Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2002 16:02:11 +0200 (CEST) From: Martin Karlsson <martin.karlsson@visit.se> To: FreeBSD-gnats-submit@FreeBSD.org Subject: docs/36614: [PATCH] typos in the handbook Message-ID: <200204011402.g31E2B001316@foo31-146.visit.se>
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>Number: 36614
>Category: docs
>Synopsis: [PATCH] typos in the handbook
>Confidential: no
>Severity: non-critical
>Priority: low
>Responsible: freebsd-doc
>State: open
>Quarter:
>Keywords:
>Date-Required:
>Class: doc-bug
>Submitter-Id: current-users
>Arrival-Date: Mon Apr 01 06:10:04 PST 2002
>Closed-Date:
>Last-Modified:
>Originator: Martin Karlsson
>Release: FreeBSD 4.5-RELEASE-p2 i386
>Organization:
>Environment:
System: FreeBSD foo31-146.visit.se 4.5-RELEASE-p2 FreeBSD 4.5-RELEASE-p2 #0: Wed Mar 27 07:31:58 CET 2002 root@foo31-146.visit.se:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/BERTIL i386
>Description:
This patch fixes some typos in the handbook. Hopefully.
Cheers,
--
Martin
>How-To-Repeat:
Read the handbook.
>Fix:
Apply the following patch.
--- diff.handbook begins here ---
diff -ru handbook.orig/backups/chapter.sgml handbook/backups/chapter.sgml
--- handbook.orig/backups/chapter.sgml Mon Apr 1 15:02:09 2002
+++ handbook/backups/chapter.sgml Mon Apr 1 15:31:13 2002
@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@
printouts and the backup tapes. You will be so distraught when
restoring that the notes may prevent you from destroying your backup
tapes (How? In place of <command>tar xvf /dev/rsa0</command>, you
- might accidently type <command>tar cvf /dev/rsa0</command> and
+ might accidentally type <command>tar cvf /dev/rsa0</command> and
over-write your backup tape).</para>
<para>For an added measure of security, make bootable floppies and two
diff -ru handbook.orig/config/chapter.sgml handbook/config/chapter.sgml
--- handbook.orig/config/chapter.sgml Mon Apr 1 15:02:10 2002
+++ handbook/config/chapter.sgml Mon Apr 1 15:43:21 2002
@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@
during heavy operations, so these operations are quicker
than synchronous updates.
Additionally the complexity of the implementation is fairly
- limited, so the risk of bugs being present is low. A disadvatage
+ limited, so the risk of bugs being present is low. A disadvantage
is that all meta-data are written twice (once into the
logging region and once to the proper location) so for
normal work, a performance <quote>pessimization</quote>
@@ -1085,7 +1085,7 @@
this number, the kernel is given most of its pre-defined limits.
Even though a production machine may not actually have 256 users
connected as once, the resources needed may be similar to a
- high-scale webserver.</para>
+ high-scale web server.</para>
<note><para>As of FreeBSD 4.5, setting <option>MAXUSERS</option> to
<literal>0</literal> in your kernel configuration file will choose
@@ -1107,7 +1107,7 @@
needed. If you have a web server which maxes out at 1000
simultaneous connections, and each connection eats a 16K receive
and 16K send buffer, you need approximately 32MB worth of
- network buffers to cover the webserver. A good rule of thumb is
+ network buffers to cover the web server. A good rule of thumb is
to multiply by 2, so 32MBx2 = 64MB/2K = 32768.</para>
</sect2>
</sect1>
diff -ru handbook.orig/cutting-edge/chapter.sgml handbook/cutting-edge/chapter.sgml
--- handbook.orig/cutting-edge/chapter.sgml Mon Apr 1 15:02:10 2002
+++ handbook/cutting-edge/chapter.sgml Mon Apr 1 15:31:32 2002
@@ -1389,7 +1389,7 @@
Congratulations.</para>
<para>If things went slightly wrong, it is easy to rebuild a particular
- piece of the system. For example, if you accidently deleted
+ piece of the system. For example, if you accidentally deleted
<filename>/etc/magic</filename> as part of the upgrade or merge of
<filename>/etc</filename>, the &man.file.1; command will stop working.
In this case, the fix would be to run:</para>
diff -ru handbook.orig/disks/chapter.sgml handbook/disks/chapter.sgml
--- handbook.orig/disks/chapter.sgml Mon Apr 1 15:02:10 2002
+++ handbook/disks/chapter.sgml Mon Apr 1 15:31:47 2002
@@ -1753,7 +1753,7 @@
printouts and the backup tapes. You will be so distraught when
restoring that the notes may prevent you from destroying your backup
tapes (How? In place of <command>tar xvf /dev/rsa0</command>, you
- might accidently type <command>tar cvf /dev/rsa0</command> and
+ might accidentally type <command>tar cvf /dev/rsa0</command> and
over-write your backup tape).</para>
<para>For an added measure of security, make bootable floppies and two
diff -ru handbook.orig/install/chapter.sgml handbook/install/chapter.sgml
--- handbook.orig/install/chapter.sgml Mon Apr 1 15:02:11 2002
+++ handbook/install/chapter.sgml Mon Apr 1 15:05:57 2002
@@ -2805,7 +2805,7 @@
<para>For detailed information on Local Area Networks and
configuring FreeBSD as a gateway/router refer to the tutorial
<ulink url="../ppp-primer/index.html">
- PPP- Pendantic PPP Primer</ulink>.</para>
+ PPP- Pedantic PPP Primer</ulink>.</para>
<screen> User Confirmation Requested
Would you like to configure Ethernet or SLIP/PPP network devices?
