Date: Sat, 12 May 2018 11:56:13 +0000 (UTC) From: =?UTF-8?Q?Dag-Erling_Sm=c3=b8rgrav?= <des@FreeBSD.org> To: src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-vendor@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r333545 - in vendor/unbound/dist: . doc testcode validator Message-ID: <201805121156.w4CBuDoa020024@repo.freebsd.org>
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Author: des Date: Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 New Revision: 333545 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/333545 Log: Vendor import of Unbound 1.6.8. Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/aclocal.m4 vendor/unbound/dist/configure vendor/unbound/dist/configure.ac vendor/unbound/dist/doc/Changelog vendor/unbound/dist/doc/README vendor/unbound/dist/doc/example.conf.in vendor/unbound/dist/doc/libunbound.3.in vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound-anchor.8.in vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound-checkconf.8.in vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound-control.8.in vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound-host.1.in vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound.8.in vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound.conf.5.in vendor/unbound/dist/testcode/unitverify.c vendor/unbound/dist/validator/autotrust.c vendor/unbound/dist/validator/autotrust.h vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_nsec.c vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_nsec.h vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_nsec3.c vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_nsec3.h vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_sigcrypt.c vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_sigcrypt.h vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_utils.c vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_utils.h vendor/unbound/dist/validator/validator.c Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/aclocal.m4 ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/aclocal.m4 Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/aclocal.m4 Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ -# generated automatically by aclocal 1.15 -*- Autoconf -*- +# generated automatically by aclocal 1.15.1 -*- Autoconf -*- -# Copyright (C) 1996-2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# Copyright (C) 1996-2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc. # This file is free software; the Free Software Foundation # gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, @@ -9390,7 +9390,7 @@ AS_IF([test "$AS_TR_SH([with_]m4_tolower([$1]))" = "ye # AM_CONDITIONAL -*- Autoconf -*- -# Copyright (C) 1997-2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# Copyright (C) 1997-2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc. # # This file is free software; the Free Software Foundation # gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, @@ -9421,7 +9421,7 @@ AC_CONFIG_COMMANDS_PRE( Usually this means the macro was only invoked conditionally.]]) fi])]) -# Copyright (C) 2006-2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# Copyright (C) 2006-2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc. # # This file is free software; the Free Software Foundation # gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/configure ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/configure Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/configure Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ #! /bin/sh # Guess values for system-dependent variables and create Makefiles. -# Generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69 for unbound 1.6.7. +# Generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69 for unbound 1.6.8. # # Report bugs to <unbound-bugs@nlnetlabs.nl>. # @@ -590,8 +590,8 @@ MAKEFLAGS= # Identity of this package. PACKAGE_NAME='unbound' PACKAGE_TARNAME='unbound' -PACKAGE_VERSION='1.6.7' -PACKAGE_STRING='unbound 1.6.7' +PACKAGE_VERSION='1.6.8' +PACKAGE_STRING='unbound 1.6.8' PACKAGE_BUGREPORT='unbound-bugs@nlnetlabs.nl' PACKAGE_URL='' @@ -1437,7 +1437,7 @@ if test "$ac_init_help" = "long"; then # Omit some internal or obsolete options to make the list less imposing. # This message is too long to be a string in the A/UX 3.1 sh. cat <<_ACEOF -\`configure' configures unbound 1.6.7 to adapt to many kinds of systems. +\`configure' configures unbound 1.6.8 to adapt to many kinds of systems. Usage: $0 [OPTION]... [VAR=VALUE]... @@ -1502,7 +1502,7 @@ fi if test -n "$ac_init_help"; then case $ac_init_help in - short | recursive ) echo "Configuration of unbound 1.6.7:";; + short | recursive ) echo "Configuration of unbound 1.6.8:";; esac cat <<\_ACEOF @@ -1714,7 +1714,7 @@ fi test -n "$ac_init_help" && exit $ac_status if $ac_init_version; then cat <<\_ACEOF -unbound configure 1.6.7 +unbound configure 1.6.8 generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69 Copyright (C) 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc. @@ -2423,7 +2423,7 @@ cat >config.log <<_ACEOF This file contains any messages produced by compilers while running configure, to aid debugging if configure makes a mistake. -It was created by unbound $as_me 1.6.7, which was +It was created by unbound $as_me 1.6.8, which was generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69. Invocation command line was $ $0 $@ @@ -2775,11 +2775,11 @@ UNBOUND_VERSION_MAJOR=1 UNBOUND_VERSION_MINOR=6 -UNBOUND_VERSION_MICRO=7 +UNBOUND_VERSION_MICRO=8 LIBUNBOUND_CURRENT=7 -LIBUNBOUND_REVISION=6 +LIBUNBOUND_REVISION=7 LIBUNBOUND_AGE=5 # 1.0.0 had 0:12:0 # 1.0.1 had 0:13:0 @@ -2837,6 +2837,7 @@ LIBUNBOUND_AGE=5 # 1.6.5 had 7:4:5 # 1.6.6 had 7:5:5 # 1.6.7 had 7:6:5 +# 1.6.8 had 7:7:5 # Current -- the number of the binary API that we're implementing # Revision -- which iteration of the implementation of the binary @@ -20694,7 +20695,7 @@ _ACEOF -version=1.6.7 +version=1.6.8 date=`date +'%b %e, %Y'` @@ -21213,7 +21214,7 @@ cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 # report actual input values of CONFIG_FILES etc. instead of their # values after options handling. ac_log=" -This file was extended by unbound $as_me 1.6.7, which was +This file was extended by unbound $as_me 1.6.8, which was generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69. Invocation command line was CONFIG_FILES = $CONFIG_FILES @@ -21279,7 +21280,7 @@ _ACEOF cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 ac_cs_config="`$as_echo "$ac_configure_args" | sed 's/^ //; s/[\\""\`\$]/\\\\&/g'`" ac_cs_version="\\ -unbound config.status 1.6.7 +unbound config.status 1.6.8 configured by $0, generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69, with options \\"\$ac_cs_config\\" Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/configure.ac ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/configure.ac Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/configure.ac Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -11,14 +11,14 @@ sinclude(dnscrypt/dnscrypt.m4) # must be numbers. ac_defun because of later processing m4_define([VERSION_MAJOR],[1]) m4_define([VERSION_MINOR],[6]) -m4_define([VERSION_MICRO],[7]) +m4_define([VERSION_MICRO],[8]) AC_INIT(unbound, m4_defn([VERSION_MAJOR]).m4_defn([VERSION_MINOR]).m4_defn([VERSION_MICRO]), unbound-bugs@nlnetlabs.nl, unbound) AC_SUBST(UNBOUND_VERSION_MAJOR, [VERSION_MAJOR]) AC_SUBST(UNBOUND_VERSION_MINOR, [VERSION_MINOR]) AC_SUBST(UNBOUND_VERSION_MICRO, [VERSION_MICRO]) LIBUNBOUND_CURRENT=7 -LIBUNBOUND_REVISION=6 +LIBUNBOUND_REVISION=7 LIBUNBOUND_AGE=5 # 1.0.0 had 0:12:0 # 1.0.1 had 0:13:0 @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ LIBUNBOUND_AGE=5 # 1.6.5 had 7:4:5 # 1.6.6 had 7:5:5 # 1.6.7 had 7:6:5 +# 1.6.8 had 7:7:5 # Current -- the number of the binary API that we're implementing # Revision -- which iteration of the implementation of the binary Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/doc/Changelog ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/doc/Changelog Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/doc/Changelog Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -1,3 +1,7 @@ +19 January 2018: Wouter + - patch for CVE-2017-15105: vulnerability in the processing of + wildcard synthesized NSEC records. + 10 October 2017: Wouter - tag 1.6.7 Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/doc/README ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/doc/README Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/doc/README Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -README for Unbound 1.6.7 +README for Unbound 1.6.8 Copyright 2007 NLnet Labs http://unbound.net Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/doc/example.conf.in ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/doc/example.conf.in Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/doc/example.conf.in Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # # Example configuration file. # -# See unbound.conf(5) man page, version 1.6.7. +# See unbound.conf(5) man page, version 1.6.8. # # this is a comment. Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/doc/libunbound.3.in ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/doc/libunbound.3.in Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/doc/libunbound.3.in Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.TH "libunbound" "3" "Oct 10, 2017" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.7" +.TH "libunbound" "3" "Jan 19, 2018" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.8" .\" .\" libunbound.3 -- unbound library functions manual .\" @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ .B ub_ctx_zone_remove, .B ub_ctx_data_add, .B ub_ctx_data_remove -\- Unbound DNS validating resolver 1.6.7 functions. +\- Unbound DNS validating resolver 1.6.8 functions. .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B #include <unbound.h> .LP Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound-anchor.8.in ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound-anchor.8.in Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound-anchor.8.in Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.TH "unbound-anchor" "8" "Oct 10, 2017" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.7" +.TH "unbound-anchor" "8" "Jan 19, 2018" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.8" .\" .\" unbound-anchor.8 -- unbound anchor maintenance utility manual .\" Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound-checkconf.8.in ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound-checkconf.8.in Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound-checkconf.8.in Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.TH "unbound-checkconf" "8" "Oct 10, 2017" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.7" +.TH "unbound-checkconf" "8" "Jan 19, 2018" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.8" .\" .\" unbound-checkconf.8 -- unbound configuration checker manual .\" Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound-control.8.in ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound-control.8.in Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound-control.8.in Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.TH "unbound-control" "8" "Oct 10, 2017" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.7" +.TH "unbound-control" "8" "Jan 19, 2018" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.8" .\" .\" unbound-control.8 -- unbound remote control manual .\" Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound-host.1.in ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound-host.1.in Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound-host.1.in Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.TH "unbound\-host" "1" "Oct 10, 2017" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.7" +.TH "unbound\-host" "1" "Jan 19, 2018" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.8" .\" .\" unbound-host.1 -- unbound DNS lookup utility .\" Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound.8.in ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound.8.in Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound.8.in Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.TH "unbound" "8" "Oct 10, 2017" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.7" +.TH "unbound" "8" "Jan 19, 2018" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.8" .\" .\" unbound.8 -- unbound manual .\" @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ .\" .SH "NAME" .B unbound -\- Unbound DNS validating resolver 1.6.7. +\- Unbound DNS validating resolver 1.6.8. .SH "SYNOPSIS" .B unbound .RB [ \-h ] Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound.conf.5.in ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound.conf.5.in Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/doc/unbound.conf.5.in Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.TH "unbound.conf" "5" "Oct 10, 2017" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.7" +.TH "unbound.conf" "5" "Jan 19, 2018" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.8" .\" .\" unbound.conf.5 -- unbound.conf manual .\" Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/testcode/unitverify.c ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/testcode/unitverify.c Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/testcode/unitverify.c Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -186,7 +186,9 @@ verifytest_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_en ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class)); } setup_sigalg(dnskey, sigalg); /* check all algorithms in the dnskey */ - sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, dnskey, sigalg, &reason); + /* ok to give null as qstate here, won't be used for answer section. */ + sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, dnskey, sigalg, &reason, + LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, NULL); if(vsig) { printf("verify outcome is: %s %s\n", sec_status_to_string(sec), reason?reason:""); Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/validator/autotrust.c ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/validator/autotrust.c Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/validator/autotrust.c Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -1227,17 +1227,20 @@ void autr_write_file(struct module_env* env, struct tr * @param ve: validator environment (with options) for verification. * @param tp: trust point to verify with * @param rrset: DNSKEY rrset to verify. + * @param qstate: qstate with region. * @return false on failure, true if verification successful. */ static int verify_dnskey(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, - struct trust_anchor* tp, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset) + struct trust_anchor* tp, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, + struct module_qstate* qstate) { char* reason = NULL; uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1]; int downprot = env->cfg->harden_algo_downgrade; enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(env, ve, rrset, - tp->ds_rrset, tp->dnskey_rrset, downprot?sigalg:NULL, &reason); + tp->ds_rrset, tp->dnskey_rrset, downprot?sigalg:NULL, &reason, + qstate); /* sigalg is ignored, it returns algorithms signalled to exist, but * in 5011 there are no other rrsets to check. if downprot is * enabled, then it checks that the DNSKEY is signed with all @@ -1276,7 +1279,8 @@ min_expiry(struct module_env* env, struct packed_rrset /** Is rr self-signed revoked key */ static int rr_is_selfsigned_revoked(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, size_t i) + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, size_t i, + struct module_qstate* qstate) { enum sec_status sec; char* reason = NULL; @@ -1285,7 +1289,7 @@ rr_is_selfsigned_revoked(struct module_env* env, struc /* no algorithm downgrade protection necessary, if it is selfsigned * revoked it can be removed. */ sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, dnskey_rrset, i, - &reason); + &reason, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate); return (sec == sec_status_secure); } @@ -1501,7 +1505,7 @@ init_events(struct trust_anchor* tp) static void check_contains_revoked(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct trust_anchor* tp, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, - int* changed) + int* changed, struct module_qstate* qstate) { struct packed_rrset_data* dd = (struct packed_rrset_data*) dnskey_rrset->entry.data; @@ -1521,7 +1525,7 @@ check_contains_revoked(struct module_env* env, struct } if(!ta) continue; /* key not found */ - if(rr_is_selfsigned_revoked(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, i)) { + if(rr_is_selfsigned_revoked(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, i, qstate)) { /* checked if there is an rrsig signed by this key. */ /* same keytag, but stored can be revoked already, so * compare keytags, with +0 or +128(REVOKE flag) */ @@ -2118,7 +2122,8 @@ autr_tp_remove(struct module_env* env, struct trust_an } int autr_process_prime(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, - struct trust_anchor* tp, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset) + struct trust_anchor* tp, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, + struct module_qstate* qstate) { int changed = 0; log_assert(tp && tp->autr); @@ -2159,7 +2164,7 @@ int autr_process_prime(struct module_env* env, struct