Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2025 17:21:09 GMT From: Ed Maste <emaste@FreeBSD.org> To: src-committers@FreeBSD.org, dev-commits-src-all@FreeBSD.org, dev-commits-src-main@FreeBSD.org Subject: git: 0fdf8fae8b56 - main - openssh: Update to 9.8p1 Message-ID: <202502191721.51JHL9CT090248@gitrepo.freebsd.org>
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The branch main has been updated by emaste: URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=0fdf8fae8b569bf9fff3b5171e669dcd7cf9c79e commit 0fdf8fae8b569bf9fff3b5171e669dcd7cf9c79e Merge: fdccf0336197 d565364dadeb Author: Ed Maste <emaste@FreeBSD.org> AuthorDate: 2025-02-19 17:20:44 +0000 Commit: Ed Maste <emaste@FreeBSD.org> CommitDate: 2025-02-19 17:20:44 +0000 openssh: Update to 9.8p1 Highlights from the release notes are reproduced below. Some security and bug fixes were previously merged into FreeBSD and have been elided. See the upstream release notes for full details (https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html). --- Future deprecation notice ========================= OpenSSH plans to remove support for the DSA signature algorithm in early 2025. Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * sshd(8): the server will now block client addresses that repeatedly fail authentication, repeatedly connect without ever completing authentication or that crash the server. See the discussion of PerSourcePenalties below for more information. Operators of servers that accept connections from many users, or servers that accept connections from addresses behind NAT or proxies may need to consider these settings. * sshd(8): the server has been split into a listener binary, sshd(8), and a per-session binary "sshd-session". This allows for a much smaller listener binary, as it no longer needs to support the SSH protocol. As part of this work, support for disabling privilege separation (which previously required code changes to disable) and disabling re-execution of sshd(8) has been removed. Further separation of sshd-session into additional, minimal binaries is planned for the future. * sshd(8): several log messages have changed. In particular, some log messages will be tagged with as originating from a process named "sshd-session" rather than "sshd". * ssh-keyscan(1): this tool previously emitted comment lines containing the hostname and SSH protocol banner to standard error. This release now emits them to standard output, but adds a new "-q" flag to silence them altogether. * sshd(8): (portable OpenSSH only) sshd will no longer use argv[0] as the PAM service name. A new "PAMServiceName" sshd_config(5) directive allows selecting the service name at runtime. This defaults to "sshd". bz2101 New features ------------ * sshd(8): sshd(8) will now penalise client addresses that, for various reasons, do not successfully complete authentication. This feature is controlled by a new sshd_config(5) PerSourcePenalties option and is on by default. * ssh(8): allow the HostkeyAlgorithms directive to disable the implicit fallback from certificate host key to plain host keys. Portability ----------- * sshd(8): expose SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 always to PAM auth modules unconditionally. The previous behaviour was to expose it only when particular authentication methods were in use. * ssh(1), ssh-agent(8): allow the presence of the WAYLAND_DISPLAY environment variable to enable SSH_ASKPASS, similarly to the X11 DISPLAY environment variable. GHPR479 --- Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D48914 crypto/openssh/.depend | 19 +- crypto/openssh/.git_allowed_signers | 2 + crypto/openssh/.git_allowed_signers.asc | 26 +- crypto/openssh/.github/ci-status.md | 10 +- crypto/openssh/.github/configs | 3 +- crypto/openssh/.github/run_test.sh | 1 + crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/c-cpp.yml | 16 +- crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/cifuzz.yml | 4 +- crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/selfhosted.yml | 55 +- crypto/openssh/.github/workflows/upstream.yml | 18 +- crypto/openssh/.gitignore | 5 +- crypto/openssh/.skipped-commit-ids | 8 + crypto/openssh/ChangeLog | 11260 ++++++++++--------- crypto/openssh/Makefile.in | 25 +- crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.agent | 5 +- crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.key | 4 +- crypto/openssh/README | 2 +- crypto/openssh/addr.c | 12 +- crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c | 54 +- crypto/openssh/auth-pam.h | 2 +- crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c | 3 +- crypto/openssh/auth.c | 108 +- crypto/openssh/auth.h | 15 +- crypto/openssh/auth2-gss.c | 41 +- crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c | 15 +- crypto/openssh/auth2-kbdint.c | 7 +- crypto/openssh/auth2-methods.c | 134 + crypto/openssh/auth2-none.c | 12 +- crypto/openssh/auth2-passwd.c | 9 +- crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c | 15 +- crypto/openssh/auth2.c | 91 +- crypto/openssh/channels.c | 22 +- crypto/openssh/channels.h | 4 +- crypto/openssh/cipher.c | 4 +- crypto/openssh/clientloop.c | 73 +- crypto/openssh/clientloop.h | 3 +- crypto/openssh/config.h | 21 +- crypto/openssh/configure.ac | 40 +- crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec | 3 +- crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec | 3 +- crypto/openssh/ed25519.sh | 4 +- crypto/openssh/kex-names.c | 330 + crypto/openssh/kex.c | 270 +- crypto/openssh/kex.h | 9 +- crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c | 4 +- crypto/openssh/log.c | 17 +- crypto/openssh/log.h | 9 +- crypto/openssh/m4/openssh.m4 | 3 + crypto/openssh/misc.c | 100 +- crypto/openssh/misc.h | 11 +- crypto/openssh/moduli | 922 +- crypto/openssh/monitor.c | 57 +- crypto/openssh/monitor.h | 6 +- crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c | 234 +- crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h | 17 +- crypto/openssh/msg.c | 5 +- crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c | 24 +- crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c | 98 +- crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h | 5 + crypto/openssh/packet.c | 92 + crypto/openssh/packet.h | 5 +- crypto/openssh/pathnames.h | 