Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2019 03:46:39 +0000 (UTC) From: Sean Eric Fagan <sef@FreeBSD.org> To: src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r344140 - in head/sys: conf modules/crypto opencrypto Message-ID: <201902150346.x1F3kdkE013327@repo.freebsd.org>
next in thread | raw e-mail | index | archive | help
Author: sef Date: Fri Feb 15 03:46:39 2019 New Revision: 344140 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/344140 Log: Add CBC-MAC authentication. This adds the CBC-MAC code to the kernel, but does not hook it up to anything (that comes in the next commit). https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3610 describes the algorithm. Note that this is a software-only implementation, which means it is fairly slow. Sponsored by: iXsystems Inc Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D18592 Added: head/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.c (contents, props changed) head/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.h (contents, props changed) head/sys/opencrypto/xform_cbc_mac.c (contents, props changed) Modified: head/sys/conf/files head/sys/modules/crypto/Makefile head/sys/opencrypto/cryptodev.h Modified: head/sys/conf/files ============================================================================== --- head/sys/conf/files Fri Feb 15 00:29:44 2019 (r344139) +++ head/sys/conf/files Fri Feb 15 03:46:39 2019 (r344140) @@ -4847,6 +4847,8 @@ crypto/libsodium/randombytes.c optional crypto \ compile-with "${NORMAL_C} -I$S/contrib/libsodium/src/libsodium/include -I$S/crypto/libsodium" crypto/libsodium/utils.c optional crypto \ compile-with "${NORMAL_C} -I$S/contrib/libsodium/src/libsodium/include -I$S/crypto/libsodium" +opencrypto/cbc_mac.c optional crypto +opencrypto/xform_cbc_mac.c optional crypto rpc/auth_none.c optional krpc | nfslockd | nfscl | nfsd rpc/auth_unix.c optional krpc | nfslockd | nfscl | nfsd rpc/authunix_prot.c optional krpc | nfslockd | nfscl | nfsd Modified: head/sys/modules/crypto/Makefile ============================================================================== --- head/sys/modules/crypto/Makefile Fri Feb 15 00:29:44 2019 (r344139) +++ head/sys/modules/crypto/Makefile Fri Feb 15 03:46:39 2019 (r344140) @@ -68,5 +68,7 @@ CFLAGS.utils.c += -I${LIBSODIUM_INC} -I${LIBSODIUM_C SRCS += opt_param.h cryptodev_if.h bus_if.h device_if.h SRCS += opt_ddb.h +SRCS += cbc_mac.c +SRCS += xform_cbc_mac.c .include <bsd.kmod.mk> Added: head/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.c ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ head/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.c Fri Feb 15 03:46:39 2019 (r344140) @@ -0,0 +1,252 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018-2019 iXsystems Inc. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include <sys/cdefs.h> +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$); + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/systm.h> +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/endian.h> +#include <opencrypto/cbc_mac.h> +#include <opencrypto/xform_auth.h> + +/* + * Given two CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN blocks, xor + * them into dst, and then encrypt dst. + */ +static void +xor_and_encrypt(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx, + const uint8_t *src, uint8_t *dst) +{ + const uint64_t *b1; + uint64_t *b2; + uint64_t temp_block[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN/sizeof(uint64_t)]; + + b1 = (const uint64_t*)src; + b2 = (uint64_t*)dst; + + for (size_t count = 0; + count < CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN/sizeof(uint64_t); + count++) { + temp_block[count] = b1[count] ^ b2[count]; + } + rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->keysched, ctx->rounds, (void*)temp_block, dst); +} + +void +AES_CBC_MAC_Init(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx) +{ + bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +void +AES_CBC_MAC_Setkey(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *key, uint16_t