Date: Mon, 13 Nov 1995 11:29:34 -0800 From: David Greenman <davidg@Root.COM> To: Peter Wemm <peter@jhome.dialix.com> Cc: ache@astral.msk.su, committers@freebsd.org, security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: cvs commit: CVSROOT log_accum.pl Message-ID: <199511131929.LAA04201@corbin.Root.COM> In-Reply-To: Your message of "Tue, 14 Nov 95 02:26:45 %2B0800." <Pine.BSF.3.91.951114020403.353D-100000@jhome.DIALix.COM>
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>I wonder if this is really appropriate though. We are supposed to be >able to trust root or setuid programs (they can call reboot() after >all). I'm not convinced that making setlogin() fail for root is an >inherently safe operation... Agreed? setlogin() should not fail for root session leaders. >I suspect the ideal fix would be to change the semantics to use something >like the credentials system where it's reference counted and copy-on-write >when a process changes it. I suspect it would be better for new processes Gack. No, let's keep the current mechanism. >BTW: I suspect "struct ucred" should be reordered for better internal >alignment.. That's fine by me. -DG
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