7 +- crypto/openssh/platform-listen.c | 84 + crypto/openssh/platform.c | 49 +- crypto/openssh/platform.h | 1 + crypto/openssh/readconf.c | 4 +- crypto/openssh/readpass.c | 9 +- crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile | 6 +- crypto/openssh/regress/cfgmatchlisten.sh | 2 +- crypto/openssh/regress/dropbear-ciphers.sh | 15 +- crypto/openssh/regress/dropbear-kex.sh | 14 +- crypto/openssh/regress/key-options.sh | 2 +- .../regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz_helper.c | 1 - .../openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/kex_fuzz.cc | 8 +- .../openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc | 8 +- crypto/openssh/regress/penalty-expire.sh | 35 + crypto/openssh/regress/penalty.sh | 52 + crypto/openssh/regress/percent.sh | 5 - crypto/openssh/regress/rekey.sh | 4 +- crypto/openssh/regress/sftp-cmds.sh | 29 +- crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh | 96 +- crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/kex/Makefile | 3 +- crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c | 6 +- crypto/openssh/regress/yes-head.sh | 2 +- crypto/openssh/scp.c | 4 +- crypto/openssh/servconf.c | 283 +- crypto/openssh/servconf.h | 34 +- crypto/openssh/serverloop.c | 50 +- crypto/openssh/session.c | 51 +- crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c | 4 +- crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c | 10 +- crypto/openssh/sftp.c | 8 +- crypto/openssh/srclimit.c | 396 +- crypto/openssh/srclimit.h | 22 +- crypto/openssh/ssh-add.1 | 12 +- crypto/openssh/ssh-gss.h | 3 +- crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.1 | 20 +- crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.1 | 21 +- crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c | 76 +- crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.8 | 6 +- crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c | 4 +- crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c | 27 +- crypto/openssh/ssh-sk-helper.0 | 34 + crypto/openssh/ssh.1 | 25 +- crypto/openssh/ssh_api.c | 17 +- crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 | 20 +- crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h | 27 +- crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c | 34 +- crypto/openssh/sshconnect.h | 6 +- crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c | 4 +- crypto/openssh/sshd-session.c | 1505 +++ crypto/openssh/sshd.8 | 9 +- crypto/openssh/sshd.c | 1711 +-- crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 | 110 +- crypto/openssh/sshkey.h | 3 +- crypto/openssh/version.h | 4 +- secure/lib/libssh/Makefile | 2 +- secure/libexec/Makefile | 2 +- secure/libexec/sshd-session/Makefile | 66 + secure/usr.sbin/sshd/Makefile | 48 +- 120 files changed, 10945 insertions(+), 8531 deletions(-) diff --cc crypto/openssh/.gitignore index 7fccc6fe3dc3,000000000000..41d505c46dde mode 100644,000000..100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/.gitignore +++ b/crypto/openssh/.gitignore @@@ -1,38 -1,0 +1,35 @@@ +Makefile +buildpkg.sh +config.h - config.h.in +config.h.in~ +config.log +config.status - configure - aclocal.m4 +openbsd-compat/Makefile +openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile +openssh.xml +opensshd.init +survey.sh - **/*.0 +**/*.o +**/*.lo +**/*.so +**/*.out +**/*.a +**/*.un~ +**/.*.swp +autom4te.cache/ +scp +sftp +sftp-server +ssh +ssh-add +ssh-agent +ssh-keygen +ssh-keyscan +ssh-keysign +ssh-pkcs11-helper +ssh-sk-helper +sshd +!regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile +!regress/unittests/sshsig/Makefile +tags ++ diff --cc crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c index cf7a661a7daa,13c0a792e99e..f95f6abbcbe0 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c @@@ -105,7 -100,7 +100,8 @@@ #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" + #include "srclimit.h" +#include "blacklist_client.h" extern ServerOptions options; extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; diff --cc crypto/openssh/auth.c index f390df839d62,000000000000..059104f26688 mode 100644,000000..100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/auth.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/auth.c @@@ -1,879 -1,0 +1,785 @@@ - /* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.160 2023/03/05 05:34:09 dtucker Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.161 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/wait.h> + +#include <netinet/in.h> + +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include <paths.h> +#endif +#include <pwd.h> +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H +#include <login.h> +#endif +#ifdef USE_SHADOW +#include <shadow.h> +#endif +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <netdb.h> +#include <time.h> + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "groupaccess.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "auth-options.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "loginrec.h" +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif +#include "authfile.h" +#include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "blacklist_client.h" + +/* import */ +extern ServerOptions options; +extern struct include_list includes; - extern int use_privsep; +extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; +extern struct passwd *privsep_pw; +extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; + +/* Debugging messages */ +static struct sshbuf *auth_debug; + +/* + * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed + * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false + * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed + * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't + * listed there, false will be returned. + * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned. + * Otherwise true is returned. + */ +int +allowed_user(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd * pw) +{ + struct stat st; + const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL; + u_int i; + int r; + + /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */ + if (!pw || !pw->pw_name) + return 0; + + if (!options.use_pam && platform_locked_account(pw)) { + logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked", + pw->pw_name); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we + * are chrooting. + */ + if (options.chroot_directory == NULL || + strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) { + char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? + _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */ + + if (stat(shell, &st) == -1) { + logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s " + "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell); + free(shell); + return 0; + } + if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 || + (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) { + logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s " + "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell); + free(shell); + return 0; + } + free(shell); + } + + if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 || + options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { + hostname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns); + ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); + } + + /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */ + if (options.num_deny_users > 0) { + for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) { + r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, + options.deny_users[i]); + if (r < 0) { + fatal("Invalid DenyUsers pattern \"%.100s\"", + options.deny_users[i]); + } else if (r != 0) { + logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " + "because listed in DenyUsers", + pw->pw_name, hostname); + return 0; + } + } + } + /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */ + if (options.num_allow_users > 0) { + for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) { + r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, + options.allow_users[i]); + if (r < 0) { + fatal("Invalid AllowUsers pattern \"%.100s\"", + options.allow_users[i]); + } else if (r == 1) + break; + } + /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */ + if (i >= options.num_allow_users) { + logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " + "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname); + return 0; + } + } + if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { + /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */ + if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) { + logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " + "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname); + return 0; + } + + /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */ + if (options.num_deny_groups > 0) + if (ga_match(options.deny_groups, + options.num_deny_groups)) { + ga_free(); + logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " + "because a group is listed in DenyGroups", + pw->pw_name, hostname); + return 0; + } + /* + * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups + * isn't listed there + */ + if (options.num_allow_groups > 0) + if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups, + options.num_allow_groups)) { + ga_free(); + logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " + "because none of user's groups are listed " + "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname); + return 0; + } + ga_free(); + } + +#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER + if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, loginmsg)) + return 0; +#endif + + /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */ + return 1; +} + +/* + * Formats any key left in authctxt->auth_method_key for inclusion in + * auth_log()'s message. Also includes authxtct->auth_method_info if present. + */ +static char * +format_method_key(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + const struct sshkey *key = authctxt->auth_method_key; + const char *methinfo = authctxt->auth_method_info; + char *fp, *cafp, *ret = NULL; + + if (key == NULL) + return NULL; + + if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", + sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, + key->cert->key_id, + (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, + sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), + cafp == NULL ? "(null)" : cafp, + methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ", + methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo); + free(fp); + free(cafp); + } else { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s", sshkey_type(key), + fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, + methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ", + methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo); + free(fp); + } + return ret; +} + +void +auth_log(struct ssh *ssh, int authenticated, int partial, + const char *method, const char *submethod) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; + int level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; + const char *authmsg; + char *extra = NULL; + - if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed) ++ if (!mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed) + return; + + /* Raise logging level */ + if (authenticated == 1 || + !authctxt->valid || + authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 || + strcmp(method, "password") == 0) + level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; + + if (authctxt->postponed) + authmsg = "Postponed"; + else if (partial) + authmsg = "Partial"; + else { + authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed"; + if (authenticated) + BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_AUTH_OK, "ssh"); + } + + if ((extra = format_method_key(authctxt)) == NULL) { + if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL) + extra = xstrdup(authctxt->auth_method_info); + } + + do_log2(level, "%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2%s%s", + authmsg, + method, + submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod, + authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", + authctxt->user, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + ssh_remote_port(ssh), + extra != NULL ? ": " : "", + extra != NULL ? extra : ""); + + free(extra); + +#if defined(CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN) || defined(SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS) + if (authenticated == 0 && !