klen) +{ + ctx->rounds = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(ctx->keysched, key, klen * 8); +} + +/* + * This is called to set the nonce, aka IV. + * Before this call, the authDataLength and cryptDataLength fields + * MUST have been set. Sadly, there's no way to return an error. + * + * The CBC-MAC algorithm requires that the first block contain the + * nonce, as well as information about the sizes and lengths involved. + */ +void +AES_CBC_MAC_Reinit(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *nonce, uint16_t nonceLen) +{ + uint8_t b0[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN]; + uint8_t *bp = b0, flags = 0; + uint8_t L = 0; + uint64_t dataLength = ctx->cryptDataLength; + + KASSERT(ctx->authDataLength != 0 || ctx->cryptDataLength != 0, + ("Auth Data and Data lengths cannot both be 0")); + + KASSERT(nonceLen >= 7 && nonceLen <= 13, + ("nonceLen must be between 7 and 13 bytes")); + + ctx->nonce = nonce; + ctx->nonceLength = nonceLen; + + ctx->authDataCount = 0; + ctx->blockIndex = 0; + explicit_bzero(ctx->staging_block, sizeof(ctx->staging_block)); + + /* + * Need to determine the L field value. This is the number of + * bytes needed to specify the length of the message; the length + * is whatever is left in the 16 bytes after specifying flags and + * the nonce. + */ + L = 15 - nonceLen; + + flags = ((ctx->authDataLength > 0) << 6) + + (((AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN - 2) / 2) << 3) + + L - 1; + /* + * Now we need to set up the first block, which has flags, nonce, + * and the message length. + */ + b0[0] = flags; + bcopy(nonce, b0 + 1, nonceLen); + bp = b0 + 1 + nonceLen; + + /* Need to copy L' [aka L-1] bytes of cryptDataLength */ + for (uint8_t *dst = b0 + sizeof(b0) - 1; dst >= bp; dst--) { + *dst = dataLength; + dataLength >>= 8; + } + /* Now need to encrypt b0 */ + rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->keysched, ctx->rounds, b0, ctx->block); + /* If there is auth data, we need to set up the staging block */ + if (ctx->authDataLength) { + if (ctx->authDataLength < ((1<<16) - (1<<8))) { + uint16_t sizeVal = htobe16(ctx->authDataLength); + bcopy(&sizeVal, ctx->staging_block, sizeof(sizeVal)); + ctx->blockIndex = sizeof(sizeVal); + } else if (ctx->authDataLength < (1UL<<32)) { + uint32_t sizeVal = htobe32(ctx->authDataLength); + ctx->staging_block[0] = 0xff; + ctx->staging_block[1] = 0xfe; + bcopy(&sizeVal, ctx->staging_block+2, sizeof(sizeVal)); + ctx->blockIndex = 2 + sizeof(sizeVal); + } else { + uint64_t sizeVal = htobe64(ctx->authDataLength); + ctx->staging_block[0] = 0xff; + ctx->staging_block[1] = 0xff; + bcopy(&sizeVal, ctx->staging_block+2, sizeof(sizeVal)); + ctx->blockIndex = 2 + sizeof(sizeVal); + } + } +} + +int +AES_CBC_MAC_Update(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, + uint16_t length) +{ + size_t copy_amt; + + /* + * This will be called in one of two phases: + * (1) Applying authentication data, or + * (2) Applying the payload data. + * + * Because CBC-MAC puts the authentication data size before the + * data, subsequent calls won't be block-size-aligned. Which + * complicates things a fair bit. + * + * The payload data doesn't have that problem. + */ + + if (ctx->authDataCount < ctx->authDataLength) { + /* + * We need to process data as authentication data. + * Since we may be out of sync, we may also need + * to pad out the staging block. + */ + const uint8_t *ptr = data; + while (length > 0) { + + copy_amt = MIN(length, + sizeof(ctx->staging_block) - ctx->blockIndex); + + bcopy(ptr, ctx->staging_block + ctx->blockIndex, + copy_amt); + ptr += copy_amt; + length -= copy_amt; + ctx->authDataCount += copy_amt; + ctx->blockIndex += copy_amt; + ctx->blockIndex %= sizeof(ctx->staging_block); + if (ctx->authDataCount == ctx->authDataLength) + length = 0; + if (ctx->blockIndex == 0 || + ctx->authDataCount >= ctx->authDataLength) { + /* + * We're done with this block, so we + * xor staging_block with block, and then + * encrypt it. + */ + xor_and_encrypt(ctx, ctx->staging_block, ctx->block); + bzero(ctx->staging_block, sizeof(ctx->staging_block)); + ctx->blockIndex = 0; + } + } + return (0); + } + /* + * If we're here, then we're encoding payload data. + * This is marginally easier, except that _Update can + * be called with non-aligned update lengths. As a result, + * we still need to use the staging block. + */ + KASSERT((length + ctx->cryptDataCount) <= ctx->cryptDataLength, + ("More encryption data than allowed")); + + while (length) { + uint8_t *ptr; + + copy_amt = MIN(sizeof(ctx->staging_block) - ctx->blockIndex, + length); + ptr = ctx->staging_block + ctx->blockIndex; + bcopy(data, ptr, copy_amt); + data += copy_amt; + ctx->blockIndex += copy_amt; + ctx->cryptDataCount += copy_amt; + length -= copy_amt; + if (ctx->blockIndex == sizeof(ctx->staging_block)) { + /* We've got a full block */ + xor_and_encrypt(ctx, ctx->staging_block, ctx->block); + ctx->blockIndex = 0; + bzero(ctx->staging_block, sizeof(ctx->staging_block)); + } + } + return (0); +} + +void +AES_CBC_MAC_Final(uint8_t *buf, struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx) +{ + uint8_t s0[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN]; + + /* + * We first need to check to see if we've got any data + * left over to encrypt. + */ + if (ctx->blockIndex != 0) { + xor_and_encrypt(ctx, ctx->staging_block, ctx->block); + ctx->cryptDataCount += ctx->blockIndex; + ctx->blockIndex = 0; + explicit_bzero(ctx->staging_block, sizeof(ctx->staging_block)); + } + bzero(s0, sizeof(s0)); + s0[0] = (15 - ctx->nonceLength) - 1; + bcopy(ctx->nonce, s0 + 1, ctx->nonceLength); + rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->keysched, ctx->rounds, s0, s0); + for (size_t indx = 0; indx < AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN; indx++) + buf[indx] = ctx->block[indx] ^ s0[indx]; + explicit_bzero(s0, sizeof(s0)); +} Added: head/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.h ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ head/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.h Fri Feb 15 03:46:39 2019 (r344140) @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014 The FreeBSD Foundation + * Copyright (c) 2018, iXsystems Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * This software was developed by Sean Eric Fagan, with lots of references + * to existing AES-CCM (gmac) code. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * $FreeBSD$ + * + */ + +#ifndef _CBC_CCM_H +# define _CBC_CCM_H + +# include <sys/types.h> +# include <crypto/rijndael/rijndael.h> + +# define CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN 16 /* 128 bits */ +# define CCM_CBC_MAX_DIGEST_LEN 16 +# define CCM_CBC_MIN_DIGEST_LEN 4 + +/* + * This is the authentication context structure; + * the encryption one is similar. + */ +struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx { + uint64_t authDataLength, authDataCount; + uint64_t cryptDataLength, cryptDataCount; + int blockIndex; + uint8_t staging_block[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN]; + uint8_t block[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN]; + const uint8_t *nonce; + int nonceLength; /* This one is in bytes, not bits! */ + /* AES state data */ + int rounds; + uint32_t keysched[4*(RIJNDAEL_MAXNR+1)]; +}; + +void AES_CBC_MAC_Init(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *); +void AES_CBC_MAC_Setkey(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *, const uint8_t *, uint16_t); +void AES_CBC_MAC_Reinit(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *, const uint8_t *, uint16_t); +int AES_CBC_MAC_Update(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *, const uint8_t *, uint16_t); +void AES_CBC_MAC_Final(uint8_t *, struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *); + +#endif /* _CBC_CCM_H */ Modified: head/sys/opencrypto/cryptodev.h ============================================================================== --- head/sys/opencrypto/cryptodev.h Fri Feb 15 00:29:44 2019 (r344139) +++ head/sys/opencrypto/cryptodev.h Fri Feb 15 03:46:39 2019 (r344140) @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ #define SHA1_KPDK_HASH_LEN 20 #define AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN 16 #define POLY1305_HASH_LEN 16 +#define AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN 16 /* Maximum hash algorithm result length */ #define HASH_MAX_LEN SHA2_512_HASH_LEN /* Keep this updated */ @@ -107,6 +108,9 @@ #define AES_128_GMAC_KEY_LEN 16 #define AES_192_GMAC_KEY_LEN 24 #define AES_256_GMAC_KEY_LEN 32 +#define AES_128_CBC_MAC_KEY_LEN 16 +#define AES_192_CBC_MAC_KEY_LEN 24 +#define AES_256_CBC_MAC_KEY_LEN 32 #define POLY1305_KEY_LEN 32 @@ -199,7 +203,8 @@ #define CRYPTO_SHA2_384 36 #define CRYPTO_SHA2_512 37 #define CRYPTO_POLY1305 38 -#define CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX 38 /* Keep updated - see below */ +#define CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC 39 /* auth side */ +#define CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX 39 /* Keep updated - see below */ #define CRYPTO_ALGO_VALID(x) ((x) >= CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN && \ (x) <= CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX) Added: head/sys/opencrypto/xform_cbc_mac.c ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ head/sys/opencrypto/xform_cbc_mac.c Fri Feb 15 03:46:39 2019 (r344140) @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +#include <sys/cdefs.h> +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + +#include <opencrypto/cbc_mac.h> +#include <opencrypto/xform_auth.h> + +/* Authentication instances */ +struct auth_hash auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_128 = { + .type = CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC, + .name = "CBC-CCM-AES-128", + .keysize = AES_128_CBC_MAC_KEY_LEN, + .hashsize = AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN, + .ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx), + .blocksize = CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN, + .Init = (void (*)(void *)) AES_CBC_MAC_Init, + .Setkey = + (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t))AES_CBC_MAC_Setkey, + .Reinit = + (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_CBC_MAC_Reinit, + .Update = + (int (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_CBC_MAC_Update, + .Final = (void (*)(u_int8_t *, void *)) AES_CBC_MAC_Final, +}; +struct auth_hash auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_192 = { + .type = CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC, + .name = "CBC-CCM-AES-192", + .keysize = AES_192_CBC_MAC_KEY_LEN, + .hashsize = AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN, + .ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx), + .blocksize = CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN, + .Init = (void (*)(void *)) AES_CBC_MAC_Init, + .Setkey = + (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_CBC_MAC_Setkey, + .Reinit = + (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_CBC_MAC_Reinit, + .Update = + (int (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_CBC_MAC_Update, + .Final = (void (*)(u_int8_t *, void *)) AES_CBC_MAC_Final, +}; +struct auth_hash auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_256 = { + .type = CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC, + .name = "CBC-CCM-AES-256", + .keysize = AES_256_CBC_MAC_KEY_LEN, + .hashsize = AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN, + .ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx), + .blocksize = CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN, + .Init = (void (*)(void *)) AES_CBC_MAC_Init, + .Setkey = + (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_CBC_MAC_Setkey, + .Reinit = + (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_CBC_MAC_Reinit, + .Update = + (int (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_CBC_MAC_Update, + .Final = (void (*)(u_int8_t *, void *)) AES_CBC_MAC_Final, +};
Want to link to this message? Use this URL: <https://mail-archive.FreeBSD.org/cgi/mid.cgi?201902150346.x1F3kdkE013327>