return 1; /* trust point exists */ } /* check for revoked keys to remove immediately */ - check_contains_revoked(env, ve, tp, dnskey_rrset, &changed); + check_contains_revoked(env, ve, tp, dnskey_rrset, &changed, qstate); if(changed) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "autotrust: revokedkeys, reassemble"); if(!autr_assemble(tp)) { @@ -2175,7 +2180,7 @@ int autr_process_prime(struct module_env* env, struct } } /* verify the dnskey rrset and see if it is valid. */ - if(!verify_dnskey(env, ve, tp, dnskey_rrset)) { + if(!verify_dnskey(env, ve, tp, dnskey_rrset, qstate)) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "autotrust: dnskey did not verify."); /* only increase failure count if this is not the first prime, * this means there was a previous successful probe */ Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/validator/autotrust.h ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/validator/autotrust.h Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/validator/autotrust.h Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ struct val_anchors; struct trust_anchor; struct ub_packed_rrset_key; struct module_env; +struct module_qstate; struct val_env; struct sldns_buffer; @@ -188,12 +189,14 @@ void autr_point_delete(struct trust_anchor* tp); * @param tp: trust anchor to process. * @param dnskey_rrset: DNSKEY rrset probed (can be NULL if bad prime result). * allocated in a region. Has not been validated yet. + * @param qstate: qstate with region. * @return false if trust anchor was revoked completely. * Otherwise logs errors to log, does not change return value. * On errors, likely the trust point has been unchanged. */ int autr_process_prime(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, - struct trust_anchor* tp, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset); + struct trust_anchor* tp, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, + struct module_qstate* qstate); /** * Debug printout of rfc5011 tracked anchors Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_nsec.c ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_nsec.c Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_nsec.c Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ val_nsec_proves_no_ds(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec static int nsec_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec, struct key_entry_key* kkey, - char** reason) + char** reason, struct module_qstate* qstate) { struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*) nsec->entry.data; @@ -185,7 +185,8 @@ nsec_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_e rrset_check_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, nsec, *env->now); if(d->security == sec_status_secure) return 1; - d->security = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, nsec, kkey, reason); + d->security = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, nsec, kkey, reason, + LDNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, qstate); if(d->security == sec_status_secure) { rrset_update_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, nsec, *env->now); return 1; @@ -196,7 +197,8 @@ nsec_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_e enum sec_status val_nsec_prove_nodata_dsreply(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct query_info* qinfo, struct reply_info* rep, - struct key_entry_key* kkey, time_t* proof_ttl, char** reason) + struct key_entry_key* kkey, time_t* proof_ttl, char** reason, + struct module_qstate* qstate) { struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec = reply_find_rrset_section_ns( rep, qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC, @@ -213,7 +215,7 @@ val_nsec_prove_nodata_dsreply(struct module_env* env, * 1) this is a delegation point and there is no DS * 2) this is not a delegation point */ if(nsec) { - if(!nsec_verify_rrset(env, ve, nsec, kkey, reason)) { + if(!nsec_verify_rrset(env, ve, nsec, kkey, reason, qstate)) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NSEC RRset for the " "referral did not verify."); return sec_status_bogus; @@ -242,7 +244,8 @@ val_nsec_prove_nodata_dsreply(struct module_env* env, i++) { if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type != htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC)) continue; - if(!nsec_verify_rrset(env, ve, rep->rrsets[i], kkey, reason)) { + if(!nsec_verify_rrset(env, ve, rep->rrsets[i], kkey, reason, + qstate)) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NSEC for empty non-terminal " "did not verify."); return sec_status_bogus; Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_nsec.h ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_nsec.h Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_nsec.h Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ #include "util/data/packed_rrset.h" struct val_env; struct module_env; +struct module_qstate; struct ub_packed_rrset_key; struct reply_info; struct query_info; @@ -64,6 +65,7 @@ struct key_entry_key; * @param kkey: key entry to use for verification of signatures. * @param proof_ttl: if secure, the TTL of how long this proof lasts. * @param reason: string explaining why bogus. + * @param qstate: qstate with region. * @return security status. * SECURE: proved absence of DS. * INSECURE: proved that this was not a delegation point. @@ -73,7 +75,7 @@ struct key_entry_key; enum sec_status val_nsec_prove_nodata_dsreply(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct query_info* qinfo, struct reply_info* rep, struct key_entry_key* kkey, - time_t* proof_ttl, char** reason); + time_t* proof_ttl, char** reason, struct module_qstate* qstate); /** * nsec typemap check, takes an NSEC-type bitmap as argument, checks for type. Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_nsec3.c ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_nsec3.c Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_nsec3.c Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ nsec3_prove_wildcard(struct module_env* env, struct va static int list_is_secure(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num, - struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason) + struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason, struct module_qstate* qstate) { struct packed_rrset_data* d; size_t i; @@ -1299,7 +1299,7 @@ list_is_secure(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* if(d->security == sec_status_secure) continue; d->security = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, list[i], kkey, - reason); + reason, LDNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, qstate); if(d->security != sec_status_secure) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NSEC3 did not verify"); return 0; @@ -1312,7 +1312,8 @@ list_is_secure(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* enum sec_status nsec3_prove_nods(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num, - struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason) + struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason, + struct module_qstate* qstate) { rbtree_type ct; struct nsec3_filter flt; @@ -1325,7 +1326,7 @@ nsec3_prove_nods(struct module_env* env, struct val_en *reason = "no valid NSEC3s"; return sec_status_bogus; /* no valid NSEC3s, bogus */ } - if(!list_is_secure(env, ve, list, num, kkey, reason)) + if(!list_is_secure(env, ve, list, num, kkey, reason, qstate)) return sec_status_bogus; /* not all NSEC3 records secure */ rbtree_init(&ct, &nsec3_hash_cmp); /* init names-to-hash cache */ filter_init(&flt, list, num, qinfo); /* init RR iterator */ Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_nsec3.h ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_nsec3.h Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_nsec3.h Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ struct val_env; struct regional; struct module_env; +struct module_qstate; struct ub_packed_rrset_key; struct reply_info; struct query_info; @@ -185,6 +186,7 @@ nsec3_prove_wildcard(struct module_env* env, struct va * @param qinfo: query that is verified for. * @param kkey: key entry that signed the NSEC3s. * @param reason: string for bogus result. + * @param qstate: qstate with region. * @return: * sec_status SECURE of the proposition is proven by the NSEC3 RRs, * BOGUS if not, INSECURE if all of the NSEC3s could be validly ignored. @@ -194,7 +196,8 @@ nsec3_prove_wildcard(struct module_env* env, struct va enum sec_status nsec3_prove_nods(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num, - struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason); + struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason, + struct module_qstate* qstate); /** * Prove NXDOMAIN or NODATA. Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_sigcrypt.c ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_sigcrypt.c Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_sigcrypt.c Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -485,7 +485,8 @@ int algo_needs_missing(struct algo_needs* n) enum sec_status dnskeyset_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, - uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason) + uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section, + struct module_qstate* qstate) { enum sec_status sec; size_t i, num; @@ -512,7 +513,7 @@ dnskeyset_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct } for(i=0; i<num; i++) { sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig(env, ve, *env->now, rrset, - dnskey, i, &sortree, reason); + dnskey, i, &sortree, reason, section, qstate); /* see which algorithm has been fixed up */ if(sec == sec_status_secure) { if(!sigalg) @@ -553,7 +554,8 @@ void algo_needs_reason(struct module_env* env, int alg enum sec_status dnskey_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, - size_t dnskey_idx, char** reason) + size_t dnskey_idx, char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section, + struct module_qstate* qstate) { enum sec_status sec; size_t i, num, numchecked = 0; @@ -577,7 +579,8 @@ dnskey_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val buf_canon = 0; sec = dnskey_verify_rrset_sig(env->scratch, env->scratch_buffer, ve, *env->now, rrset, - dnskey, dnskey_idx, i, &sortree, &buf_canon, reason); + dnskey, dnskey_idx, i, &sortree, &buf_canon, reason, + section, qstate); if(sec == sec_status_secure) return sec; numchecked ++; @@ -591,7 +594,8 @@ enum sec_status dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, time_t now, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, size_t sig_idx, - struct rbtree_type** sortree, char** reason) + struct rbtree_type** sortree, char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section, + struct module_qstate* qstate) { /* find matching keys and check them */ enum sec_status sec = sec_status_bogus; @@ -616,7 +620,7 @@ dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig(struct module_env* env, str /* see if key verifies */ sec = dnskey_verify_rrset_sig(env->scratch, env->scratch_buffer, ve, now, rrset, dnskey, i, - sig_idx, sortree, &buf_canon, reason); + sig_idx, sortree, &buf_canon, reason, section, qstate); if(sec == sec_status_secure) return sec; } @@ -1121,12 +1125,15 @@ int rrset_canonical_equal(struct regional* region, * signer name length. * @param sortree: if NULL is passed a new sorted rrset tree is built. * Otherwise it is reused. + * @param section: section of packet where this rrset comes from. + * @param qstate: qstate with region. * @return false on alloc error. */ static int rrset_canonical(struct regional* region, sldns_buffer* buf, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* k, uint8_t* sig, size_t