Date: Sat, 12 Apr 2008 17:38:08 -0400 From: David Schultz <das@FreeBSD.ORG> To: Coleman Kane <cokane@FreeBSD.ORG> Cc: mezz7@cox.net, Joe Marcus Clarke <marcus@FreeBSD.ORG>, imp@FreeBSD.ORG, current@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: mlock(2), unprivileged users, and RLIMIT_MEMLOCK Message-ID: <20080412213808.GA38426@zim.MIT.EDU> In-Reply-To: <1208032865.1424.9.camel@localhost> References: <1208027381.1327.31.camel@localhost> <1208028217.82222.32.camel@shumai.marcuscom.com> <20080412195505.GA36208@zim.MIT.EDU> <1208032865.1424.9.camel@localhost>
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On Sat, Apr 12, 2008, Coleman Kane wrote:
> On Sat, 2008-04-12 at 15:55 -0400, David Schultz wrote:
> > On Sat, Apr 12, 2008, Joe Marcus Clarke wrote:
> > > On Sat, 2008-04-12 at 15:09 -0400, Coleman Kane wrote:
> > > > Hello,
> > > >
> > > > Recently we've been having a discussion on the GNOME list about fixing
> > > > the seahorse breakage introduced with the latest GNOME 2.22, rooted in
> > > > the fact that FreeBSD's mlock(2) implementation is only usable if you
> > > > have superuser privileges. Due to bugs in seahorse, the lack of mlock(2)
> > > > causes many seahorse applications to die. I've posted a suggested patch
> > > > to
> > [...]
> > > > As a third idea, we could leave the per-process limit (to abide by
> > > > historical documentation), but also add a sysctl that enforces a
> > > > system-wide "max mlock pages" which can be tested by the mlock(2)
> > > > syscall, refusing to mlock(2) more memory if the limit is hit.
> > >
> > > I think this already exists in -CURRENT: vm.max_wired ("System-wide
> > > limit to wired page count"). This is tested by mlock(2) in addition to
> > > RLIMIT_MEMLOCK.
> >
> > First of all, many other operating systems such as Solaris also
> > restrict mlock(2) to the superuser, so this is a bug in seahorse.
> >
> > That said, it seems like allowing ordinary users to mlock(2) small
> > amounts of memory (e.g., vm_page_max_wired / 4 across all
> > non-superuser processes by default) would fix your problem and be
> > easy to implement. Of course, per-user or per-process limits
> > would be more flexible, but how many people really have lots of
> > users who are trying to abuse the system?
> >
>
> I did some math and came up with the following per-user limit on my
> system. Using the default install, my maxproc is set to 5547:
> max_secure_mem = max_proc * memorylocked = 5547 * 16384 = 90882048 =
> about 87MB
>
> So, under my operating conditions (2GB System RAM), a user's maximum DoS
> attempt would be capped at 87MB... which doesn't seem as serious
> anymore. This is using the 16K memorylocked value that gnome-keyring &
> friends seem to work fine with.
Yes, but why bother? A system-wide limit would still be far easier
to implement than keeping track of a per-process limit, and it
allows processes to lock more memory on single-user systems, while
keeping the overall limit low (since most processes don't lock
anything).
There are additional difficulties with per-process limits such as
deciding who to charge when multiple processes lock a shared
memory segment. If you charge one or the other, e.g., processes A
and B share a locked segment and you charge A, then B could exceed
its limit by locking another segment, then having A munlock(). If
you charge both processes, then mmap() on a segment that another
process has locked might fail.
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