diff -ru handbook.orig/ports/chapter.sgml handbook/ports/chapter.sgml
--- handbook.orig/ports/chapter.sgml Mon Apr 1 15:02:15 2002
+++ handbook/ports/chapter.sgml Mon Apr 1 15:06:41 2002
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@
<step>
<para>Change <literal>CHANGE_THIS.FreeBSD.org</literal> to a
<application>CVSup</application> near you. See <link
- linkend="cvsup-mirrors">CVSupp Mirrors</link> (<xref
+ linkend="cvsup-mirrors">CVSup Mirrors</link> (<xref
linkend="cvsup-mirrors">) for a complete listing of mirror
sites.</para>
</step>
diff -ru handbook.orig/security/chapter.sgml handbook/security/chapter.sgml
--- handbook.orig/security/chapter.sgml Mon Apr 1 15:02:10 2002
+++ handbook/security/chapter.sgml Mon Apr 1 15:24:26 2002
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<!--
+!--
The FreeBSD Documentation Project
$FreeBSD: doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/security/chapter.sgml,v 1.105 2002/03/27 01:16:55 keramida Exp $
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@
machine. What it does mean is that you should not make it
possible to use the password outside of the console or possibly
even with the &man.su.1; command. For example, make sure that
- your pty's are specified as being unsecure in the
+ your pty's are specified as being insecure in the
<filename>/etc/ttys</filename> file so that direct
<username>root</username> logins
via <command>telnet</command> or <command>rlogin</command> are
@@ -354,9 +354,9 @@
<para>An indirect way to secure staff accounts, and ultimately
<username>root</username> access is to use an alternative
login access method and
- do what is known as <quote>starring</quote> out the crypted
+ do what is known as <quote>starring</quote> out the encrypted
password for the staff accounts. Using the &man.vipw.8;
- command, one can replace each instance of a crypted password
+ command, one can replace each instance of a encrypted password
with a single <quote><literal>*</literal></quote> character.
This command will update the <filename>/etc/master.passwd</filename>
file and user/password database to disable password-authenticated
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@
<application>xterm</application> binary. Sgid binaries can be
almost as dangerous. If an intruder can break an sgid-kmem binary,
the intruder might be able to read <filename>/dev/kmem</filename>
- and thus read the crypted password file, potentially compromising
+ and thus read the encrypted password file, potentially compromising
any passworded account. Alternatively an intruder who breaks
group <literal>kmem</literal> can monitor keystrokes sent through
pty's, including pty's used by users who login through secure
@@ -553,7 +553,7 @@
<para>The only sure fire way is to <literal>*</literal> out as many
passwords as you can and use ssh or
- Kerberos for access to those accounts. Even though the crypted
+ Kerberos for access to those accounts. Even though the encrypted
password file (<filename>/etc/spwd.db</filename>) can only be read
by <username>root</username>, it may be possible for an intruder
to obtain read access to that file even if the attacker cannot
@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@
scripts use. The <application>ssh</application> client on the
client box may already be compromised. All in all, using
ssh may be necessary when running over
- unsecure links, but it is also a lot harder to deal with.</para>
+ insecure links, but it is also a lot harder to deal with.</para>
<para>A good security script will also check for changes to user and
staff members access configuration files:
@@ -919,12 +919,12 @@
respect except that it forwards encryption keys by default. What
this means is that if you have a secure workstation holding keys
that give you access to the rest of the system, and you
- ssh to an unsecure machine, your keys
+ ssh to an insecure machine, your keys
becomes exposed. The actual keys themselves are not exposed, but
ssh installs a forwarding port for the
duration of your login, and if an attacker has broken
<username>root</username> on the
- unsecure machine he can utilize that port to use your keys to gain
+ insecure machine he can utilize that port to use your keys to gain
access to any other machine that your keys unlock.</para>
<para>We recommend that you use ssh in
diff -ru handbook.orig/serialcomms/chapter.sgml handbook/serialcomms/chapter.sgml
--- handbook.orig/serialcomms/chapter.sgml Mon Apr 1 15:02:10 2002
+++ handbook/serialcomms/chapter.sgml Mon Apr 1 15:34:50 2002
@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@
tip57600|Dial any phone number at 57600 bps:\
:dv=/dev/cuaa0:br#57600:at=hayes:pa=none:du:</programlisting>
- <para>Then you can things like:</para>
+ <para>Then you can do things like:</para>
<screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>tip -115200 5551234</userinput></screen>
@@ -1776,7 +1776,7 @@
followed by a newline. <replaceable>single-char</replaceable> is any
single character. If you leave out
<replaceable>single-char</replaceable>, then the force character is
- the nul character, which you can get by typing
+ the null character, which you can get by typing
<keycombo action="simul">
<keycap>Ctrl</keycap><keycap>2</keycap>
</keycombo>
--- diff.handbook ends here ---
>Release-Note:
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