siglen, - struct rbtree_type** sortree) + struct rbtree_type** sortree, sldns_pkt_section section, + struct module_qstate* qstate) { struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)k->entry.data; uint8_t* can_owner = NULL; @@ -1175,6 +1182,20 @@ rrset_canonical(struct regional* region, sldns_buffer* canonicalize_rdata(buf, k, d->rr_len[walk->rr_idx]); } sldns_buffer_flip(buf); + + /* Replace RR owner with canonical owner for NSEC records in authority + * section, to prevent that a wildcard synthesized NSEC can be used in + * the non-existence proves. */ + if(ntohs(k->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC && + section == LDNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY) { + k->rk.dname = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, can_owner, + can_owner_len); + if(!k->rk.dname) + return 0; + k->rk.dname_len = can_owner_len; + } + + return 1; } @@ -1318,7 +1339,8 @@ dnskey_verify_rrset_sig(struct regional* region, sldns struct val_env* ve, time_t now, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, size_t dnskey_idx, size_t sig_idx, - struct rbtree_type** sortree, int* buf_canon, char** reason) + struct rbtree_type** sortree, int* buf_canon, char** reason, + sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate) { enum sec_status sec; uint8_t* sig; /* RRSIG rdata */ @@ -1417,7 +1439,7 @@ dnskey_verify_rrset_sig(struct regional* region, sldns /* create rrset canonical format in buffer, ready for * signature */ if(!rrset_canonical(region, buf, rrset, sig+2, - 18 + signer_len, sortree)) { + 18 + signer_len, sortree, section, qstate)) { log_err("verify: failed due to alloc error"); return sec_status_unchecked; } Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_sigcrypt.h ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_sigcrypt.h Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_sigcrypt.h Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -44,8 +44,10 @@ #ifndef VALIDATOR_VAL_SIGCRYPT_H #define VALIDATOR_VAL_SIGCRYPT_H #include "util/data/packed_rrset.h" +#include "sldns/pkthdr.h" struct val_env; struct module_env; +struct module_qstate; struct ub_packed_rrset_key; struct rbtree_type; struct regional; @@ -237,13 +239,16 @@ uint16_t dnskey_get_flags(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* * @param sigalg: if nonNULL provide downgrade protection otherwise one * algorithm is enough. * @param reason: if bogus, a string returned, fixed or alloced in scratch. + * @param section: section of packet where this rrset comes from. + * @param qstate: qstate with region. * @return SECURE if one key in the set verifies one rrsig. * UNCHECKED on allocation errors, unsupported algorithms, malformed data, * and BOGUS on verification failures (no keys match any signatures). */ enum sec_status dnskeyset_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason); + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, + sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate); /** * verify rrset against one specific dnskey (from rrset) @@ -253,12 +258,15 @@ enum sec_status dnskeyset_verify_rrset(struct module_e * @param dnskey: DNSKEY rrset, keyset. * @param dnskey_idx: which key from the rrset to try. * @param reason: if bogus, a string returned, fixed or alloced in scratch. + * @param section: section of packet where this rrset comes from. + * @param qstate: qstate with region. * @return secure if *this* key signs any of the signatures on rrset. * unchecked on error or and bogus on bad signature. */ enum sec_status dnskey_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, size_t dnskey_idx, char** reason); + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, size_t dnskey_idx, char** reason, + sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate); /** * verify rrset, with dnskey rrset, for a specific rrsig in rrset @@ -271,13 +279,16 @@ enum sec_status dnskey_verify_rrset(struct module_env* * @param sortree: reused sorted order. Stored in region. Pass NULL at start, * and for a new rrset. * @param reason: if bogus, a string returned, fixed or alloced in scratch. + * @param section: section of packet where this rrset comes from. + * @param qstate: qstate with region. * @return secure if any key signs *this* signature. bogus if no key signs it, * or unchecked on error. */ enum sec_status dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, time_t now, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, size_t sig_idx, - struct rbtree_type** sortree, char** reason); + struct rbtree_type** sortree, char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section, + struct module_qstate* qstate); /** * verify rrset, with specific dnskey(from set), for a specific rrsig @@ -295,6 +306,8 @@ enum sec_status dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig(struct modu * pass false at start. pass old value only for same rrset and same * signature (but perhaps different key) for reuse. * @param reason: if bogus, a string returned, fixed or alloced in scratch. + * @param section: section of packet where this rrset comes from. + * @param qstate: qstate with region. * @return secure if this key signs this signature. unchecked on error or * bogus if it did not validate. */ @@ -302,7 +315,8 @@ enum sec_status dnskey_verify_rrset_sig(struct regiona struct sldns_buffer* buf, struct val_env* ve, time_t now, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, size_t dnskey_idx, size_t sig_idx, - struct rbtree_type** sortree, int* buf_canon, char** reason); + struct rbtree_type** sortree, int* buf_canon, char** reason, + sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate); /** * canonical compare for two tree entries Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_utils.c ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_utils.c Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_utils.c Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -335,7 +335,8 @@ rrset_get_ttl(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset) enum sec_status val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* keys, - uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason) + uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section, + struct module_qstate* qstate) { enum sec_status sec; struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset-> @@ -357,7 +358,8 @@ val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_en } log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset", rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type), ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class)); - sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, keys, sigalg, reason); + sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, keys, sigalg, reason, + section, qstate); verbose(VERB_ALGO, "verify result: %s", sec_status_to_string(sec)); regional_free_all(env->scratch); @@ -390,7 +392,7 @@ val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_en enum sec_status val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct key_entry_key* kkey, - char** reason) + char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate) { /* temporary dnskey rrset-key */ struct ub_packed_rrset_key dnskey; @@ -403,7 +405,8 @@ val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env, struct dnskey.rk.dname_len = kkey->namelen; dnskey.entry.key = &dnskey; dnskey.entry.data = kd->rrset_data; - sec = val_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, &dnskey, kd->algo, reason); + sec = val_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, &dnskey, kd->algo, reason, + section, qstate); return sec; } @@ -411,7 +414,8 @@ val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env, struct static enum sec_status verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, size_t ds_idx, char** reason) + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, size_t ds_idx, char** reason, + struct module_qstate* qstate) { enum sec_status sec = sec_status_bogus; size_t i, num, numchecked = 0, numhashok = 0; @@ -442,7 +446,7 @@ verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(struct module_env* env, stru /* Otherwise, we have a match! Make sure that the DNSKEY * verifies *with this key* */ sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, - dnskey_rrset, i, reason); + dnskey_rrset, i, reason, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate); if(sec == sec_status_secure) { return sec; } @@ -478,7 +482,8 @@ int val_favorite_ds_algo(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* d enum sec_status val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason) + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, + struct module_qstate* qstate) { /* as long as this is false, we can consider this DS rrset to be * equivalent to no DS rrset. */ @@ -520,7 +525,7 @@ val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env, stru has_useful_ds = 1; sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, - ds_rrset, i, reason); + ds_rrset, i, reason, qstate); if(sec == sec_status_secure) { if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs, (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i))) { @@ -553,11 +558,12 @@ val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env, stru struct key_entry_key* val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, int downprot, char** reason) + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, int downprot, char** reason, + struct module_qstate* qstate) { uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1]; enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(env, ve, - dnskey_rrset, ds_rrset, downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason); + dnskey_rrset, ds_rrset, downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason, qstate); if(sec == sec_status_secure) { return key_entry_create_rrset(region, @@ -579,7 +585,8 @@ enum sec_status val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds, - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason) + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, + struct module_qstate* qstate) { /* as long as this is false, we can consider this anchor to be * equivalent to no anchor. */ @@ -630,7 +637,7 @@ val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct module_env* env, stru has_useful_ta = 1; sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, - ta_ds, i, reason); + ta_ds, i, reason, qstate); if(sec == sec_status_secure) { if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs, (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i))) { @@ -656,7 +663,7 @@ val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct module_env* env, stru has_useful_ta = 1; sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, - ta_dnskey, i, reason); + ta_dnskey, i, reason, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate); if(sec == sec_status_secure) { if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs, (uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i))) { @@ -690,12 +697,12 @@ val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(struct regional* region struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds_rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey_rrset, int downprot, - char** reason) + char** reason, struct module_qstate* qstate) { uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1]; enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, ta_ds_rrset, ta_dnskey_rrset, - downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason); + downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason, qstate); if(sec == sec_status_secure) { return