Date: Tue, 08 Aug 2000 23:56:12 +0100 From: Brian Somers <brian@Awfulhak.org> To: Kris Kennaway <kris@FreeBSD.org> Cc: Brian Somers <brian@FreeBSD.org>, cvs-committers@FreeBSD.org, cvs-all@FreeBSD.org, brian@Awfulhak.org Subject: Re: cvs commit: src/etc rc Message-ID: <200008082256.XAA03062@hak.lan.Awfulhak.org> In-Reply-To: Message from Kris Kennaway <kris@FreeBSD.org> of "Tue, 08 Aug 2000 15:24:52 PDT." <Pine.BSF.4.21.0008081521460.95705-100000@freefall.freebsd.org>
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> On Tue, 8 Aug 2000, Brian Somers wrote:
>
> > brian 2000/08/08 06:30:28 PDT
> >
> > Modified files:
> > etc rc
> > Log:
> > Don't use find(1) before nfs filesystems have been mounted as
> > it lives in /usr/bin. Instead, locate files manually.
> >
> > Note, only *files* under /var/spool/lock are now deleted rather
> > than everything that's not a directory. I think this is more
> > correct, but if anyone disagrees please feel free to change it.
>
> This is vulnerable to filenames with spaces in them and the like. Granted,
> the directory is not world-writable, but we've had several "group dialer"
> or "user uucp" exploits in ports.
>
> morden# ls -ld /var/spool/lock
> drwxrwxr-x 2 uucp dialer 512 Aug 8 14:26 /var/spool/lock
How is it vulnerable to files with spaces ? I have specifically
tested this with filenames containing embedded spaces and ^Hs and the
like.
The only vulnerability I'm aware of is the time difference between
identifying it as a file and removing it, and that's not an issue as
there are not yet any users.
> Kris
>
> --
> In God we Trust -- all others must submit an X.509 certificate.
> -- Charles Forsythe <forsythe@alum.mit.edu>
--
Brian <brian@Awfulhak.org> <brian@[uk.]FreeBSD.org>
<http://www.Awfulhak.org>; <brian@[uk.]OpenBSD.org>
Don't _EVER_ lose your sense of humour !
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