(authctxt->postponed || partial)) { + /* Log failed login attempt */ +# ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN + if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 || + strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 || + strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0) + record_failed_login(ssh, authctxt->user, + auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh"); +# endif +# ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_event(ssh, audit_classify_auth(method)); +# endif + } +#endif +#if defined(CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN) && defined(WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE) + if (authenticated) + sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user, + auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh", + loginmsg); +#endif +} + +void +auth_maxtries_exceeded(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; + + error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for " + "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2", + authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", + authctxt->user, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + ssh_remote_port(ssh)); + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Too many authentication failures"); + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +/* + * Check whether root logins are disallowed. + */ +int +auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method) +{ + switch (options.permit_root_login) { + case PERMIT_YES: + return 1; + case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: + if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 || + strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 || + strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0) + return 1; + break; + case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: + if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) { + logit("Root login accepted for forced command."); + return 1; + } + break; + } + logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s port %d", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); + return 0; +} + + +/* + * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename + * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%', + * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username. + * + * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc. + */ +char * +expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw) +{ + char *file, uidstr[32], ret[PATH_MAX]; + int i; + + snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", + (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); + file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir, + "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL); + + /* + * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward + * compatible and prepend the '%h/' + */ + if (path_absolute(file)) + return (file); + + i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file); + if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret)) + fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long"); + free(file); + return (xstrdup(ret)); +} + +char * +authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw) +{ + if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL) + return NULL; + return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw); +} + +/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */ +HostStatus +check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, const char *host, + const char *sysfile, const char *userfile) +{ + char *user_hostfile; + struct stat st; + HostStatus host_status; + struct hostkeys *hostkeys; + const struct hostkey_entry *found; + + hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); + load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile, 0); + if (userfile != NULL) { + user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid); + if (options.strict_modes && + (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) && + ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || + (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { + logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: " + "bad owner or modes for %.200s", + pw->pw_name, user_hostfile); + auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes", + user_hostfile); + } else { + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile, 0); + restore_uid(); + } + free(user_hostfile); + } + host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found); + if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED) + error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication", + host); + else if (host_status == HOST_OK) + debug_f("key for %s found at %s:%ld", + found->host, found->file, found->line); + else + debug_f("key for host %s not found", host); + + free_hostkeys(hostkeys); + + return host_status; +} + +struct passwd * +getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *user) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + extern login_cap_t *lc; +#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK + const char *from_host, *from_ip; +#endif +#ifdef BSD_AUTH + auth_session_t *as; +#endif +#endif + struct passwd *pw; + struct connection_info *ci; + u_int i; + - ci = get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns); ++ ci = server_get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns); + ci->user = user; + parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, ci); + log_change_level(options.log_level); + log_verbose_reset(); + for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++) + log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]); - process_permitopen(ssh, &options); ++ server_process_permitopen(ssh); + +#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB) + aix_setauthdb(user); +#endif + + pw = getpwnam(user); + +#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB) + aix_restoreauthdb(); +#endif + if (pw == NULL) { + BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_BAD_USER, user); + logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s port %d", + user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); +#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN + record_failed_login(ssh, user, + auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh"); +#endif +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER); +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ + return (NULL); + } + if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw)) + return (NULL); +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if ((lc = login_getpwclass(pw)) == NULL) { + debug("unable to get login class: %s", user); + return (NULL); + } +#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK + from_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns); + from_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); + if (!auth_hostok(lc, from_host, from_ip)) { + debug("Denied connection for %.200s from %.200s [%.200s].", + pw->pw_name, from_host, from_ip); + return (NULL); + } +#endif /* HAVE_AUTH_HOSTOK */ +#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_TIMEOK + if (!auth_timeok(lc, time(NULL))) { + debug("LOGIN %.200s REFUSED (TIME)", pw->pw_name); + return (NULL); + } +#endif /* HAVE_AUTH_TIMEOK */ +#ifdef BSD_AUTH + if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 || + auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) { + debug("Approval failure for %s", user); + pw = NULL; + } + if (as != NULL) + auth_close(as); +#endif +#endif + if (pw != NULL) + return (pwcopy(pw)); + return (NULL); +} + +/* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */ +int +auth_key_is_revoked(struct sshkey *key) +{ + char *fp = NULL; + int r; + + if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL) + return 0; + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + error_fr(r, "fingerprint key"); + goto out; + } + + r = sshkey_check_revoked(key, options.revoked_keys_file); + switch (r) { + case 0: + break; /* not revoked */ + case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED: + error("Authentication key %s %s revoked by file %s", + sshkey_type(key), fp, options.revoked_keys_file); + goto out; + default: + error_r(r, "Error checking authentication key %s %s in " + "revoked keys file %s", sshkey_type(key), fp, + options.revoked_keys_file); + goto out; + } + + /* Success */ + r = 0; + + out: + free(fp); + return r == 0 ? 0 : 1; +} + +void +auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) +{ + char buf[1024]; + va_list args; + int r; + + va_start(args, fmt); + vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); + va_end(args); + debug3("%s", buf); + if (auth_debug != NULL) + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(auth_debug, buf)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_cstring"); +} + +void +auth_debug_send(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + char *msg; + int r; + + if (auth_debug == NULL) + return; + while (sshbuf_len(auth_debug) != 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(auth_debug, &msg, NULL)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_get_cstring"); + ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "%s", msg); + free(msg); + } +} + +void +auth_debug_reset(void) +{ + if (auth_debug != NULL) + sshbuf_reset(auth_debug); + else if ((auth_debug = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); +} + +struct passwd * +fakepw(void) +{ + static int done = 0; + static struct passwd fake; + const char hashchars[] = "./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ" + "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"; /* from bcrypt.c */ + char *cp; + + if (done) + return (&fake); + + memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake)); + fake.pw_name = "NOUSER"; + fake.pw_passwd = xstrdup("$2a$10$" + "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"); + for (cp = fake.pw_passwd + 7; *cp != '\0'; cp++) + *cp = hashchars[arc4random_uniform(sizeof(hashchars) - 1)]; +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS + fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER"; +#endif + fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid; + fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid; +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS + fake.pw_class = ""; +#endif + fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist"; + fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist"; + done = 1; + + return (&fake); +} + - /* - * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not - * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is - * called. - * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some - * attacks on based on conflation of hostnames and IP addresses. - */ - - static char * - remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) - { - struct sockaddr_storage from; - socklen_t fromlen; - struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; - char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; - const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); - - /* Get IP address of client. */ - fromlen = sizeof(from); - memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); - if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), - (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { - debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - return xstrdup(ntop); - } - - ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); - if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) - fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); - - debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); - /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ - if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), - NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { - /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ - return xstrdup(ntop); - } - - /* - * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, - * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: - * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 - */ - memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); - hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ - hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; - if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { - logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", *** 18231 LINES SKIPPED ***
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