key_entry_create_rrset(region, Modified: vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_utils.h ============================================================================== --- vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_utils.h Sat May 12 11:56:05 2018 (r333544) +++ vendor/unbound/dist/validator/val_utils.h Sat May 12 11:56:13 2018 (r333545) @@ -42,10 +42,12 @@ #ifndef VALIDATOR_VAL_UTILS_H #define VALIDATOR_VAL_UTILS_H #include "util/data/packed_rrset.h" +#include "sldns/pkthdr.h" struct query_info; struct reply_info; struct val_env; struct module_env; +struct module_qstate; struct ub_packed_rrset_key; struct key_entry_key; struct regional; @@ -120,11 +122,14 @@ void val_find_signer(enum val_classification subtype, * @param sigalg: if nonNULL provide downgrade protection otherwise one * algorithm is enough. Algo list is constructed in here. * @param reason: reason of failure. Fixed string or alloced in scratch. + * @param section: section of packet where this rrset comes from. + * @param qstate: qstate with region. * @return security status of verification. */ enum sec_status val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* keys, - uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason); + uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section, + struct module_qstate* qstate); /** * Verify RRset with keys from a keyset. @@ -133,11 +138,14 @@ enum sec_status val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* en * @param rrset: what to verify * @param kkey: key_entry to verify with. * @param reason: reason of failure. Fixed string or alloced in scratch. + * @param section: section of packet where this rrset comes from. + * @param qstate: qstate with region. * @return security status of verification. */ enum sec_status val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, - struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason); + struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section, + struct module_qstate* qstate); /** * Verify DNSKEYs with DS rrset. Like val_verify_new_DNSKEYs but @@ -150,13 +158,15 @@ enum sec_status val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_e * algorithm is enough. The list of signalled algorithms is returned, * must have enough space for ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1. * @param reason: reason of failure. Fixed string or alloced in scratch. + * @param qstate: qstate with region. * @return: sec_status_secure if a DS matches. * sec_status_insecure if end of trust (i.e., unknown algorithms). * sec_status_bogus if it fails. */ enum sec_status val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason); + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, + struct module_qstate* qstate); /** * Verify DNSKEYs with DS and DNSKEY rrset. Like val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS @@ -170,6 +180,7 @@ enum sec_status val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct modul * algorithm is enough. The list of signalled algorithms is returned, * must have enough space for ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1. * @param reason: reason of failure. Fixed string or alloced in scratch. + * @param qstate: qstate with region. * @return: sec_status_secure if a DS matches. * sec_status_insecure if end of trust (i.e., unknown algorithms). * sec_status_bogus if it fails. @@ -177,7 +188,8 @@ enum sec_status val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct modul enum sec_status val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds, - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason); + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, + struct module_qstate* qstate); /** * Verify new DNSKEYs with DS rrset. The DS contains hash values that should @@ -192,6 +204,7 @@ enum sec_status val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct modul * @param downprot: if true provide downgrade protection otherwise one * algorithm is enough. * @param reason: reason of failure. Fixed string or alloced in scratch. + * @param qstate: qstate with region. * @return a KeyEntry. This will either contain the now trusted * dnskey_rrset, a "null" key entry indicating that this DS * rrset/DNSKEY pair indicate an secure end to the island of trust @@ -205,7 +218,8 @@ enum sec_status val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct modul struct key_entry_key* val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, int downprot, char** reason); + struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, int downprot, char** reason, + struct module_qstate* qstate); /** @@ -220,6 +234,7 @@ struct key_entry_key* val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(struct re * @param downprot: if true provide downgrade protection otherwise one * algorithm is enough. * @param reason: reason of failure. Fixed string or alloced in scratch. + * @param qstate: qstate with region. * @return a KeyEntry. This will either contain the now trusted * dnskey_rrset, a "null" key entry indicating that this DS * rrset/DNSKEY pair indicate an secure end to the island of trust @@ -235,7 +250,7 @@ struct key_entry_key* val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(s struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds_rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey_rrset, - int downprot, char** reason); + int downprot, char** reason, struct module_qstate* qstate); /** * Determine if DS rrset is usable for validator or not. @@ -252,7 +267,7 @@ int val_dsset_isusable(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_ * the result of a wildcard expansion. If so, return the name of the * generating wildcard. * - * @param rrset The rrset to chedck. + * @param rrset The rrset to check. *** DIFF OUTPUT TRUNCATED AT 1000 LINES ***
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