(stderr, "HA1: [%s]\n", HA1)); + HASHHEX digest; + DigestCalcResponse(HA1, c->nonce, noncecount, cnonce, c->qop, + "GET", url->doc, "", digest); + + if (c->qop[0]) { + r = http_cmd(conn, "%s: Digest username=\"%s\",realm=\"%s\"," + "nonce=\"%s\",uri=\"%s\",response=\"%s\"," + "qop=\"auth\", cnonce=\"%s\", nc=%s%s", + hdr, parms->user, c->realm, + c->nonce, url->doc, digest, + cnonce, noncecount, options); + } else { + r = http_cmd(conn, "%s: Digest username=\"%s\",realm=\"%s\"," + "nonce=\"%s\",uri=\"%s\",response=\"%s\"%s", + hdr, parms->user, c->realm, + c->nonce, url->doc, digest, options); + } + if (options) + free(options); + return (r); +} + /* * Encode username and password */ @@ -627,8 +1287,8 @@ http_basic_auth(conn_t *conn, const char char *upw, *auth; int r; - DEBUG(fprintf(stderr, "usr: [%s]\n", usr)); - DEBUG(fprintf(stderr, "pwd: [%s]\n", pwd)); + DEBUG(fprintf(stderr, "basic: usr: [%s]\n", usr)); + DEBUG(fprintf(stderr, "basic: pwd: [%s]\n", pwd)); if (asprintf(&upw, "%s:%s", usr, pwd) == -1) return (-1); auth = http_base64(upw); @@ -641,33 +1301,49 @@ http_basic_auth(conn_t *conn, const char } /* - * Send an authorization header + * Chose the challenge to answer and call the appropriate routine to + * produce the header. */ static int -http_authorize(conn_t *conn, const char *hdr, const char *p) +http_authorize(conn_t *conn, const char *hdr, http_auth_challenges_t *cs, + http_auth_params_t *parms, struct url *url) { - /* basic authorization */ - if (strncasecmp(p, "basic:", 6) == 0) { - char *user, *pwd, *str; - int r; - - /* skip realm */ - for (p += 6; *p && *p != ':'; ++p) - /* nothing */ ; - if (!*p || strchr(++p, ':') == NULL) - return (-1); - if ((str = strdup(p)) == NULL) - return (-1); /* XXX */ - user = str; - pwd = strchr(str, ':'); - *pwd++ = '\0'; - r = http_basic_auth(conn, hdr, user, pwd); - free(str); - return (r); + http_auth_challenge_t *basic = NULL; + http_auth_challenge_t *digest = NULL; + int i; + + /* If user or pass are null we're not happy */ + if (!parms->user || !parms->password) { + DEBUG(fprintf(stderr, "NULL usr or pass\n")); + return (-1); } - return (-1); -} + /* Look for a Digest and a Basic challenge */ + for (i = 0; i < cs->count; i++) { + if (cs->challenges[i]->scheme == HTTPAS_BASIC) + basic = cs->challenges[i]; + if (cs->challenges[i]->scheme == HTTPAS_DIGEST) + digest = cs->challenges[i]; + } + + /* Error if "Digest" was specified and there is no Digest challenge */ + if (!digest && (parms->scheme && + !strcasecmp(parms->scheme, "digest"))) { + DEBUG(fprintf(stderr, + "Digest auth in env, not supported by peer\n")); + return (-1); + } + /* + * If "basic" was specified in the environment, or there is no Digest + * challenge, do the basic thing. Don't need a challenge for this, + * so no need to check basic!=NULL + */ + if (!digest || (parms->scheme && !strcasecmp(parms->scheme,"basic"))) + return (http_basic_auth(conn,hdr,parms->user,parms->password)); + + /* Else, prefer digest. We just checked that it's not NULL */ + return (http_digest_auth(conn, hdr, digest, parms, url)); +} /***************************************************************************** * Helper functions for connecting to a server or proxy @@ -797,13 +1473,13 @@ http_print_html(FILE *out, FILE *in) */ FILE * http_request(struct url *URL, const char *op, struct url_stat *us, - struct url *purl, const char *flags) + struct url *purl, const char *flags) { char timebuf[80]; char hbuf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 7], *host; conn_t *conn; struct url *url, *new; - int chunked, direct, ims, need_auth, noredirect, verbose; + int chunked, direct, ims, noredirect, verbose; int e, i, n, val; off_t offset, clength, length, size; time_t mtime; @@ -811,6 +1487,14 @@ http_request(struct url *URL, const char FILE *f; hdr_t h; struct tm *timestruct; + http_headerbuf_t headerbuf; + http_auth_challenges_t server_challenges; + http_auth_challenges_t proxy_challenges; + + /* The following calls don't allocate anything */ + init_http_headerbuf(&headerbuf); + init_http_auth_challenges(&server_challenges); + init_http_auth_challenges(&proxy_challenges); direct = CHECK_FLAG('d'); noredirect = CHECK_FLAG('A'); @@ -830,7 +1514,6 @@ http_request(struct url *URL, const char i = 0; e = HTTP_PROTOCOL_ERROR; - need_auth = 0; do { new = NULL; chunked = 0; @@ -895,27 +1578,67 @@ http_request(struct url *URL, const char /* virtual host */ http_cmd(conn, "Host: %s", host); - /* proxy authorization */ - if (purl) { - if (*purl->user || *purl->pwd) - http_basic_auth(conn, "Proxy-Authorization", - purl->user, purl->pwd); - else if ((p = getenv("HTTP_PROXY_AUTH")) != NULL && *p != '\0') - http_authorize(conn, "Proxy-Authorization", p); + /* + * Proxy authorization: we only send auth after we received + * a 407 error. We do not first try basic anyway (changed + * when support was added for digest-auth) + */ + if (purl && proxy_challenges.valid) { + http_auth_params_t aparams; + init_http_auth_params(&aparams); + if (*purl->user || *purl->pwd) { + aparams.user = purl->user ? + strdup(purl->user) : strdup(""); + aparams.password = purl->pwd? + strdup(purl->pwd) : strdup(""); + } else if ((p = getenv("HTTP_PROXY_AUTH")) != NULL && + *p != '\0') { + if (http_authfromenv(p, &aparams) < 0) { + http_seterr(HTTP_NEED_PROXY_AUTH); + goto ouch; + } + } + http_authorize(conn, "Proxy-Authorization", + &proxy_challenges, &aparams, url); + clean_http_auth_params(&aparams); } - /* server authorization */ - if (need_auth || *url->user || *url->pwd) { - if (*url->user || *url->pwd) - http_basic_auth(conn, "Authorization", url->user, url->pwd); - else if ((p = getenv("HTTP_AUTH")) != NULL && *p != '\0') - http_authorize(conn, "Authorization", p); - else if (fetchAuthMethod && fetchAuthMethod(url) == 0) { - http_basic_auth(conn, "Authorization", url->user, url->pwd); + /* + * Server authorization: we never send "a priori" + * Basic auth, which used to be done if user/pass were + * set in the url. This would be weird because we'd send the + * password in the clear even if Digest is finally to be + * used (it would have made more sense for the + * pre-digest version to do this when Basic was specified + * in the environment) + */ + if (server_challenges.valid) { + http_auth_params_t aparams; + init_http_auth_params(&aparams); + if (*url->user || *url->pwd) { + aparams.user = url->user ? + strdup(url->user) : strdup(""); + aparams.password = url->pwd ? + strdup(url->pwd) : strdup(""); + } else if ((p = getenv("HTTP_AUTH")) != NULL && + *p != '\0') { + if (http_authfromenv(p, &aparams) < 0) { + http_seterr(HTTP_NEED_AUTH); + goto ouch; + } + } else if (fetchAuthMethod && + fetchAuthMethod(url) == 0) { + aparams.user = url->user ? + strdup(url->user) : strdup(""); + aparams.password = url->pwd ? + strdup(url->pwd) : strdup(""); } else { http_seterr(HTTP_NEED_AUTH); goto ouch; } + http_authorize(conn, "Authorization", + &server_challenges, &aparams, url); + clean_http_auth_params(&aparams); } /* other headers */ @@ -965,7 +1688,7 @@ http_request(struct url *URL, const char */ break; case HTTP_NEED_AUTH: - if (need_auth) { + if (server_challenges.valid) { /* * We already sent out authorization code, * so there's nothing more we can do. @@ -978,13 +1701,18 @@ http_request(struct url *URL, const char fetch_info("server requires authorization"); break; case HTTP_NEED_PROXY_AUTH: - /* - * If we're talking to a proxy, we already sent - * our proxy authorization code, so there's - * nothing more we can do. - */ - http_seterr(conn->err); - goto ouch; + if (proxy_challenges.valid) { + /* + * We already sent our proxy + * authorization code, so there's + * nothing more we can do. */ + http_seterr(conn->err); + goto ouch; + } + /* try again, but send the password this time */ + if (verbose) + fetch_info("proxy requires authorization"); + break; case HTTP_BAD_RANGE: /* * This can happen if we ask for 0 bytes because @@ -1004,9 +1732,13 @@ http_request(struct url *URL, const char /* fall through so we can get the full error message */ } - /* get headers */ + /* get headers. http_next_header expects one line readahead */ + if (fetch_getln(conn) == -1) { + fetch_syserr(); + goto ouch; + } do { - switch ((h = http_next_header(conn, &p))) { *** DIFF OUTPUT TRUNCATED AT 1000 LINES ***
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